THE URBAN HOUSING MARKET IN A TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY: SHANGHAI AS A CASE STUDY by Tang, Zhigang
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE URBAN HOUSING MARKET IN A TRANSITIONAL 
ECONOMY: SHANGHAI AS A CASE STUDY 
 
 
Zhigang Tang 
 
 
 
Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of Geography 
The Indiana University 
 
 
 
May, 2006 
                    ii 
ACCEPTANCE 
 
 
Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, the Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
 
       Oct. 31, 2005            
Date of Oral Examination 
 
 
 
                                         
                                      Dr. Daniel Knudsen, Chairman 
     
 
 
                                         
                                      Dr. Dennis Conway 
Doctoral  
Committee 
 
                                         
                                      Dr. John Odland 
 
 
 
                                         
                                      Dr. Michael V. Alexeev 
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c 2006 
Zhigang Tang 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
      iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Weisheng Tang and Dezhen Tan, and my 
wife, Yan Zhang. Without their support and understanding, I would not be able to focus 
on my studies and research and finish my dissertation. I would also like to especially 
thank friends Zhigang Li, Jun Luo, Zhaohui Han, and Long Kang who offered intellectual 
support to my research. 
 I also wish to thank my doctoral committee, Dan, Dennis, John, and Michael, who 
suggested numerous worthwhile improvements in this dissertation and guided my 
progress at Indiana University with a watchful eye. Thanks are also due to the people I 
interviewed in Shanghai. Lastly, I wish to acknowledge and thank the geography and 
economics faculty, and my many colleagues and friends in the geography and economics 
departments.  
v 
Abstract 
The urban housing market has been an important research topic for urban 
geographers and urban economists. After 1990 when former communist regimes were 
transformed from planned to market-oriented economies and globalization accelerated, 
the urban housing markets of the transitional nations attracted increasing attention from 
academia. Most of these studies addressed housing market structure, housing price and 
residential location. Similarly, this research examines housing market structure and 
housing price in the newly established housing market in Shanghai.  
This research begins with an exploration of market structure and market players and 
the interactions between them. Market structure sets the framework within which market 
players’ maximize their market related interests. China’s reform and its integration into 
the world economy have brought many players into its urban housing market. These 
players not only have unique interests in the market but also share common interests to 
some extent. Players include international institutions, private companies, and traditional 
forces, such as the government and work units. It is necessary to understand market 
structure and players and how they interact because this knowledge is fundamental for 
any further investigation of the market. Moreover, the analysis of market structure and 
market players adds texture to the following empirical analysis. 
Housing price is another focus of this research. The determinants of housing price 
and the geographical distribution of housing price are the main research topics of housing 
price studies. Previous literature has documented the effects of houses’ structural and 
locational characteristics on housing price. However, they rarely pay attention to the 
influences of ‘macro factors’ (such as FDI, economic transition (ET) and urban 
transformation (UT)) on housing price, although these factors do play crucial roles. Using 
hedonic modeling techniques, this research conducts quantitative analyses of the impacts 
of ‘macro factors’ on housing price. The hedonic models are fitted for both the whole 
housing market and individual submarkets. Since the modeling results may be affected by 
definition of submarkets and there are many methods to delimit the submarkets, this 
research also explores an appropriate method of market segregation for Shanghai’s 
housing market.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Housing is one of the most important inputs of human resource production. A well-
established urban housing market benefits urban residents, various institutions that 
employ urban residents, city economies, and even the national economy. From a global 
viewpoint, housing markets are crucial to the relative success or failure of the competitive 
stance of cities in the emerging global economy (Kauko 2001). Accordingly, housing 
markets have been one of the important research subjects of academia (Adair et al. 1994, 
1996, Alain et al. 1995, Bajic 1985, Ball 1977, Berry et al. 1971, Bourassa et al. 1999, 
Bourne et al. 1978, Bramley 1993, Can 1990, Dale-Johnson 1982, Dowall 1993, 
Edelstein 1974, Goodman and Kaiwai 1986, Harvey 1982, 1985, 1989, Healey and 
Barrett 1990, Kauko 2001, Keivani et al. 2001, Olmo 1995, Ong and Sing 2002, Orford 
2000, Palm 1978, Watkins 2001, Wu 1998, 2001, 2002b). For geographers, the traditional 
topics of urban housing market study are: housing market structure and players, housing 
price, and housing submarkets (Bramley 1993, Can 1990, Giussani and Hadjimatheou 
1992, Healey and Barrett 1990, Keivani et al. 2001, Olmo 1995, Ong and Sing 2002, 
Orford 2000, Palm 1978, Stutz and Kartman 1982, Watkins 2001, Wu 1999, 2001). 
Market structure is the framework within which individual agents make their choices 
(Healey and Barrett 1990). Specifically, the term market structure refers to resources, 
rules and ideas that drive the operation of the market and guide the behaviors of market 
players. On the other hand, the market structure and its power and influence are 
constrained and altered by a large number of competing market players/market agencies 
(Shlomo et al. 1983) that are the active components of the urban housing market (Han 
and Wang 2003, Healey 1992, Healey and Barrett 1990, Teixeira 1995). The primary 
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goal of market players is to maximize their gains from the market. In the urban housing 
market, the market structure and players are interactively related (Han and Wang 2003, 
Healey and Barrett 1990). Structure sets the framework for players while players, in order 
to maximize their gains, attempt to reframe the structure (Healey 1992, Healey and 
Barrett 1990).  
In Western countries, because of an established market structure, the role of each 
player is clear and, most times, exclusive. However, in transitional economies, because 
the housing markets are newly set up, old political and economic structures still have 
influential impacts, which means that the roles of market players in transitional 
economies might be difficult to identify. For this reason, the housing market in 
transitional economies such as Central and Eastern European countries, Russia and China 
has recently become the subject of intense scrutiny by geographers and other social 
scientists (Adair et al. 1999, Han and Wang 2003, 2004, Huang 2003, Keivani et al. 2001, 
Parsa and Keivani 1999, Pichler-Milanovich 2001, Wu 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002a, 
2002b, 2003, Wu and Yeh 1999, Xie et al. 2002, Yeh and Wu 1996, Yeung 1996, Yusuf 
and Wu 2002, Zhang 2001). The primary questions that need to be answered in this 
portion of the research are: What are the important components of a transitional 
economy’s housing market structure? Who are the major players in a transitional 
economy’s urban housing market? What are their roles and relationships? How have the 
roles of the various market players changed? And what are the influences of FDI, 
economic transition and urban transformation on the market structure and players in a 
transitional economy’s housing market? 
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It is widely accepted that housing price levels are determined by housing features 
(Adair et al. 1996, Bowen et al. 2001, Dale-Johnson 1982, Halvorsen 1981, Linneman 
1980, Michaels and Smith 1990, Palmquist 1991, Rosen 1974, Straszheim 1974). 
Traditionally, housing features can be categorized into two groups, namely, locational 
characteristics and structural characteristics (Dale-Johnson 1982, Olmo 1995, Ong and 
Sing 2002, Orford 2000, Palm 1978, Rosen 1974, Straszheim 1974, Watkins 2001). 
There is no doubt that these two groups of factors can explain many of the differences in 
houses’ prices (Dale-Johnson 1982, Olmo 1995, Ong and Sing 2002, Orford 2000, Palm 
1978, Rosen 1974, Straszheim 1974, Watkins 2001). However, housing price is also 
affected by ‘macro’ factors (Adair et al. 1999, Bramley 1993, Parsa and Keivani 1999, 
Huang 2004, Lipscomb 2003, Wong and Zhao 1999, Wu 1999). For example, 
government policies and regulations, particularly those associated with urban/regional 
development planning or zoning, may directly cause variation in housing price, while 
other policies, such as those discouraging intercity immigration, have indirect influences 
on housing price (Bramley 1993, Parsa and Keivani 1999, Huang 2004, Pichler-
Milanovich 2001, Wong and Zhao 1999, Wu 1999). Another ‘macro’ factor, foreign 
direct investment also affects housing price (Adair et al. 1999, Parsa and Keivani 1999, 
Keivani et al. 2001, Wu 2001, 2003). For instance, foreign direct investment (FDI)1 
causes an increase in the demand for housing and thus stimulates housing price (Wu 2001, 
2003). Last but not least, the effect of urban infrastructural transformation (UT) on 
housing price should not be ignored (Chen and Parish 1996, Wu 1998). For example, the 
                                                 
1 FDI is defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting 
interest and control of a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent 
enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor 
(UNCTAD 1997).  
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construction of a new city center will improve the locational advantages of the adjacent 
area consequently causing housing in the area to become more valuable, and potentially 
leading to a price decrease in other areas (Olmo 1995, Kauko 2001). Although it is 
commonly thought that FDI, economic transition and urban transformation are 
homogenous across the urban housing market, variation exists in different areas of a city 
(Wu 1999, 2002a). The effects of FDI, economic transition and urban transformation 
occasionally can be individualized to each property (Bramley 1993). In the geography 
and economics literature, it is a common practice to use a hedonic price model to 
examine the impacts of various housing attributes on housing price. In a hedonic model, 
the coefficients are referred to as ‘implicit prices’ (Rosen 1974) of the attributes while the 
signs of the coefficients indicate the positive or negative impacts of the attributes on 
housing price.  
Since the 1980s, the political and economic structure of China has undergone 
fundamental changes. As a result, a housing market, which originally did not exist, 
emerged and developed. Economic transition, foreign direct investment and urban 
transformation played important roles in this emergence. Without them, current housing 
markets in China might look very different. However, current studies that discuss the 
effects of FDI, economic transition and urban transformation on housing price are limited. 
Therefore, a relatively comprehensive study using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods to investigate the impacts of FDI, economic transition and urban transformation 
on housing price is needed. Taking Shanghai, China as the research site, this research will 
examine the question: What are the impacts of economic transition, foreign direct 
investment and urban transformation (UT) on housing price?  
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Since locations and the physical structure of houses are diversified and the demand 
for houses is heterogeneous across housing consumers, the urban housing market should 
not be considered as a single fully-integrated entity (Adair et al. 1996, Allen et al. 1995, 
Bourassa et al. 1999, Goodman 1981, Hancock 1991, Tu 1997). In fact, using certain 
segregation methods, the market can be stratified into many small-scale markets, i.e. 
submarkets (Adair et al. 1996, Allen et al. 1995, Bourassa et al. 1999, Goodman 1981, 
Hancock 1991, Tu 1997). Because of the existence of housing submarkets, a city-wide 
hedonic model may be misleading and meaningless in some cases. A more appropriate 
way is developing the hedonic models city-wide and for each submarket. The proper 
method to delimit submarkets is very important because different definitions of 
submarkets may result in different signs and significance levels of the coefficients. 
However, while most researchers admit that housing submarkets do exist, there is still no 
consensus on the best method used to define submarkets. Three different methods, 
structural submarket stratification, locational submarket stratification, and joint 
submarket stratification have been developed based on different visions of the 
composition of the urban housing market. One reason for the different visions is that 
housing markets are different across cities. The other is that empirical research has been 
insufficient to develop a general method. In practice, which method should be used is 
mainly contingent on the research purpose and the conditions of the research site (Orford 
2000, Watkins 1999, 2001). To address this methodological problem, more empirical 
studies on housing submarkets in different cities are needed. This research will explore 
the submarkets in Shanghai’s housing market and try to establish a better way to define 
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housing submarkets. Based on the examination, this research will answer the question: 
What is the best way to define submarkets? 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, is the literature review. This is followed by a description 
of the research methodology in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides an introduction to the 
Shanghai housing market. Chapter 5 investigates the housing market structure and 
players in the Shanghai housing market. Chapter 6 contains the results of the hedonic 
pricing analysis for Shanghai. Chapter 7 contains a summary and conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Literature relevant to the housing market has been classified by Baxter and Anthony 
(1971) into three groups: (a) economic models of the housing market (market 
dynamics/equilibrium, housing price models, etc.); (b) residential development models; 
(c) residential location models (location choice models). Since this generalization was 
made decades ago, it now looks incomplete in that it does not include the studies on 
housing market segregation and housing market structure and players. A more general 
and complete classification should also include submarket investigation and institutional 
analysis of market players and structure. For the purpose of this research, only the 
literature on housing market price, submarkets, and housing market players and structure 
will be reviewed. I will first review the literature on China’s economic transition, 
globalization and urban transformation and the urban housing market.  
2.1. Economic Transition, Globalization and Urban Transformation 
Since the research is to explore the influence of economic transition, globalization 
and urban transformation on urban housing, it is necessary to give a brief review of 
economic transition, globalization and urban transformation before conducting the 
empirical study.  
2.1.1 Economic Transition 
Economic transition, also called economic liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization (Sykora 1994, Rana 1995), refers to the economic reforms in a transitional 
economy that is “one kind of emerging economy … belonging to that category of 
countries where there is a shift from a command economy to a market economy” 
(Kumssa and Jones 1999, p.194). The shift includes changes not only in the political 
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economy, but also in the organization of urban and land development and in the functions 
of urban planning (Table 2-1) (Wu 1998).  
Table 2-1: Implications of the economic transition (Wu F. 1998) 
Political Economy Organization of urban and 
land development 
Functions of urban 
planning 
increasing localization, 
diversification of 
investment and the growth 
of foreign capital 
from project-specific to 
comprehensive development,
real estate development 
from sectoral-
subordinated to a 
municipally based control
 
Commonly, transitional economies refer to Central and Eastern European countries, 
Russia, China and Vietnam. Based on the type of reform introduced, transitional 
economies may be divided into two groups. The first group includes China and Vietnam 
where a gradual and cautious approach is being undertaken (Kumssa and Jones, 1999). 
The second group of transitional economies includes some Central and Eastern European 
countries, some independent states of the former Soviet Union, and Mongolia, where a 
“big bang approach” or “shock therapy” was employed (Kumssa and Jones 1999, p.196).  
Housing reform is one of the most important transformations in transitional 
economies. It aims at promoting market efficiency and distributional equity (Pichler-
Milanovich 2001), improving housing consumption, creating a housing market (Huang 
2003) and solving housing problems, such as unrecoverable housing investment and 
housing shortages resulting from constrained investment (Wu 2001). Two main pillars of 
these market-oriented housing reforms, namely, the restitution of private property and 
privatization, have greatly influenced the development of local real estate markets 
(Keivani et al. 2001). The effects are mostly in the form of “tenure change, differentiation 
in house prices, use of the housing stock, management and maintenance activities, 
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mobility, residential differentiation, property rights regulations (i.e. zoning, rules, 
property register, condominium law, tax, etc.) and institution building and strengthening” 
(Pichler-Milanovich 2001, p.145).  
The most frequently addressed impacts of housing reform on housing markets are the 
institutional changes, which include three aspects. First, housing investment has 
diversified. According to Wu (2001), housing reform was characterized by 
decentralization of housing investment, especially from the central budget to diversified 
capitals (including funds from foreign investors, state work-units, local governments, and 
individual households). Second, housing reform and globalization together lead to an 
inflow of FDI to the housing market. Foreign capital, such as joint ventures, has created a 
demand for commercial properties (Wu, 2001) and caused housing prices to increase. 
Lastly, together with political reform, housing reform results in fundamental changes in 
local administration and urban planning policy (Keivani et al. 2001). In addition, housing 
reform has also introduced or exacerbated problems such as housing inequality and 
residential separation (Huang 2003). 
Economic transition also causes the fiscal policies (interest rate, taxation, etc.) in 
transitional economies to be modified. Some scholars, such as Berry et al. (2001), have 
discussed the dynamics of the housing market caused by the transformation of fiscal 
policy. They claim that fiscal policy and taxation measures can be used on both the 
demand and supply side to stimulate or deflate markets (Adair et al. 1994, Berry et al. 
2001). For example, on the supply side, tax concessions to private investors can promote 
the supply of affordable housing (Yates and Wood 1996); on the demand side, fiscal and 
monetary policy directly affect housing demand through changes in personal disposable 
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income, interest rates and the tax allowance on mortgage interest payments (Giussani and 
Hadjimatheou 1992). All these changes in supply or demand are reflected in housing 
prices.  
Economic transitions such as deregulation, privatization, and price liberalization 
have set the preconditions for more profound restructuring in the transitional economies, 
namely integration into global capitalism (Sykora 1994). “A significant fraction of the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) … coming into the transition economies was generated 
by the different privatization programs initiated under central planning” (Siklos 2000, 
p.373-p.374). Consequently, transitional economies have gradually come under the 
influence of globalization. They no longer operate and develop in the closed system of a 
socialist command economy as they did before. 
2.1.2 Globalization 
Globalization means the cross-border functional integration of globally dispersed 
economic activities and growing interdependency among regional economic blocs 
(Dicken 1992, Lo and Marcotullio 2000). Functional integration is progressing through 
increased stretching (geographical widening) and intensity (deepening) of international 
linkages (Dicken 1992). The emergence of transnational corporations and banks, global 
consumption norms, world ideologies, and international authority structures (Ash 2002) 
accelerates the integration process which in turn, results in the expansion of international 
trade, financial flows (mainly in the form of FDI), communications (information and idea 
flows), personal and business travel  and labor flow (Fu-chen and Peter 2000, Ash 2002), 
the formation of supra-national political organizations, and the spread of values and 
norms across the world (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000).  
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The influences of globalization on urban housing markets have been well 
documented. Urban property markets of both Keynesian capitalism and socialist 
command economies were usually subject to stringent local control. With the economic 
transition, local states had to adjust their regulatory regimes to embrace/enhance 
competitiveness and this paved the way for the increased influence of external investment 
in real estate development (Logan 1993, Wu 2001). Based on their observations of 
London’s and New York’s housing markets, Harloe et al. (1992) see globalization 
affecting housing markets in at least three ways. The first impact lies in the rippling price 
effect. The concentration of multinational financial institutions and other corporations 
leads directly to an increase in the small but significant demand for luxury housing and 
then results in inflated price levels for other housing. Similarly, Knox and Taylor (1995) 
think that the inflow of foreign capital stimulated unprecedented property booms and 
urban redevelopment in many cities, such as Seoul (Kim and Choe 1997, Short and Kim 
1999), Sydney (Short and Kim 1999), and Toronto (Todd 1995). Siklos (2000) argues 
that FDI may cause an increase in domestic liquidity that can be inflationary, and thus 
lead to an increase in housing price levels. The second consequence claimed by Harloe et 
al. (1992) is that elite housing has become an increasingly attractive option for global 
investors. The third effect is the deregulation and globalization of home mortgage finance. 
Because of globalization, real estate prices in local markets have become sensitive to the 
climate of the international financial market (Sassen 1991). For example, the Asian 
financial crisis during 1997-1999 resulted in the collapse of urban housing prices in South 
East Asia (Fung and Forrest 2002). Another important effect of globalization includes the 
exclusion of moderately profitable firms and of residents from the city center, due to the 
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concentration of highly profitable TNCs there and the concomitant increase in real estate 
prices (Haila 2000). 
External influences on local housing price are especially strong in world cities. In 
world cities, foreign companies usually build their offices in the central city. They are 
willing to pay an extremely high premium for a central location and have no interest in 
other locations (Sassen 1991). The competition for better places directly causes the 
housing price in city centers to increase. In addition, because of the presence of foreign 
companies in world cities, a dichotomized labor force also comes into being. On one side 
are the high-wage elite who are professionally specialized in control functions. On the 
other side are a great number of low-waged persons who are low-skilled workers engaged 
in manufacturing and low-end services. Despite representing a small proportion of urban 
residents, the high-income elite are the most important consumer group in world cities. 
This group is interested in and able to afford high-end housing. Its demand for luxury 
housing inevitably results in the high housing prices of world cities (Sassen 1991). As 
Sassen (1991) argued, the rapid growth of a high-price real estate market is a result of 
rapid growth in the number of financial firms, services firms, and high-income workers. 
However, it should be noted that although housing prices in world cities generally are 
increasing, there are market discontinuities. While housing in central-city locations is 
extremely expensive in world cities, in other portions of these cities, prices are much 
lower.  
Most studies on globalization and urban housing markets address how foreign direct 
investment affects housing price (Harloe et al. 1992, Todd 1995, Kim and Choe 1997, 
Short and Kim 1999, 1999, Siklos 2000). This is not only because housing price is a 
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critical issue for households, investors and government, but also and more importantly 
because among all the influences of globalization on cities, the major one is foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Harloe et al. 1992). Therefore, FDI, rather than globalization, is 
measured in this study. 
The impacts of globalization have also been investigated in emerging economies, 
such as China. Wu (2001) groups the effects into three aspects. First, the emergence of 
joint ventures contributes to the formation and development of land and housing markets. 
The inflow of foreign capital stimulates property booms and urban redevelopment (Knox 
and Taylor 1995, Todd 1995, Kim and Choe 1997, Short and Kim 1999). Second, foreign 
investment helps to develop a dynamic market segment and form housing submarkets. 
Third, globalization influences the perception of what is ‘fashionable’ and worth pursuing. 
Foreign architecture styles of buildings are used by real estate developers as a selling 
point to attract customers who are looking for a new way of life. It is foreseeable that 
globalization, led by foreign investment and regulatory bodies, will increasingly 
influence cities’ housing markets in transitional economies (Wu 2001). The intensity of 
its influence depends on the volume of foreign direct investment, which in most cases is 
measurable and therefore makes the quantitative research on globalization feasible. 
2.1.3 Urban Transformation2 
Economic transition is imprinted on urban form through urban transformation. In 
transitional economies, through various economic reforms (mainly through 
decentralization), local governments now make almost all the major decisions concerning 
local planning and development. Such decisions were made by central government before 
                                                 
2 In this research, the concept of urban transformation not only refers to urban spatial 
restructuring (the reshaping of urban form), but also includes urban social restructuring. 
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the reforms. This change has resulted in new business districts, gentrified residential 
communities, new social areas, urban sprawl, large peripheral residential communities 
and development zones and sub-centers (Wu 1998, Gaubatz 1999, Wu and Yeh 1999). 
Urban social structure also altered with the economic transition. For example, as Nee 
(1989) and Bian and Logan (1996) argued, the transition from a planned to a market 
economy continues to contribute to income inequality in China.  
Globalization also contributes to the new spatial order of cities. As Friedmann (1986) 
states, the physical form of cities can be explained with reference to a worldwide process 
that affects the direction and volume of transnational capital flows--- the spatial division 
of the functions of finance, management and production; and the employment structure of 
economic activities. For example, the rise of financial and producer services and the 
massive influx of mobile capital in large metropolises lead to the emergence of new 
financial districts and luxurious residential areas in developed economies (Short and Kim 
1999). Scholars (Sassen 1991, Short and Kim 1999) argue that this expansion of global 
functions has been the major source of urban restructuring in world cities. Their 
reasoning is that foreign capital’s selective investment causes local governments to 
reform/renovate cities to cater to foreign investment. For example, in Guangzhou, China, 
urban master plans were revised in the 1990s to make the city more internationalized and 
more attractive to foreign investors (Wu 2001). Moreover, globalization also leads to 
increasing social spatial differentiation or polarization (Sassen 1991). Hamnett and Cross 
(1998) claim that even if polarization is not occurring, increasing social inequality does 
occur in global cities.  
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Spatial restructuring has at least two effects on the urban housing market (Han 2000). 
First, the construction of new urban areas alters the locational characteristics of housing, 
like distance to the city center, and thereby changes housing price. Second, urban 
renovation creates new amenities, such as parks, open-space, theaters and museums. 
Since households compete to live in areas with amenities, they are willing to pay more 
for houses contiguous to amenities (Ball 1983).  
Social restructuring influences the housing market as well. Social structure refers to 
the demographic structure, the income structure of the population, and the social spatial 
structure. A change in social structure may result in the adjustment of the housing market. 
For instance, since people of different ages or with diverse incomes have dissimilar 
preferences for housing, they may value the same type of houses differently. The elderly 
and those receiving high-incomes may be willing to pay for “good”3 housing while youth 
and those receiving low-incomes may not. As a consequence, in a city with a substantial 
population of elderly and high-income people, the price of luxury housing is anticipated 
to be rather high because of strong demand. Moreover, the geographical distribution of 
households with different family structures or household incomes partially accounts for 
price differentiation over spatial submarkets.  
2.2 Market players and rules 
The housing market is conceptualized as a system which embodies a set of market 
players, and a set of formal and informal rules and conventions (Fung and Forrest 2002). 
In order to unravel the behavior of the urban housing market, including the formation of 
housing price and market segregation, it is necessary to know the market players and their 
interests, strategies and actions, and the market rules. Only after we have such 
                                                 
3 Good housing refers to housing with high-quality structures and in favorable places. 
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information, can we examine the relationship between the players and rules, which is the 
key to understanding the behavior of the urban housing market (Parsa and Keivani 1999). 
In this section, I will first review the literature on market players, then on market rules.  
In an urban housing market there are various groups of players who have a variety of 
motivations and vested interests and employ diverse tactics. These include speculators, 
developers, intermediary agencies, financial agencies, governments, architects, and 
building material providers (Healey and Barrett 1990, Wu 1999). Each player reacts in 
the market according to his or her perception to maximize housing-related benefits. Most 
activities in the urban housing market involve several players. For example, in order to 
convert rural land to residential use, at least five different actors must participate: a 
speculator, a developer, the state, a builder, and finally, a household. Therefore, although 
these players participate in the urban housing market with various motivations and 
methods, they are tightly interrelated.  
Speculators participate in the market mainly through buying and banking land and 
buildings. Sometimes, they also renovate the banked properties for future gain. 
Speculation is sometimes considered to have positive effects by urban geographers. For 
example, speculative activities account at least partly for the revitalization of 
neighborhoods, through either private or public financed upgrading or gentrification 
(Pacione 2001). However, speculation does not always play a positive role. Speculation 
may contribute to the creation of slums, and the displacement and destruction of 
communities (Pacione 2001). Around the peripheries of cities, speculation is one of the 
reasons causing “leapfrogging”: speculators hold land for a future increase in the price 
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but leave it undeveloped; on the other hand, in order to avoid land held by speculators, 
builder-developers invest in even further-out suburban areas (Johnston 1976).  
Another group of players, developers, are the producers of the urban housing market. 
Developers’ decisions as to whether a development project is desirable depend on the 
market conditions, such as the supply and demand situations of properties and capital. 
Therefore, they are very sensitive to the market and active in producing or reproducing 
the built environment. The relationships between a developer and other players in the 
market could also be bounded by market conditions. For example, according to their 
perception of market conditions, developers acquire specific amounts of inputs such as 
technical expertise, material, capital, land or a regulatory environment from other players 
(Han and Wang 2003).  Hence, the development of housing involves not only the 
decisions of the developers but also the decisions of other players (William 1983). 
Various intermediary agents and state institutions affect the volume and direction of 
capital flows and other market activities, thus cannot be excluded from a study of urban 
housing market (Peter 1989). Intermediary agents such as banks, appraisers, insurance 
companies, advertising companies and real estate agents function to provide information, 
evaluation and mediate the relationship between the other players. The most important 
role of real estate agents is as a bridge between buyers and sellers of real estate. Real 
estate agents, together with other institutions such as financial institutions, usually 
actively assist with and facilitate property transfers because their revenues come from the 
fees charged on completed property transactions. In addition, real estate agents may also 
contribute to patterns of residential segregation (Pacione 2001). Through deliberate racial 
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and ethnic steering, they can influence the social composition of neighborhoods by 
directing people to particular housing areas (McNamara 1984, Teixeira 1995).  
Financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, provide the capital for 
the housing market. The urban housing market is a place where capital is intensively 
concentrated. Both suppliers and consumers need money that they commonly do not own 
in full. Therefore, as the capital suppliers, financial institutions are indispensable for the 
urban housing market. As Harvey (1982, 1985) argues, various financial institutions 
provide paths of capital flow through which surplus generated in the primary sector is 
directed to the built-environment. However, since capital is always profit-oriented, and 
the opportunities of investment are differentiated over the urban area and individuals in 
that urban area, financial institutions adopt spatially and ethnically discriminating lending 
practices that have a significant impact on the urban landscape. It is much easier to get 
loans for advantageous places for development or renovation; majority populations can 
get mortgages easily while minority groups often can not. This kind of practice is usually 
referred to as red-lining (Pacione 2001, Rubenstein 2002).  
The government is another critical actor in the urban housing market. Although the 
degree of their involvement varies across countries, the regulation of housing markets by 
the state is a universal phenomenon because of the spillover of externalities and the need 
for the provision of public goods (Yeh and Wu 1996). Common instruments include 
routinely overseeing the housing market, fiscal policies such as taxation, legal restriction 
of private rights to use urban land, authorizations of residential subdivisions, planning, 
zoning, the provision of urban infrastructure, and other related policies (Roweis and Scott 
1981, Yeh and Wu 1996). It should be noted that the formation and implementation of the 
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policies involve many governmental agencies and actors who stand for various interests 
(Yeh and Wu 1996). Thus any government decision concerning the urban housing market 
can be seen as the result of the balance of power between the different actors and parts of 
the state and administrative apparatus (Alain 1987). Through regulation, government is 
able to “support the development process … moderate its adverse externalities, safeguard 
social needs and conserve resources and environmental heritage” (Healey and Barrett 
1990, p.96). Government is not only the regulator of the market. It also participates in 
development activities by forming coalitions with public or private companies4 (Keng 
1996), especially for large scale projects that developers themselves may not be able to 
afford (Peter 1989). It is believed that the main objective of government in these 
coalitions is to foster urban development and revitalize local economies (McNamara 1984, 
Logan and Molotch 1987, Healey and Barrett 1990). Private firms usually welcome such 
coalitions so that their investment is secured. Lastly, the state works as a development 
intermediary or as a safeguard for particular interest groups (Healey and Barrett 1990).    
Only recently, foreign investors including foreign speculators, developers and 
builders were recognized as influential market players in local housing markets. Various 
reasons account for overseas companies entering local markets, such as problems at home, 
and favorable policies and financial advantages (low interest rates, high rates of return) in 
destination countries (Healey and Barrett 1990). Because they commonly are not familiar 
with local markets, they participate in the market usually by working in partnership with 
local firms. It is thought that this partnership could maximize their possibility of success 
within local economies and local politics. The effects of foreign investors on the local 
housing market are many. They can reorient players’ interests, strategies, working 
                                                 
4 Such a coalition is called a growth coalition. 
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methods and relationships, challenge established relationships among players, and 
introduce new business perceptions (Healey and Barrett 1990). In transitional economies, 
foreign investment has been crucial in the rapid development and growth of the real 
estate markets (Parsa and Keivani 1999). Foreign investors provide not only housing 
supply but also demand, which is essential for rapid development of newly emerging 
housing markets. Also, they bring in advanced management and promotion skills that 
when learned by local real estate companies help to improve local companies’ profit 
margins.   
An important but often neglected group of players in the market are the households 
(Wu 1999, Wang and Murie 2000). In terms of supporting the fundamental structure of 
the urban housing market, households together with developers are the most important 
players in the market. Without households, the housing market would not exist. It is 
claimed that in the developing world a large proportion of the capital gains in property 
values that are associated with rapid urban growth is garnered by the high-income 
households whereas low-income groups especially suffer from the effects of crowding, 
lack of services, adverse policies and displacement from favored locations close to 
employment opportunities and social services (Linn 1983, William 1983).  
Last but not least, major commercial and industrial enterprises are another group of 
market players. They participate in the market first because they must get prime sites for 
their commercial and industrial activities. Moreover, it is essential for them to assure that 
the urban housing is relatively cheap and available for the majority of urban residents 
since high-priced housing exerts upward pressure on wages, removing the competitive 
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edge that is the fundamental basis for much of commercial and industrial activity 
(William 1983).  
In summary, the urban housing market involves the speculators, the construction 
industry, the building materials industry, the financial sector, households, and 
commercial and industry enterprises (Healey 1994). To mediate the relationship between 
these players, intermediaries have emerged. Moreover, the government enters into these 
processes in diverse ways, through regulations and policies, as a development 
intermediary itself, and in order to safeguard particular interests and values. Whatever the 
socioeconomic framework and the organization of real estate market the major players 
and their strategies combine to produce the specific characteristics and qualities of the 
urban housing market. These are then exploited by property developers, investors and 
other privileged player groups to create development opportunities and extract value 
(Healey 1994). 
Housing market players have been intensively scrutinized by researchers. However, 
market structure has not received the same detailed examination. Market structure, as 
defined by Healey and Barrett (1990), is what drives the development process and 
produces distinctive patterns in particular periods. Specifically, it is the framework within 
which individual agents make their choices. The core aspects of structure include the 
various resources to which agents may have access, the rules which govern their 
behavior, not only in the form of legal documents and administrative decrees but also 
informal rules in the form of custom and culture (Han and Wang 2003), and the ideas 
which they draw upon in developing their strategies. Market structure is established by 
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the way agents operate: deploying, acknowledging, challenging and potentially 
transforming resources, rules and ideas as they frame and pursue their own strategies.  
The relationship between market players is reciprocal. On one hand, market structure 
sets up the framework within which market players act to maximize their benefits. In this 
way, market structure is reflected in market players’ routine activities, such as developing 
and pursuing their strategies. On the other hand, market structure is affected by the way 
individual agents determine their strategies and conduct their relationships as they deal 
with specific projects and issues, and as they consider their future stream of activities 
(Healey and Barrett 1990).  
2.3 Housing Market 
2.3.1. Housing price  
The price or value of any product is derived from the utility that consumers gain 
from consuming the product, more specifically, from consuming the features of the 
product. A housing unit is best perceived as a product that is a bundle of features which 
contribute to the provision of a flow of one or more housing services (Watkins 1999). 
Accordingly, housing price is determined by the housing features, including not only the 
physical structure of the residential building itself, but also the accessibility of the lot on 
which the building stands and the services provided to the lot such as water and energy 
supply, transportation, waste disposal, drainage, and fire and police protection (Linn 
1983). All these features fall in one of the three categories - structural characteristics, 
locational characteristics and other characteristics (Olmo 1995). The classification of 
housing features has long been established and verified by many researches, even though 
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the specific attributes used in various studies are different. A summarization of the 
housing characteristics used in selected literature is available in Table 2-2.  
Table 2-2: Housing characteristics used to explain housing price 
 structural attributes locational 
attributes 
others 
Olmo 
(1995) 
Apartment age, numbers of 
bathrooms, constructed square meters/ 
the number of rooms, floor of building
Cartesian  
co-ordinates 
N/A 
Orford 
(2000) 
 
Floor area, dwelling type, number of 
bedrooms, number of reception rooms, 
number of bathrooms, number of 
separate shower rooms, central heating 
system, number of garages, parking, 
age, garden, modification 
Distance to CBD, 
neighborhood’s 
social class 
Building 
purpose, 
ownership 
Linn 
(1983) 
Space, on-site service, shelter structure Access Tenure 
Edelstein 
(1974) 
Lot size, garage spaces, number of 
bathrooms, age 
Distance to city 
center, property 
location 
Sale date 
Palm 
(1978) 
Age, square footage Minorities, 
education, career, 
population 
density, distance 
to CBD, air 
pollution, crime 
rates, tax rates 
Tenure, 
household 
structure 
Bajic 
(1985) 
Floor area, outside lot area, numbers 
of bathrooms, garage places, and 
extras, construction material 
Distances to 
transportation and 
CBD 
N/A 
 
The table illustrates that structural characteristics typically consist of housing size, 
floor of building, facilities/on-site services (heat, water, etc.) and, of course, housing 
structure such as the construction material and the arrangement of rooms. Structural 
characteristics convey direct benefits or disbenefits associated with the consumption of 
these characteristics. For this reason, intuitively, better structural characteristics lead to 
higher housing price.  
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On the other hand, locational characteristics are comprised of accessibility and 
neighborhood characteristics. In monocentric theory, accessibility is measured as the 
distance, cost or time (including congestion) to the central business district (CBD), along 
with the difficulties, costs or limitations that this entails (Olmo 1995). In multicentric 
theory, the distance/cost/time to sub-centers also matters. Accessibility of employment 
opportunities, of off-site services such as health and education facilities, and of 
community contacts is also important because it permits households the opportunity of 
earning incomes and of benefiting from social services (Linn 1983). Therefore properties 
with better accessibility can claim higher prices. Similarly, favorable neighborhood 
characteristics may result in higher housing prices. People are willing to pay more for the 
social prestige of living in a certain area (Lanegran and Palm 1978) because on one hand 
people are willing to pay more for living close to those who share the same cultural and 
social backgrounds, and on the other hand, housing is frequently used as a status symbol. 
Neighborhood characteristics can be represented by household income, gross rent, 
percentage of professional jobs held by residents (Heikkila et al. 1989), crime rate (Smith 
1978, Diamond 1980), environmental quality (Smith 1978, Diamond 1980, Nelson 1993, 
Rosenthal and Helsley 1994, McDonald and McMillen 1998) and traffic congestion 
(Nelson 1993). Obviously, the locational characteristics of a housing unit do not always 
remain the same. And thus the price of a particular housing unit may be affected by the 
changes of the transport system, by changes in the location of employment opportunities 
and social service facilities, and by changes in the cultural and social balance of the 
community (Linn 1983). 
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2.3.2. Housing submarket: 
Urban housing researchers have long debated the existence and significance of 
housing submarkets (Whitehead 1999). Two questions underlie the debate on this topic: 
first, what is the appropriate level of aggregation for the study of housing, i.e. should the 
urban housing market be divided or just be seen as a whole? Second, if the metropolitan 
housing market is to be subdivided, what is the best means of delimiting submarkets 
(Palm 1978)? Most scholars now agree that the urban housing market operates as a series 
of linked, quasi-independent submarkets (Maclennan 1982, Orford 2000). In practice, this 
view has generally been adopted as an assumption for housing market research when 
submarkets are carefully defined to bound areas which are likely to show discrete 
attribute price structures (Palm 1978).  
The existence of housing submarkets is supported by market reality. This can be 
illustrated by examining how housing bundles are bought and sold (Orford 2000). On one 
hand, the consumers of housing can be partitioned into distinct ‘consumer groups’ on the 
basis of households’ housing preferences and tastes, income, stage in the life cycle, 
lifestyle, size and composition, and socioeconomic status (Kirby 1976, Maclennan 1992, 
Feitelson 1993, Kauko 2001). Even in the same ‘consumer group’, the housing choices of 
households are also likely to be constrained by search and information costs. In other 
words, people may demand particular locations and/or particular types of housing at 
particular locations (Goodman and Thibodeau 1998). On the other hand, housing stock 
can also be subdivided into distinct ‘product groups’ (Maclennan et al. 1987, Watkins 
2001) on the basis of building, location, area density or internal attributes (Grigsby et al. 
1987, Bourassa et al. 1997, Laakso 1997, Kauko 2001). A house occupies a unique 
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location in space and its locational attributes may be impossible to duplicate (Case and 
Mayer, 1996), which leads to the inelasticity of housing supply, even over long periods of 
time. The inelasticity of housing supply is compounded by the durability of the housing 
stock which is difficult to modify (Orford 2000). Segmented and sometime inelastic 
demand is matched to the differentiated and inelastic housing supply, which gives rise to 
housing submarkets, thus differential prices are paid for given attributes in different 
market segments (Watkins 1999, 2001). The segmentation of housing submarkets is more 
obvious in larger urban areas because the heterogeneity of housing demand and the 
inelasticity of housing supply are exaggerated in large cities due to their large, 
heterogeneous populations (Orford 2000).  
The segmentation of a housing market is also determined by the separation of the land 
market. A relative unchanging supply of land over long periods makes a parcel of land 
almost unique, a characteristic which is amplified by its fixed location. The 
characteristics of a fixed and immovable supply are particularly important for urban land, 
since the demand for a piece of land in a growing city cannot be met with the relative 
surplus of supply elsewhere, which means that the land market in effect comprises a large 
number of separate markets. In the urban context, these are spatially discrete (Johnston 
1976).  
Moreover, segmentation is the result of institutional barriers and can be significantly 
influenced by the actions of gatekeepers such as land-owners, developers, estate agents, 
housing managers and financial institutions whose motivation and behavior largely 
structure the supply of housing bundles (Knox 1995). This is particularly important with 
respect to housing segmentation caused by racial discrimination (Orford 2000). 
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In practice, housing submarkets exists where the interaction between segmented 
demand and segmented supply generate price differences for some hypothetical 
standardized dwelling. Specifically, a submarket is deemed to exist if: 1) the ‘law of one 
price’5 exists within the submarkets; 2) a hypothetical, standardized housing unit trades at 
different prices in different submarkets (Watkins 2001).  
Although it is beyond dispute that housing submarkets usually exist, the studies of 
housing submarkets are still few in number and submarkets have not been fully embraced 
in applied research (Watkins 2001). Most models of the housing market are still 
estimated on the assumption of a single market (Goodman and Thibodeau 1998). This 
situation is partly due to the convenience associated with the single market assumption, 
and partly because of the two major difficulties of submarket theory itself. The first 
problem is that a coherent definition of a housing submarket does not exist (Tu 1997, 
Watkins 2001). For example, some researchers have defined submarkets as consisting of 
all dwellings within a specific geographical area (Straszheim 1975, Johnston 1976, Palm 
1978). Their argument is housing is not spatially substitutable because it is immovable. 
On the other hand, some scholars have suggested that submarkets comprise all dwellings 
which possess similar physical characteristics and are relatively close substitutes for one 
another, but relatively poor substitutes for dwellings in other submarkets (Grigsby 1963, 
Dale-Johnson 1982, Grigsby et al. 1987). Lastly, others may think that the urban housing 
market should be subdivided by the different tenure types associated with housing units 
(David and Lisa 1978). The second difficulty lies in that even if researchers agree on a 
definition, there is no consensus as to how submarkets should be identified. In practice, 
                                                 
5 Within a submarket, all dwellings are considered relatively close substitutes by would-be buyers 
(Watkins 1999). Therefore, only one set of implicit prices of housing characteristics exists in a 
submarket. This is the ‘law of one price’. 
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submarket specification has typically been performed on an ad hoc basis (Goodman and 
Thibodeau 1998, Bourassa et al. 1999). Some use census boundaries (Ball and Kirwan 
1977); some prefer aggregated contiguous postcodes (Watkins 2001); some survey real 
estate agents (Michaels and Smith 1990); and others employ aggregated census tracts on 
the basis of racial composition (Straszheim 1974). A significant difficulty with the ad hoc 
procedure for defining submarkets is that there is no reason to be confident that the 
resulting submarkets are defined in an optimal or even satisfactory way. In other words, it 
is not clear that the ad hoc methods produce groupings of dwellings that have a maximum 
degree of internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity (Bourassa et al. 1999).  
Besides the above restrictions, other inconsistencies6 also have prevented the 
development of a coherent analytical approach to submarket analysis and thus the use of 
submarkets as an analytical framework for housing studies. Hence, it seems that in order 
to develop a general definition and methodology for submarkets, more empirical studies 
need be conducted and more submarkets in different cities need to be investigated. Only 
after we possess enough knowledge on the submarkets in different cities and during 
different time periods, can we possibly develop a more generalized and universally 
applicable submarket theory. 
2.4 Hypotheses 
In this research, I will test the following hypotheses: 
1) Foreign direct investment and economic transition have introduced more market 
players and caused a change in market structure. Market rather than government plays an 
increasingly important role in the housing market.  
                                                 
6 For example, the empirical analyses have employed differing tests, and case studies have 
focused on a range of different cities and different time periods (Watkins 2001). 
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2) The hedonic model adequately captures the Shanghai market. On one hand, since 
the market now becomes more influential, the hedonic model should work. On the other 
hand, the specificity of players and structures in China’s urban housing market tends to 
make the model not work. In particular, the model works better in the more capitalist 
sectors/submarkets than it does in the more traditional sectors.  
3) There are significant differences across submarkets within the overall Shanghai 
housing market. This can be observed from the significant differences existing across 
submarkets in hedonic model form. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1. Research site 
Shanghai, situated in Eastern China, is the ‘crucible of modern China’ (Yusuf and Wu 
2002). Shanghai entered the stage of modern commercial and industrial development in 
the second half of the 19th century (Wei 1987). Ranked as the 7th largest city in the 
world in 1936, no modern Asian city from that period could match Shanghai’s 
international reputation (Yeung 1996). Since the People’s Republic of China was founded 
in 1949, Shanghai has served as a ‘cash cow’, providing revenue for the central 
government (Ho and Tsui, 1996). It has played and will continue to play a critical role in 
China’s modernization and development (Han 2000). In 1990, Shanghai was designated 
the largest open city in China. With the opening of Pudong, Shanghai is expected to 
assume the leading role for economic growth in the Yangtze River basin (Han 2000). 
Now, with a population of over 15 million and an area of 6341 km2, Shanghai is the 
largest city and the economic center of China. The metropolitan area consists of 19 urban 
districts, 9 of which are located in the central city (Figure 3-1), and 10 suburban counties 
(Figure 3-2) (Yusuf and Wu 2002). 
Shanghai is a planned and sanctioned experiment with capitalism in China. The 
experiment began in 1990 when the central government announced the development of 
Pudong New Area. Since then, Shanghai’s economy has shown remarkable expansion. 
Today, with a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$75.37 billion, Shanghai is responsible 
for 5.36 percent of national industrial output and contributes a significant proportion (as 
of 2001, 3.72%) of central state revenue. The almost exponential rate of economic 
                                                 
7 In the study, the exchange rate of 1:8.3 between US dollars and RMB is adopted. 
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Figure 3-1: The ten urban districts of central Shanghai (Yeung 1996) 
 
Figure 3-2: The administrative sub-divisions of Shanghai Municipality (Yeung 1996) 
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growth in Shanghai is the product of deliberate and organized national and local state 
policy decisions and institutional innovations (Safier 2001) that correspond to China’s 
transition from a planned to a market economy.  
One more impetus to Shanghai’s development is its integration into the world 
economy. From the 1980s to 2001, the total contract value of FDI in Shanghai was US 
$104.88 billion and realized FDI was US $57.52 billion. The total value of foreign trade 
increased from US $2.89 billion in 1978 to US$112.4 billion in 2003 (NBSC 2004). The 
landscape also shows the tremendous and pervasive impact of foreign investment (Wu 
2003). For example, advertisements for commercial goods of transnational corporations 
(TNCs), such as Coca-Cola, Samsung, Siemens, Sony, Panasonic, Pepsi, 7Up, Visa, 
McDonalds and Kentucky Fried Chicken, are quickly becoming the dominant “symbols” 
of modern Shanghai (Rosen 1997). Shanghai therefore is a good place to observe the 
impact of FDI as it is quickly becoming the most globalized city in China (Wu 2001).  
Corresponding to the rapid economic development and recent population influx, 
Shanghai is undergoing a significant urban transformation. Among the instances of this 
reconfiguration, the process of spatial expansion across the Huangpu River into the ‘new 
city’ of Pudong (the eastern side of the Huangpu River) is the most remarkable (Safier 
2001). In the larger and more built-up area of Puxi (the western side of the Huangpu 
River), the pre-existing urban area is also undergoing intensification and regeneration. 
Moreover, new infrastructure projects, such as elevated expressways and bridges, are 
quickly transforming the city’s accessibility and creating new development spaces (Wu 
2000). Furthermore, tremendous changes in social structure, especially population 
structure, are also observed in Shanghai, because the city is becoming the seed bed of a 
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new middle-class society and a magnet for tens of thousands of migrants seeking 
opportunities in its frenetic construction sector and looking for employment in its fast-
growing manufacturing and services sectors (Safier 2001).  
Owing to its integration into the world economy, its unparalleled economic status in 
China and its significant change in spatial and social structure, Shanghai is an appropriate 
“window” through which the influences of economic transition, FDI and urban 
transformation on urban housing markets can be examined. Moreover, examining what is 
happening in China could help people to better understand contemporary China. As Pye 
(1981, p. xi) said, “Serious analysis of nearly all of the important aspects of life in China 
must, eventually, confront Shanghai and its special place in the Chinese scheme of 
things.” There is no other city in China more suitable than Shanghai to conduct this 
research. 
3.2. Methodology  
3.2.1 Investigation of Players and Structure of Shanghai's Housing Market 
Several methods have been developed to examine the roles of actors or institutions in 
the urban housing market. Each uses some form of actor-based or institutional frame of 
analysis. In their 1990’s paper, Healey and Barrett (1990) provided an excellent critique 
of previous methods. They assert these methods have failed to adequately address 
existing conditions in the housing market and they suggest a new approach for urban 
housing studies.  
In their approach, a housing market includes market players, the nexus of 
relationships between players, supporting legal arrangements, resources, rules, and 
ideology, i.e. market players and market structure (Healey and Barrett 1990, Healey 
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1992). Han and Wang (2003) categorized the components of housing market structure 
into three groups: 1) material resources referring to the primary ingredients of the 
production process--- land rights, labor, finance, information and expertise, 2) 
institutional rules that govern how resources are used and set by the institution or the 
political process, and 3) organizing ideas that influence the dynamics of resource use and 
rule formulation in shaping the development process. A fundamental dimension of the 
urban housing market is the interaction between market players’ behaviors and the 
broader processes or structures that drive these players’ strategies and interests (Wilson 
and Huff 1994). Structure both affects and is changed by the behavior of players in the 
housing market, while players in turn act within the opportunities and constraints 
provided by the structure of the housing market (Healey 1998, Healey and Barrett 1990). 
In this research, I will use this approach to analyze the actors in the urban housing market, 
including their behaviors, the interactions among them and their contributions to urban 
housing market. 
A key issue in this task is the relationship between the strategies, interests and actions 
of the various players involved in the development process and the structure that frames 
the players’ decision-making (Healey and Barrett 1990). The relationship may be 
observed through the way in which players define and implement their strategies in 
relation to the rules they acknowledge, the resources they use and seek to accumulate, 
and the ideas and ideology they have in determining and justifying their strategies 
(Healey and Barrett 1990). More specifically, Healey and Barrett (1990) proposed a 
research scheme for examining the structure and players of the urban housing market. 
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The first component of the scheme is the review of the forms of capital flow into and 
out of the built environment. It requires an understanding of the diverse sources of capital, 
the different ways capital can be invested in property, and the place of property in the 
various investment strategies. The review should focus on the interrelationships between 
types of capital, types of firm and types of investment strategy, and on the implications of 
the ways in which firms value land, property and location.  
The second component focuses on the composition and strategies of the various firms 
in the urban housing market, including the strategies of firms and the consequences of the 
strategies, the relations between firms and market management agencies, and the 
appearance of new firms and the opportunities they exploit. The emphasis of this 
component is how the strategies constitute the firms’ interests in land, property and 
property redevelopment, and how these interests reflect the negotiative practices through 
which action is undertaken. The objective of this component would be to provide a basis 
for analyzing the impact of such strategies on the urban housing market.  
The third part examines the various ways in which the state impinges on firms’ 
strategies, including the tools of intervention employed, such as financial subsidy, 
taxation and land dealing, the way in which intervention affects the demand for space, the 
rules within which individual firms develop their strategies, and the forms of 
development processes. The last component assesses the implications of the above 
processes for the urban housing market in terms of the impact on urban form, land and 
property values, the resultant social and economic externality costs and benefits within 
local economies and the distribution of these.  
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Accordingly, the structure and player analysis starts with an examination of structure 
because politico-juridical rules, and ideas and ideology, convey structural limitations and 
possibilities into the strategies and relationships of market players (Healey and Barrett 
1990). The way to address this task is to combine the insights derived from the traditions 
of institutional analysis, and in particular the studies of implementation processes within 
the field of policy analysis, with the neo-classical analyses of the operation of urban land 
markets and Marxist approaches on the way capital flows through the built environment 
(Healey and Barrett 1990). Put another way, the analytical task is to link the institutional 
analysis of the housing market with the dynamics of the economy as reflected in resource 
flows, such as capital inputs, and with political organization and cultural values as 
reflected in rules and ideas (Healey and Barrett 1990). Giving an understanding of 
structure, the investigation of market players can be carried out. The critical task for this 
part of investigation is to answer five important questions: What? Who? Why? How? and 
Where? (Xie et al. 2002, Han and Wang 2003)? Specifically:  
• What does happen in the urban housing market?  
• Who are the major market players? 
• What are their roles and power relations?  
• Why do they behave as they usually do?  
• How do individual actors determine their strategies and their relationships in 
the market, and how do their behaviors affect the market structure? For 
example, how do government and developers behave in the property 
development process to achieve their own goals? And finally,  
• Where do their activities and their interactions with other players happen? 
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A critical practical problem associated with the method is how to gather information 
required for a theoretical analysis. The information needed for the analysis includes laws, 
regulations, and more important, descriptive information about how market players adapt 
to market structure, how they take advantage of the structure and how they avoid the 
negative influences, what their efforts are to change the structure, and how the structure is 
changed due to the pressure from market players, etc.  
In general, laws, regulations and other documents are readily available. However, it is 
usually hard to gather the necessary descriptive information about market players. The 
best way to acquire this information is through interview or questionnaire. However, in 
many cases, interviewees are not cooperative with the interviewer, especially when the 
questions touch upon their business or personal affairs. For example, developers are not 
willing to answer questions such as “what is your strategy to maximize revenues under 
current market conditions?” Similarly, households usually avoid questions like “what is 
your household income?” Therefore, a nondirective interview, also called a semi-
structured interview, is usually adopted if these kinds of questions are necessary for 
research. “Nondirective interviews are conducted with a fairly open framework which 
allows for focused, conversational, two-way communication. They can be used both to 
give and receive information” (Case et al. 19908). In a nondirective interview, “the 
interviewee, by decision of the interviewer, controls the purpose, subject matter to be 
discussed, and pacing of the interview” (Stewart and Cash 1982, p15). The most 
prominent advantage of a nondirective interview is that it provides the interviewers great 
flexibility. Interviewees therefore are relaxed and they become less defensive.  
                                                 
8 Link: http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/x5307e/x5307e08.htm 
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Even though a nondirective interview has these benefits, it is not universally 
applicable because it requires acute psychological insight and personal sensitivity of the 
interviewer. Otherwise, the interview will be fruitless. A combination of directive and 
nondirective approaches is therefore typically used. An interviewer may use the directive 
approach for easy to answer questions and use the nondirective approach for questions 
related to secrets or just for relaxing the interviewees.  
Another method used to make interviews fruitful is snow-ball sampling which means 
interviewing individuals in a reference system. The reference system starts from an 
individual the interviewer is familiar with and then from him, the system expands to more 
interviewees that the initial interviewee recommends. New interviewees may then 
recommend more potential interviewees. Therefore, the system is like a snow ball 
becoming bigger and bigger. This method is very useful because it provides a very 
effective and necessary introduction to otherwise very busy and hard to contact persons 
(Walcott 1995, p29). Also, because the interviewer has been recommended to the 
interviewee by a mutual acquaintance, interviewees are more willing to tell the 
interviewer what he/she wants to know. 
The focus group concept provides a useful complement to interviews (Keivani et al. 
2001). The merits of focus groups according to Kitzinger and Barbour (1999) include the 
exploring of experiences, opinions and concerns, thereby enabling different perspectives 
to be investigated. It is recognized that the interaction between focus group members 
often produces insights and a dynamic not readily obtained through individual structured 
interviews (Stewart and Shamdasani 1990). Although focus groups also have 
acknowledged limitations, the approach has the distinct merit of permitting a wider 
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exploration of issues and is becoming a more popular tool in property research (Adair et 
al., 1998, 2000).  
In addition, an internal measure of control could be introduced in the interviews and 
focus groups by subjecting the different categories of interviewees such as developers 
and households to similar questions (Keivani et al. 2001). A final measure of internal 
control is validating findings from different stages of the research—namely, interviews, 
focus groups and literature review—against each other. 
My analysis starts with the examination of the market structure, specifically, market 
rules (or government policies). This is because China’s housing market is a policy-driven 
market. New policies not only induce new players into the market but also cause a change 
of roles in existing players and the relationships among them. For this reason, the 
investigation of market players is based on the full understanding of market rules. The 
research identifies the rules that have had significant impacts on the housing market, and 
then examines the effects of these rules on market players. The examination of the effects 
concentrates on how market players adapt to the new market environment and maximize 
their profits in the new condition.  
In order to identify the market players, their roles and their strategies, I first describe 
what happened in the urban housing market, especially in the development process. 
Secondly, I identify the agencies involved in the process---their roles and power relations. 
Thirdly, I analyze the strategies and interests of significant actors and relate these back to 
market structure. This last step is important because market players have feedback effects 
on the market structure. For example, the adjustment of government policies is 
sometimes driven by market players - market players and market structure interact.  
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In the field investigation9, I used ‘snowball sampling.’ Before I went to Shanghai, I 
gathered a list of potential interviewees. Initially, the list was a short one. But after I 
contacted several Chinese friends, the list grew. Among the persons on the initial list, 
some are my friends or the friends of them, and some others were selected because their 
names are often shown in newspapers and on the Internet. My former classmates who are 
studying in the University of Southampton, U.K. also contributed their contact lists. We 
can call all the persons on the initial list ‘seeds’, because later from them, I got contact 
information of other interviewees who were interviewed by telephone. All the 
interviewees were grouped into 6 groups: government, households, real estate agents, real 
estate developers, banks and academia (Table 3-1). Among them, I gave special weight to 
academic scholars because they are consulted by government, developers, banks and real 
estate agents. As a result, they know the thoughts of these players better than any other 
groups. Moreover, households are also influenced by the academy’s views on the market 
published in the media. Therefore, they are not only knowledgeable about the housing 
market but also influence this market. In addition, since they are an independent group, 
they can provide unprejudiced views. After compiling the list, I designed several 
questionnaires. Different groups were given different questionnaires. Although the 
specific questions on different questionnaires are slightly different, the questions are 
centered on the roles of each player in the housing market and their interaction with other 
players within the market structure, such as what are the important players in Shanghai’s 
housing market; please identify the influences of other players on your part, etc. The 
questions for academia are more general and comprehensive, for example, how the role 
                                                 
9 All the investigations follow the requirements of Indiana University Bloomington Campus 
Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects.  
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of government has changed since the late 1980s, what factors have driven this change, 
what policies are important for the development of Shanghai’s housing market, etc.  
Table 3-1 The major persons in the survey 
Name Institutions Representing
Ning Zhu Eastern China Regional Center of VanKe Real 
Estate Group 
Developers 
Jingsong Wang Department of Strategic Planning, Goldenfield 
Development Co. Ltd 
Developers 
Steve Clarke Freesia Development Ltd. Foreign 
investor 
Jun Hu Jian’an Planning Bureau Government 
Yongdong 
Zhang 
Department of City Development of Shanghai Government 
Dezhong Wang Research Lab of Shanghai Municipality Government 
Xiaojian Lu Finance News of Shanghai (Newspaper) Public Media
Jing Liu ZhongNan Property Consulting Inc. Real Estate 
Agents 
Xin Qian Self-employed in real estate business Real Estate 
Intermediary
Zhi Su Department of Real Estate Loan, China Industry and 
Commerce Bank (Sichuan Branch) 
Banks 
Li Qian Law Department, Huaxia Bank   Banks 
Zanhai Li 3rd village of Eastern China Normal University 
(ECNU) 
Households 
Facheng Zuo JiaFu Residential Community Households 
Yun Cheng JiaFu Residential Community Households 
Ji Li Tianyuan Residential Community Households 
Lili Zhao Jingfu Residential Community Households 
Yongyue Zhang  (Dean) College of Orient Real Estate, ECNU Academia 
Bogeng Chen (Professor) College of Orient Real Estate, ECNU Academia 
Xiaodong Song (Professor) Department of Planning, Tongji 
University 
Academia 
Shiwen Sun (Associate Professor) Department of Planning, 
Tongji University 
Academia 
Yueming Ning (Professor) Department of Geography, ECNU Academia 
Hongming 
Zhang 
(Professor) the Center for Real Estate Research, 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) 
Academia 
Xuejin Zuo (Professor) the Economics Institute, SASS Academia 
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The results of the interviews are better than I expected. When the interviewees filled 
out the questionnaires, they did not just fill in the blanks. Usually, they also told me 
stories beyond the questionnaire. These outside stories were very informative and thought 
provoking. Once no more new information emerges from the interview of a group, the 
interviews with this group end.  
As a complement for gathering information, I also designed a few focus groups 
which included a mix of actors with differing backgrounds and perspectives on the urban 
housing market, such as public urban policy-makers, private real estate actors and 
financial institutions, households, and foreign investors. Each focus group was centered 
on four main themes:  
• The rationale for investment in Shanghai’s housing markets; 
• Factors influencing housing investment and housing prices; 
• Policy mechanisms and institutional perspectives including the role of 
planning; and 
• The benefits or losses from the urban reform.    
I also gathered information, especially information on government policies, from 
publications, such as Shanghai Real Estate Market, yearly published books, and the 
website http://www.realestate.cei.gov.cn, which is a professional real estate website, 
providing macro data of China’s real estate market and real estate-related laws and 
regulations.  
3.2.2. Hedonic Model 
Hedonic models are based on the realization that some goods or factors of production 
are not homogeneous and can differ in numerous characteristics or attributes (Palmquist 
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1991, Lipscomb 2003). Consumers purchase different bundles of characteristics, i.e. 
different goods, each time a buying decision is made. Goods are valued for their 
characteristics in a hedonic model. The hedonic prices, defined as the implicit prices of 
attributes, are revealed from observed prices of differentiated goods and the specific 
amounts of characteristics associated with them (Rosen 1974).  
Hedonic models have been used for a variety of purposes (Bourassa et al. 1999) and 
empirical research using the method of hedonic pricing has been a common feature in the 
literature of housing market research or urban studies since the 1970s (Olmo 1995, 
Orford 2000). The range of applications includes estimation of the influence on housing 
price of housing and neighborhood attributes such as land use, nonresidential activity, 
residential quality and accessibility, new residential construction and neighborhood 
disinvestment, and various externalities in the local surrounding environment (Bowen et 
al. 2001). All of these applications of the hedonic price function are rooted in Lancaster’s 
(1966) new consumer behavior theory. In this framework, housing is a multidimensional 
good differentiated into a bundle of attributes that vary in both quantity and quality. 
Accordingly, the hedonic model links housing price to measures of attributes of houses 
(Can 1990).  
Based on the assumption that housing can be regarded as the composite of a number 
of key characteristics, researchers may regress housing price on the quantities or 
availability of characteristics associated with housing stocks (Can 1990, Straszheim 1974, 
Bourassa et al. 1999). The estimated coefficients provide hedonic prices of characteristics 
considered (Can 1990). Evans (1995) considers this to be analogous to shopping in a 
supermarket which does not price individual items and where people are simply told the 
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total price to be paid for their basket of goods. If each shopper is asked to list what they 
have bought and how much they have paid, given that a sufficient number of shoppers is 
asked, the price of individual items can be found by solving a set of simultaneous 
equations. Ideally, a hedonic model should include the full set of all significant 
determinants of housing unit price as independent variables. However, this is usually not 
feasible, so judgment and experience with real estate markets are used to augment the 
theory (Bowen et al. 2001). In most empirical research, the housing attributes, a subset of 
the many characteristics which could be used to describe the housing bundle (Palm 1978), 
are grouped into locational and structural categories (Olmo 1995). The first relates to 
accessibility and neighborhood characteristics associated with the dwelling. This group 
usually includes variables pertaining to some general socioeconomics characteristics, 
accessibility, and the level of public services. The second group includes the structural 
characteristics of the dwelling, such as its style, its lot size, the number of rooms, and the 
structural integrity of the building (Can 1990). The estimated regression model is called a 
hedonic model. The coefficients in a hedonic model, also called the implicit 
prices/elasticities of considered attributes (Orford 2000, Straszheim 1974), provide a set 
of hedonic prices that are the result of the equilibration of demand and supply for housing 
attributes (Linneman 1980). 
Hedonic regressions also can be used for testing if the posited submarkets are 
appropriately defined. This test procedure (Schnare and Struyk 1976, Palm 1978, 
Goodman and Thibodeau 1998) involves three stages. First, hedonic house price 
functions are estimated for the metropolitan area and each potential market segment in 
order to compare the market and submarket prices for a ‘standard’ dwelling. Second, a 
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Chow test or an F-test is computed to establish whether significant differences exist 
between the submarket specific prices, and between the submarket prices and the prices 
of the whole market. Third, a weighted standard error is calculated for the submarket 
model. This acts as a further ‘common-sense’ test of the significance of price differences 
for standard dwellings in different submarkets, and also allows us to compare the effect 
on the accuracy of the house price models when different submarket definitions and 
stratification schemes are compared (Watkins 2001).  If the submarkets do exist, the 
strength and the direction of the coefficients of the whole market model and the 
submarket models should differ, and an F-test should show that the submarket models 
significantly reduce the squared error of the price change variable (Palm 1978). The 
problem with this procedure is that the submarkets are imposed rather than modeled. If 
submarkets impact housing prices, the factors that define the submarkets would be 
expected to affect the prices as well (Goodman and Thibodeau 1998). 
In order to interpret the marginal implicit prices (the coefficients in the hedonic model) 
the hedonic model has to be based on the assumptions of a competitive and equilibrium 
market, and symmetric information between seller and buyer. The first assumption 
indicates that the housing prices and hedonic prices clear the market for a given stock of 
houses and attributes (Olmo 1995, Wilhelmsson 2000). This means, given both 
consumers and producers base their locational and quantity decisions on maximizing 
behavior, and buyers have the freedom of movement across space and time, the amount 
of houses offered by sellers at every place in the urban area must equal the amount 
demanded by consumers choosing to locate there (Rosen 1974, Atkinson and Crocker 
1992). The second assumption implies each household is perfectly informed as to house 
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price, house attributes and other related market conditions, and transaction and moving 
costs are zero (Wilhelmsson 2000). We will see how these assumptions are satisfied in 
the last paragraph of this chapter. 
Based on these assumptions, the classic specification of the hedonic regression model 
that has been used in the majority of hedonic research is (Can 1990): 
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where Z is housing price, Sk are structural characteristics, Lj are locational characteristics, 
α, β and δ are regression model parameters, and ε is the disturbance term. The model is 
usually estimated by ordinary least-squares (OLS) techniques.  
Sometimes polynomial models are employed (Halvorsen 1981). The general form of 
these models is: 
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where λ and γ are positive integers and the other parameters and variables have the same 
definitions as in (3.1). 
Other functional forms are also available (Goodman and Kawai 1986) but most are 
just transformations or modifications of these two forms. In practice, the independent 
variables (attributes) adopted by researchers vary with the purposes of their research but 
still fall into the three categories: structural attributes, locational attributes and others 
(Table 2-2). The choice of functional form is usually based mainly on the considerations 
of convenience in dealing with the problem at hand (Halvorsen 1981). However, there are 
still some guidelines to follow. As Orford (2000) advised, the form of the hedonic model 
should reflect the processes and structures implicit in local housing market dynamics, 
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which requires a more realistic treatment of the supply and demand of housing attributes, 
taking into account both the compositional nature of the housing stock and the contextual 
nature of urban space. Similarly, Feldstein (1982) and Bowen et al. (2001) suggest that a 
good model should conform to three criteria, parsimoniousness, plausibility, and 
informativeness. A model is deemed parsimonious if it contains the minimum number of 
attributes, plausible if its variables and the relations between them are justifiable, and 
informative if it provides situational guidance appropriate to the application at hand 
(Bowen et al. 2001).  
The classic specifications have many limitations. First, they are based upon the 
assumption of a single housing market functioning in instantaneous equilibrium which 
indicates that the parameters of the model (the hedonic prices) are constant across urban 
space (Maclennean and Tu 1996, Olmo 1995). This view ignores the fact that the urban 
housing market is comprised of a set of submarkets, which can lead to disequilibrium in 
the supply and demand of housing (Goodman and Thibodeau 1998, Orford 2000, 
Straszheim 1974). A huge variation exists both in the types of housing available across 
spatial submarkets and in the demand for housing of a given type in any spatial 
submarket (Straszheim 1974). Therefore, hedonic models may be subject to aggregation 
bias because of the failure to account for submarkets in the hedonic specification 
(Straszheim 1975). Furthermore, this failure may lead to misleading inferences about the 
magnitude and significance of parameter estimates and it can also negatively affect the 
validity of a wide range of standard diagnostic tests (Anselin 1988). That is to say, that if 
the hedonic modeling is based on transaction data drawn from a variety of submarkets 
within the local housing market, then the estimates will not accurately reflect the relevant 
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attribute price in any of the submarkets. This means that the “average” attribute price 
estimated using the hedonic technique is distorted due to aggregation bias (Watkins 1999). 
Therefore, in order to improve the statistical reliability of the estimates, determine the 
influences of area-specific coefficients and predict housing prices, the model 
specification must capture sufficiently the structure of the local housing market 
(Straszheim 1974, Palm 1978, Goodman 1981, Orford 2000), i.e. the disaggregation or 
aggregation of the urban housing market. A good practical way is to conduct a multilevel 
study, which means the regression of housing price on housing attributes for each 
submarket (Orford 2000).  
Moreover, ignoring the structures and processes associated with the housing market 
can have other consequences. In particular, hedonic models may suffer from 
heteroscedasticity and spatial autocorrelation that will violate the assumptions of 
independently identically distributed (IID) errors in OLS regression (Olmo 1995, Orford 
2000). To avoid violating the assumptions, the specification must allow for housing 
bundles and housing submarkets (Orford 2000). In practice, generalized least squares 
(GLS) and iterative procedures or Kriging methods also can be used to improve hedonic 
models (Dubin 1992, Olmo 1995). 
In order to avoid the limitations associated with the classic specification of the 
hedonic model, I will allow submarkets in my model (Orford 2000). Moreover, my model 
integrates the variables of economic transition, FDI and urban transformation to 
investigate the impacts of FDI, economic transition and urban transformation on housing 
price.  
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In this model, Sk, Lj, α, β, δ and ε have the same definitions as their counterparts in 
the classical model (3.1). The dependent variable is a little bit different from the one of 
the classical model in that Zkj represents the hedonic price of the representative house in 
the kjth joint spatial structural submarket. Many new variables and coefficients are 
introduced in the model: Fi is distance to FDI-concentrated areas and distance to foreign 
companies; Tm are economic transition variables like property rights, the existence of 
which is the direct result of economic transition; Un denote urban transformation variables 
such as distance to newly-built roads, distance to new open-spaces, distance to newly-
built urban areas, and percentage of youth and elderly; and γ, η and λ are regression 
model parameters.  
This specific model could be generalized as: 
Zn = fn(c1n,…,cin)  
where cin refers to the ith component in the nth submarket. The model will be applied to 
the overall market and each submarket. By checking the significance (t-test) of 
coefficients, I can test the hypotheses on the effects of FDI, economic transition and 
urban transformation at both overall market and submarket levels. Moreover, 
investigating the model specifications, I can determine if the hedonic models are 
significantly different across submarkets.  
3.2.3. Submarkets 
There is still no consensus on methods to stratify the housing market. The 
information used to define the submarkets is predetermined by some prior view of what is 
important (Bourassa 1999). To date, three different stratification schemes have been 
developed. The first and earliest classification is based on spatial compartmentalization 
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that can be traced to Straszheim’s study of San Francisco (Straszheim 1975). He 
subdivided the market into zones that comprise relatively homogenous households and 
dwellings. The second method is based on housing structure, i.e. housing’s physical 
attributes. The last method recognizes the joint importance of spatial and structural 
characteristics (Watkins 2001) in that it combines both spatial characteristics and stock 
characteristics. All the three methods have been used in empirical studies (Table 3-2). In 
the following, more details about the three methods are described.  
Table 3-2: Classification of submarket studies (revised from Watkins (2001))  
Authors Study Area Study Date Method  
Strasheim (1975a) San Francisco Bay, USA 1965 Spatial 
Schnare and Struyk 
(1976) 
Boston, USA 1971 Spatial, 
structural 
Ball and Kirman 
(1977) 
Bristol, UK 1970/1971 Spatial 
Palm (1978) San Francisco Bay, USA 1971 and 1978 Spatial 
Sonstelie and 
Portney (1980) 
San Mateo, USA 1969/1970 Spatial 
Goodman (1981) New Haven, USA 1967-1969 Joint 
Dale-Johnson 
(1982) 
Santa Clara, USA 1977 Structural 
Gabriel (1984) Beer Sheva, Israel 1982 Spatial 
Bajic (1985) Toronto, Canada 1978 Structural 
Munro (1986) Glasgow, UK 1983/1984 Spatial 
Maclennan et al. 
(1987) 
Glasgow, UK 1976 and 1985/1986 Spatial 
Michaels and 
Smith (1990) 
Boston, USA 1977-1981 Spatial 
Rothenberg et al. 
(1991) 
Des Moines, USA 1963 and 1971 Structural 
Hancock (1991) Tayside, UK 1977/1978-1986 Spatial 
Allen et al. (1995) Clemson, USA 1991 Structural 
Adair et al. (1996) Belfast, UK 1992 Joint 
Maclennan and Tu 
(1996) 
Glasgow, UK 1984 and 1990 Joint 
Bourassa et al. 
(1999) 
Sydney and Melbourne, 
Australia 
1991 Spatial and 
joint 
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(a) Spatial submarkets 
Spatial submarkets are comprised of relatively contiguous households and dwellings. 
Goodman (1981) claims that because demand and supply are spatially segmented, market 
segmentation by area seems appropriate. Several methods have been developed to 
identify spatial submarkets. 
(a1) Census boundaries. This is the earliest published method for subdividing housing 
submarkets based on spatial location. The basic idea is stratifying neighborhoods based 
on the characteristics derived from the census (Straszheim 1975, Schnare and Struyk 
1976, Ball and Kirwan 1977). (a2) Administrative boundaries. Straszheim, Sonstelie and 
Portney (1980) use a city’s government administrative boundaries to stratify the urban 
housing market. (a3) Postcodes. The idea of this method is to pool houses from the same 
postcode (Hancock and Maclennan 1989). (a4) Principal components analysis and cluster 
analysis. Maclennan et al. (1987) use a principal components analysis to group 
neighborhoods with similar dwelling stocks and socioeconomic characteristics. Similarly, 
Bourassa et al. (1999) use a principal components analysis to identify the important 
characteristics of local government districts. Then cluster analysis is used to determine 
the most appropriate groupings of districts. (a5) Information flows. As Bourne and 
Simmons (1978) point out, a major weakness in most attempts to delimit submarkets is 
the failure to take into account the ways in which households search for housing (Palm 
1978). Therefore, some researchers have attempted to segment the market on the basis of 
information flows. For instance, Palm (1978) divides San Francisco on the basis of 
districts within which real estate agents exchange information on vacancies. However, 
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despite the intuitive appeal of this approach, there were difficulties in establishing a 
consensus (Watkins 2001). 
 (b) Structural submarkets 
An alternative to spatial segmentation bases submarkets on the characteristics of the 
housing structure. The ways employed include the following. 
(b1) Floor area and lot size (Bajic 1985). Houses with similar floor area or lot size 
are aggregated to form a submarket. (b2) Dwelling type. Allen et al. (1995) divide 
housing markets by differentiating houses between condominiums, single-family homes, 
and apartments. Similarly, Orford (1999) bases his segmentation on distinguishing 
terraces, semi-detached, detached, purpose-built flats, flats in converted buildings, 
maisonettes and bungalows. The rationale of this method is that it is usual practice for 
real estate agents to describe each property by its dwelling type and that each of the 
dwelling types embodies a typical set of structural attributes (Orford 2000). (b3) Factor 
analysis of structural characteristics (Dale-Johnson 1982). Unlike the prior two 
approaches that are basically based on just one or a small number of variables, Dale-
Johnson uses a wide variety of structural variables and employs Q-factor analysis to 
establish submarkets.  
(c) Joint spatial/structure submarkets 
The division of housing submarkets into spatial or structural is nonetheless 
problematic since the concept of housing bundles implies that locational and structural 
attributes may not be separable but may interact (Orford 2000). Especially in a large 
metropolitan area, it is unlikely that submarkets are based simply on one or two criteria 
(Palm 1978). As a result of this recognition, a more sophisticated submarket scheme, 
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joint spatial/structural submarkets, has been developed. The joint method matches the 
way people search for new homes. As Watkins (1999) argues, potential house buyers may 
focus their search for a new home on particular types of properties which are viewed as 
relatively close substitutes. In this case, potential buyers will extend their search to many 
geographical points in the market providing that the characteristics of the neighborhood 
in which the property is located are of equal quality.  
Adair et al. (1996) used the simplest version of this approach in their research on the 
Belfast housing market. The submarkets were identified by subdividing the city into inner 
city, middle city, and outer city, and then by differentiated as terraced, semi-detached, 
and detached dwellings within each area. In a different way, Watkins (2001) first 
stratified the housing market into three spatial submarkets, namely individual properties, 
enumeration districts (ED), and communities, and then divided these spatial submarkets 
according to dwelling type. Figure 3-3 may be helpful for understanding the joint 
submarkets.  
Figure 3-3 A nested local housing submarket structure (Tu 1997)  
(N=spatial submarket, SS=Structural submarket, D=dwelling) 
 
In the first level, spatial housing submarkets (N1 and N2) are distinguished. In the 
second level, the dwellings in each spatial housing submarket are grouped into structural 
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groups (for example, SS11, SS12 in N1) via their non-spatial dwelling components. The 
dwellings within each structural housing submarket (for example, dwellings D111 and 
D112 in SS11) are only different in terms of non-key dwelling components (Tu 1997).  
An ideal solution for submarket delimitation should possess the following three 
properties (Goodman 1981): (1) simplicity--- a solution with few submarkets is superior 
to a solution with many submarkets. (2) similarity--- the housing bundles within a 
submarket should be as similar as possible, thus yielding a high degree of homogeneity 
within submarkets. (3) compactness---contiguous submarkets of same type should be 
grouped together.  
In my research, I used the method of nested locational/structural submarkets to 
stratify Shanghai’s housing market (Figure 3-4). I subdivided the total housing market 
according to the administrative boundaries at first for convenience. This process 
generated ten spatial submarkets (ten central districts). Then, according to the building 
types, I defined old lane house, new lane house, multi-rise apartment, high-rise apartment, 
and garden house submarkets within each spatial submarket.   
Figure 3-4 Submarket Scheme of Shanghai housing market 
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…
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I also used Geographical Information System (GIS) to define locational/spatial 
submarkets. A GIS software bundle---ArcGIS has a function for spatial surface analysis. 
With this function, ArcGIS is able to generate a price surface for housing. This conveys 
both the location and price of housing in a single surface.  
3.3. Data  
In his paper about the British housing market, Bramley (1993) summarized the data 
needed for housing market research. These data fall into a number of categories: 
(a) Demographic data, which measure the overall scale of the market, potential 
demand flows, and alternative supply flows. The data include age structure, household 
structure, etc.  
(b) Economic data, indicators like GDP, employment/unemployment rate, earnings, 
foreign investment, asset investment, and other socioeconomic indicators. These 
economic variables play an important role in assessing housing demand. 
(c) Geographical variables, such as neighborhood quality, distance from urban 
centers and amenities.  
(d) Planning policies and land supply that can be obtained mainly from planning 
departments and/or land management departments. Planning policies and land supply are 
seen as the most important factors influencing housing supply. 
(e) Housing supply data, including housing supply, tenure supply (the types of 
tenures), vacancies and so on, which can be acquired mainly from official documents. 
(f) Housing price which is used to measure the demand and supply of housing.  
These data can be acquired from various sources (Table 3-3). The data needed for my 
study also fall in these categories. Considering the purposes of my research and the 
availability of data, I identify six potential sources (Table 3-4). 
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Table 3-3 Data source of housing market research 
Government  1. Unpublished government files, such as: city councils’ valuation rolls, 
deeds registry, building permits (Rakodi 1994); property tax files, 
subdivision records, regularization  
2. Published government documents, such as: statistic documents (Tse 
1998, Wu 2001); property review (Tse 1998); property price index (Ong 
and Sing 2002) 
Real estate 
agencies 
Private appraisers; real estate and/or financial agents 
Research 
institutes 
Property Research International (Berry et. al. 2001) 
Survey Builders’ and developers’ records (Rakodi 1994); household survey 
(Rakodi 1994, Orford 2000, Li and Siu 2001) 
Others Computer simulations (Tu 1997); newspaper’s advertisements (Rakodi 
1994, Peter et al. 1994); internet: professional real estate websites 
 
 
Table 3-4 Potential data sources of my research 
Sources Data Specified sources 
Published 
government 
documents 
income, population and 
macroeconomic 
indicators 
Shanghai Statistical Bureau: Yearbook 
(1990-2001) and its website, 
http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn/, 
http://www.realestate.cei.gov.cn 
Unpublished 
government 
files 
Housing price, land 
value, urban planning 
Shanghai Real Estate Exchange Centre, 
Shanghai Housing and Land Bureau, 
Bureau of Urban Planning, 
http://www.realestate.cei.gov.cn 
Newspaper 
advertisements 
housing price, house’s 
characteristics 
XinMing Evening Paper, Shengjiang FuWu 
DaoBao 
Real estate 
websites 
housing price, house’s 
characteristics 
http://www.ehousee.com/; http://www.for-
ease.com/; http://www.xinao.com.cn/; 
http://www.zhiheng.com.cn/; 
http://www.sakura-sh.com/; 
http://www.fangdi.com.cn/; 
http://www.sincere.com.cn/ 
Research 
institutes 
housing price, 
electronic map 
Eastern China Normal University, 
University of Southampton 
Surveys Information on 
structure and players  
household, developers, real estate agents, 
government, intermediaries, banks, 
professors 
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Housing price data were collected only for a one-month period. The housing 
transaction data of a full time series (1988-2003) are not needed because the hedonic 
model by its nature is a cross sectional model rather than a time-series one. A short period 
best guarantees the market is in equilibrium and modeling a short period is sufficient to 
illustrate the effects of FDI, economic transition and urban transformation on housing 
price. Moreover, the transaction data is second-hand housing market data, thus it is more 
likely to reflect true market value.  
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Chapter 4 Shanghai’s Housing Market 
In this chapter, economic transition/reform, FDI, and urban transformation, and their 
influences on the urban housing market will be illustrated with reference to China and 
Shanghai. Chapter 5 contains a discussion of market structure and market players in the 
Shanghai housing market. Chapter 6 contains the results of the hedonic modeling. 
4.1 China’s Reform and Economic Transition 
Since 1979, government power in China has been decentralized, a market economy 
has taken root and private enterprises have experienced rapid development. At the same 
time, China has emerged as a manufacturing powerhouse and cities have experienced 
large-scale rebuilding and restructuring (Mao 2004). Because the urban housing market 
came into being during this period of rapid change, an understanding of this 
transformation is critical for examining China’s urban housing market. In general, two 
trends, i.e. from planned to market and from public to private, characterize the 
transformation. 
4.1.1 From planned housing to housing market  
Thousands of new regulations and policies have been put into place since the 
beginning of the reform. This research will not go over all of them. Instead, only the 
government reform, open door policies, and policies stimulating urban transformation 
will be introduced because they correspond with economic transition, FDI and urban 
transformation respectively. 
1). Government reform  
There are several aspects of China’s government reform, including government 
organization, government functionality, and government power (Tang 2003, Mao 2004). 
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In terms of government organization, the reform aims at a smaller and more effective 
government; as for government functionality, government has been increasingly 
transformed to match the needs of a market economy; furthermore, government power 
has gradually decentralized from central government to local government and state-
owned enterprises (Mao 2004).  
The government reform was carried out in 5 year steps from 1982 to 2003 (Tang 2003, 
Mao 2004). The 1982 reform targeted downsizing the central government. The 1988 
reform aimed at not only a smaller government but also fewer government interventions 
in the economy. In 1992, the Chinese government decided to establish a market economy. 
Accordingly, the 1993 government reform mainly dealt with how to transform the 
government functionally to achieve this goal. The 1998 reform is an extension of the 
1993 reform. During this reform, several government departments were downsized 
because they were thought as serving a planned economy and thus were out of date. After 
the reform, more than 100 functions of central government were decentralized to local 
government and state-owned enterprises. Without further reducing the size of 
departments, the 2003 reform was characterized by reorganizing government departments 
and optimizing their functions. All these five reforms are centered on decentralizing 
power, downsizing the government and transforming government functions. 
Several goals have been achieved through the five consecutive government reforms 
(Tang 2003, Mao 2004). First, government became smaller and more effective than 
before. Second, local government and state-owned enterprises gained more powers. Third, 
laws and government regulations, gradually replacing government officials’ personal 
orders, are becoming the major ordinance that directs government activities. And fourth, 
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serving the market rather than regulating the market became the guideline for government 
behavior. 
Through government reform, the old planned market structure was broken down. An 
emerging huge market and a more efficient and pro-market government helped China 
become a favorite investment destination of foreign capital.  Economic development and 
the decentralization of power also provided local governments with more resources. All 
of these are the prerequisite conditions for the large-scale urban transformation in 
Chinese cities.  
2). Open door policies  
China decided to come back onto the world economic stage in 1978 when the 11st 
Conference of Chinese Communist Party determined to open China’s door to the world. 
Since then, China has never stopped its steps toward wider openness. In terms of 
geographic extent, not only the coast provinces but also the inner provinces have been 
opened. In terms of investment sectors, elementary industries such as food processing as 
well as high tech industry and industries crucial for the national economy (such as 
infrastructure construction) have been opened to foreign investment (Kueh 1992, Chen et 
al. 1995, Sun 1998a, 1998b, Zhang 2002).  
China’s progress toward openness can be divided into three stages (Zhang 2002, 
Yang 2004). The first stage is from 1978 to 1992. In 1979, the first law addressing 
foreign investment, The Law of Sino-Foreign Joint Venture, was issued by the People’s 
Congress of China. In the same year, the first foreign-domestic joint venture was set up. 
In 1980, Xiaoping Deng, the former Chief Secretary of Chinese Communist Party, first 
proposed the Open Door policy as one of China’s base policies. Furthermore, in 1983, the 
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Chinese government relaxed previous restrictions on the investment sector for foreign 
capital. The second stage is from 1992 to 2001. At the beginning of 1992, Xiaoping Deng 
made a speech encouraging more daring reform steps during his tour to southern China 
(Jiang 1998). According to his speech, the 14th Conference of the Chinese Communist 
Party stipulated a series of open policies promoting the openness in more sectors and a 
wider geographic extent. The last stage began in 2001 when China was accepted by the 
WTO as a member. The acceptance by the WTO means deeper integration into the world 
economy.  
3). Policies stimulating urban transformation 
The emancipation policies that were initially designed to scale down the size of 
central government, lessen central government’s financial pressure, and give more power 
to local government unexpectedly became the major driving power of urban 
transformation. Through government reform, local government gained more powers 
regarding local infrastructure construction, property ownership, planning and 
development of international trade, fiscal arrangement, and taxation (Mao 2004). Local 
investment replaced central investment as the major source of domestic asset investment 
(Yang 2004). Accompanying government reform was the establishment of a new fiscal 
system, which was designed to increase incentives to the local governments in revenue 
collection and local economic development (Tang 2003).  
The new fiscal system increases the incentives to the local governments to develop 
their economies, while the emancipation of power enables them to use whatever ways 
they see fit to achieve economic development. The ways include more high-grade roads, 
convenient and fast urban transportation (subway and elevated light rail), provision of 
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well-equipped office buildings, policy-supported industrial districts, more open spaces, 
and so on (Wu and Yeh 1999).  A large-scale urban physical restructuring seems 
inevitable in such a political and economic environment.  Meanwhile, the fiscal and 
power decentralization has created multiple power centers (for example, district 
government), and has brought forth issues of conflict, competition and rivalry between 
the power centers (Keivani et al. 2001). The competition between district governments 
has caused multi-center cities to replace single-center cities as the major form of Chinese 
large cities.  
4.1.2 From public to private  
Housing was public-owned before it was privatized during the reform. In this section, 
an introduction to China’s traditional urban housing system and housing reform will be 
presented.  
1). China’s traditional housing system 
The housing system developed since 1949 promoted public ownership and excluded 
the functioning of market mechanisms. Private housing was confiscated and set under the 
control of the government. All urban housing was actually public housing with no 
exceptions. Chinese government then distributed this confiscated housing and newly-built 
public housing directly to urban residents or to work units that further allocated housing 
units to their employees. Government essentially intervened in the whole process from 
housing construction and housing distribution to management and maintenance. There 
was no room for the market to take a role.  
This housing system had some particular characteristics. First of all, as just stated, 
urban housing was predominantly owned by the public sector. Second, housing was 
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distributed freely among citizens and the only criterion for access to housing was ‘need’ 
(Wang and Murie 1996). Every household could have their housing units. But the 
conditions10 of the housing units one could get all depended on his/her status in his/her 
work unit, which usually included ranking and seniority. Other factors such as the size 
and composition of a family rarely played a significant role. Third, this traditional 
housing system was integrated into the country’s welfare system. The majority of housing 
buildings were enclosed in working units that consisted of working place, living place, 
and other supporting facilities, such as stores, clubs, and even schools and hospitals (Wu 
and Yeh 1999). Work units distributed housing units to their employees as a benefit. The 
typical housing under the traditional housing system was just basic: a room for a couple, 
one for the children, a bathroom for every two families, a large kitchen to every three or 
four families, various community facilities in every block and other leisure/cultural health 
facilities for every several blocks (Enzo 1987).  
The problem of this system was that if the fiscal condition of working units or the 
government became worse, the living condition of urban residents worsened too. Actually, 
this was exactly what happened in China before 1978. In 1978, by the end of the Cultural 
Revolution, the overall housing conditions were extremely poor under the growing 
pressure of urbanization and a worsening fiscal condition. The average living space per 
capita decreased from 4.5 m2 in 1952 to 3.6 m2 in 1978. One-third of urban households 
were experiencing housing hardship in 1978 (Li et al.1999). In addition, the public 
housing stock was so huge that most housing lacked maintenance simply because the 
government did not have enough funding. The improvement of living conditions under 
                                                 
10 Such as number of rooms, floor, direction, and the age of the housing unit 
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the old system seemed impossible. Therefore, reform in the housing system was 
inevitable (Li et al.1999, Zhang 2001).  
2). Housing reform 
Housing reform was implemented with two interrelated objectives (Wu 2001, Huang 
2003). The primary objective was to solve the housing shortage and improve housing 
consumption through privatization and the creation of a housing market. The other 
objective was to stimulate local economic growth and ‘modernization’ of the cities, in 
which commodity housing is used as an important instrument.  
Housing reform since 1978 can be classified into four stages (Zhang 2001). The first 
stage was an experimental period during which three experiments of housing reform were 
carried out:  1) the full cost price housing sale experiment between 1979 and 1982 in 50 
cities; 2) the subsidized housing sale experiment between 1982 and 1985, which was a 
response to the failure of the first full cost sale experiment; 3) the experiment between 
1986 and 1988, which focused on the adjustment of public housing rents.  
The second stage between 1988 and 1994 was characterized by implementing the 
1988 National Housing Reform Plan, which promoted housing reform in the whole nation 
and introduced different approaches to housing reform, such as rent adjustment, public 
housing sale and financial reform (Tang and Xie 1992). The pace of housing reform 
accelerated after 1992. In 1993, profit-oriented commercial housing development began 
to surpass the provision of public housing, which indicated that market forces had 
gradually grown out of the centrally-planned system. Another significance of the 1988 
plan lies in the opening-up of the second hand market (resale market). But the stipulation 
did not come true in Shanghai until early 1998 when Shanghai’s urban residents who 
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bought former public housing were allowed for the first-time to put their housing on the 
secondary housing market and trade for better housing (China Daily, 25 May 1998, 7). 
The third stage between 1994 and 1998 concentrated on the establishment of the 
housing financial system in which the Housing Provident Fund scheme was introduced as 
a major strategy for restructuring the housing financial system (Zhang 2001). The fourth 
stage since 1998 was the introduction of housing allowances and the termination of 
housing subsidies. Before 1998, work units could sell the commodity housing that they 
bought from the developers, or housing built by the units, to their employees at 
discounted prices. Since 1998, the provision of all welfare housing has been gradually 
ended. Sitting tenants of public housing could choose to buy out the property right of 
their apartments or pay higher rent. Individuals buying public housing at market prices 
can enjoy a full ownership right. They also have the option of paying a price lower than 
the market price, but when purchasing units at this lower price, they obtain limited 
ownership rights or even use-only rights. The 1998 reform aimed to ensure that all 
housing would eventually be exchanged through the market rather than through the 
administrative allocation process.  
Although the housing reform in Shanghai is generally in line with the framework of 
the nation’s reform, it has some uniqueness. In 1979, Shanghai was selected as one of the 
50 cities that conducted the full cost price housing sale experiment, targeting those who 
had overseas relatives. However, Shanghai’s housing reform before 1990 progressed 
slowly (Wu 2001, Huang 2003). After 1990, the situation changed. Substantial progress 
was made in raising the supply of better quality housing through heavy investment 
(Huang 2003, 2004). One reason was the opening up of the urban real estate market to 
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foreign investors starting from 1993. This was the first time that foreign investment was 
allowed into the real estate market. Meanwhile, steps were taken to stimulate the demand 
side. Since 1998, all banks have been allowed to provide mortgages to qualified home-
buyers. By early 2001, officials estimated that in Shanghai about 60 per cent of all 
families may have bought their own homes, either from their employers or from private 
developers (Yusuf and Wu 2002). 
4.2 Foreign Investment in Shanghai 
Since the open-door policy was implemented, FDI in Shanghai has undergone a 
progress of rapid growth (Figure 4-1). According to Figure 4-1, we can divide the process 
into 3 stages:  
• The first period is from 1981 to 1991. Three events contributed to the 
development of FDI in this period. In 1984, Shanghai was named one of the 
COCs (Coastal Open City) and was granted many favorable policies.  In 1986, 
two economic and technological development zones (ETDZ) were set up in 
Minghang and Hongqiao districts for foreign investment. The last event is the 
opening of Pudong New Area in 1990;  
• The second period from 1992 to 1997 is a booming period. The opening of 
tertiary industries in 1992 is the reason for the booming period;  
• The third period from 1998 to 2000 is an adjustment stage. The Asian Finance 
Crisis accounted for this reversal of fortunes because the ability of eastern and 
southeastern Asian countries and regions to export capital was inevitably 
impaired by the Crisis (Wei et al. 1999, Sun 2001).  
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Figure 4-1: The growth of foreign direct investment in Shanghai (1981-2000) 
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The geographic distribution of FDI is uneven in Shanghai. Pudong new urban area 
performs very well in attracting FDI. By the end of 1999, the total FDI in Pudong 
accounted for 29.63% of the total FDI in Shanghai. FDI in Pudong clusters in special 
development zones (LFTZ, JEPZ, ZHP and WFTZ)11 while the southeastern area has a 
low FDI level. These zones are special economic development areas with preferential 
policies, first-class infrastructure, and other privileges granted by government. In Puxi, 
the old city area, by the end of 1999, the top 3 districts with the most realized FDI are 
Jingan, Huangpu and Luwan districts (Table 4-1). Generally, FDI in Puxi is 
symmetrically distributed along the Huangpu-Jingan axis. FDI decreases gradually along 
with the distance to this belt (Figure 4-2).  
                                                 
11 LFTZ-Lujiazhu Finance and Trade Zone, JEPZ- Jinqiao Export Processing Zone, ZHP-
Zhangjiang High-tech Park, WFTZ-Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone 
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Table 4-1 FDI distribution in Central Districts (by the end of 1999) 
District Realized FDI 
(US$ billion) 
Rank Investment density   
( US$ billion/km2) 
Rank 
Jingan 2.994 1 0.393 2 
Huangpu 2.764 2 0.609 1 
Minghang 2.410 3 0.007 10 
Luwan 2.320 4 0.288 3 
Xuhui 1.698 5 0.031 7 
Hongkou 1.497 6 0.064 4 
Zhabei 1.180 7 0.041 6 
Putuo 0.718 8 0.013 9 
Changning 0.514 9 0.013 8 
Nanshi 0.464 10 0.052 5 
Yangpu 0.158 11 0.003 11 
Source: www.shanghai.gov.cn 
Figure 4-2 FDI Distribution in Shanghai Central Districts 
 
The sectoral distribution of FDI also is not even. Shanghai’s open policies in 1980s 
encouraged FDI in the industrial sector, but tightly controlled FDI in service sector. One 
of the results of this policy is that by the end of 1991, 84.1% of foreign invested projects 
were related to the industrial sector. Entering the 1990s, because the Shanghai 
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government adopted a “services first, industrial second, extractive third” policy, the 
percentage of FDI in the services gradually increased. In 1999, the contracted FDI in 
services accounted for 47.5% of total contracted FDI in Shanghai, which was close to the 
proportion accounted for by the industrial sector.  
4.3 Urban Transformation in Shanghai  
Shanghai, the economic center of China, has greatly benefited from the new fiscal 
system and decentralization of power. Its large economy means that Shanghai has more 
financial resources to fund its economic development and urban restructuring than other 
municipal governments. The incomparable political status12 of Shanghai’s mayors also 
brings Shanghai’s government more freedom to decide its local affairs, such as urban 
restructuring.  
The urban structure of Shanghai before 1980s was characterized by the over-
concentration of industrial enterprises and work units in the inner city. Work units may 
include factory buildings, residential quarters for the workers and their families, retail 
outlets, schools, clinics, and even hospitals (Yeh and Wu 1996, Ma 2002). Since 1980s, 
Shanghai has experienced a large-scale spatial restructuring which has been articulated in 
three interconnected ways: reorganization of the city around multiple business and 
service centers, increased district specialization and the establishment of large-scale 
development zones (Gaubatz 1999). 
The first articulation has lead to multi-nucleation (Gaubatz 1999). On one hand, the 
status of the old city center, Nanjing Road and Waitan area, was reinforced because of the 
urban renovation programs. On the other hand, new city centers, such as the Xuhui area 
                                                 
12 Shanghai’s mayor is a member of CCP Political Bureau, the most powerful of political units in 
China. The former president of China, Zheming Jiang, and the former premier, Rongji Zhu, were 
both previous Shanghai mayors. 
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and the Huaihai Road area have emerged. The second articulation is increased district 
specialization. Residential areas, manufacturing, and commercial districts have been 
increasingly separated from each other. During the past decades, Shanghai’s government 
has redeveloped the dilapidated neighborhoods for commercial use and relocated the 
residents to new housing estates in peripheral urban area. Since 1990, the industrial sector 
located in central city has been replaced by services and the industries have been 
relocated to planned industry districts in the city’s periphery. By the end of 1997, about 
700 production sites within the inner city were moved out, making available 3 km2 of 
land for use by the service industry (Fang 1997, p. 5). The outcome of the massive 
renovation of central city and relocation of housing and industry is that a new central 
business district (CBD) is emerging. The third major articulation, the establishment of 
large-scale development zones, is gradually reorganizing the city around massive planned 
areas designed to attract and utilize inward investment. Shanghai has three high-
technology and industrial development zones, Hongqiao, Caohejing and Minhang, all of 
which are located south and west of the city core. Other planned zones, such as export 
processing zones and free tariff zones, have been established in Pudong.  
Meanwhile, urban infrastructure, especially transportation infrastructure, has been 
greatly improved. Examples included additional subway lines, Huangpu Bridge, Nanpu 
Bridge, Yangpu Bridge, Lupu Bridge, the inner- and outer- ring elevated highway, 
Pudong International Airport, the expansion of Hongqiao Airport, and the Shanghai deep-
water port. These new infrastructure projects are quickly transforming the city’s 
accessibility, creating new development spaces, and accelerating the conversion of land. 
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4.4 FDI13, ET, UT and the Urban Housing Market  
Inflow of foreign investment, economic transition, and urban transformation are three 
closely related processes (Figure 4-3). Working separately or collectively, they influence 
the urban housing market. In the following, the relationships between FDI, ET and UT 
and the urban housing market will be illustrated.  
4.4.1 Foreign investment and economic transition 
In the early years of China’s reform, foreign investment did not have much influence 
on economic transition because the scale of FDI was very small at that time. It was the 
government who guided and controlled economic transition. Moreover, the reason for 
economic transition was domestic pressure (Han 2000, Zhang 2001) not any 
consideration of foreign capital. Decentralization changed the situation by creating the 
conditions for FDI to influence transition. The reasoning is: decentralization gave local 
government the freedom to decide local affairs, such as stipulating policies and 
regulations; government officers used that freedom to create preferential policies for 
foreign investment14. Without the pressure from foreign investment, these policies would 
not been promulgated and since these policies are important components of economic 
transition, economic transition in China would not be as it is. 
Meanwhile, foreign investment also introduced ideas about the market economy. 
These ideas were borrowed by Chinese government to establish its own market economy. 
One example is the housing market. Both the Housing Provident Fund and the National 
Comfortable Housing Project are the Chinese versions of Hong Kong and Singapore’s 
                                                 
13 In China, FDI is the major effect and symbol of globalization. So in the following, this research 
uses FDI or foreign investment to substitute for globalization. 
14 Government officers have strong incentives to do this because they must show they have strong 
capabilities to advance economic development (Wu 2003) in order to be promoted to a higher 
position. The convenient and fast way to achieve economic development is foreign investment. 
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counterparts. Another example is China’s stock market that also is configured like those 
in Hong Kong and Singapore in terms of products and services (for example, ST stock, 
PT stock, and QFII).  
Figure 4-3 FDI, ET, UT and urban housing market 
 
Notes: 
1. At the beginning, inflow of FDI and economic transition were two separately operating 
processes. But along with the opening of the country, global competition has accelerated and 
deepened economic transition. 
2. FDI and economic transition indirectly affect the urban housing market through their influence 
on urban transformation. 
3. Foreign investment also has direct influences on urban housing market. 
4. Economic transition affects urban housing market. On the other hand, the urban housing 
market also influences economic transition. 
 
4.4.2 Economic transition and urban transformation: 
Economic transition has brought fascinating changes to China’s urban physical 
structure during the past decade (Han 2000). Such changes could not have been realized 
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without the decentralization of power and the implementation of economic reform in the 
urban land system, especially the introduction of a housing and land market (Li 2003).  
The reemergence of a rent gradient and the introduction of land prices in Chinese 
cities as a result of the adoption of the land-leasing system provided the work units and 
the local government with incentives to make profits from trading land (Wu 1997). 
Meanwhile, decentralization of power provided local government and work units with the 
freedom to manage their assets, including land. They can sell their land that is located in 
central cities to generate a substantial capital flow, and then buy peripheral land at a low 
price to build new facilities for the work units. Through this process the original urban 
form composed of individual work units (cells) was broken up and changed to a more 
diffuse one through polycentric and suburban development (Lo 1994, Wu and Yeh 1999, 
Ma 2002). Moreover, the relocation of work units has led to a large scale redevelopment 
in the central city and the separation of the home and shopping areas from the workplace 
(Li and Siu 2001). Without housing and land markets where the land and housing 
transactions occur, the whole process of urban transformation would not be possible. The 
housing and land markets actually provide an effective means for readjusting the spatial 
structure of cities. 
4.4.3 FDI and urban transformation: 
Foreign investments are extremely sensitive to good infrastructure, cheap land, and 
preferential government policies (Eng and Lin 1996). In order to attract more foreign 
investment, local government needs to create these advantages and this occurs mainly 
through massive urban restructuring. As a result, FDI is becoming a driving force in the 
formation of Chinese metropolitan structure (Wu 2000).  
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The significant impacts of foreign investment on urban spatial structure include the 
development of infrastructure such as transport facilities and communication 
infrastructure, the establishment of industry zones/parks and Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs) such as LFTZ, JEPZ, ZHP and WFTZ on the outskirts of Shanghai, and the 
redevelopment of dilapidated central areas.  This is because global companies are 
inclined to locate their headquarters, representative offices, management offices, sales 
offices and service centers in the city center and place the manufacturing functions in the 
suburbs. This arrangement requires a good transportation system.  
The integration into the global economic system has opened up new resources for 
urban development (Wu 2001). Foreign investors have directly provided capital for urban 
transformation by participating in real estate development in central and peripheral urban 
areas. Meanwhile, through leasing land to foreign investors, the government has gained a 
great deal of revenue, which helped local government to finance urban infrastructure 
projects (Chan 1996). 
4.4.4 Economic transition and the urban housing market: 
Economic reform, especially land and housing reform, has transformed the roles of 
government and state-own enterprises in the urban housing market and introduced 
various independent market players and market mechanisms and rules. Through housing 
reform, the state was gradually released from providing welfare housing. The role of the 
state has gradually transited towards regulating, steering and enabling the development of 
the market. Meanwhile, the introduction of a price mechanism made commercial housing 
development a profitable venture. As a result, state-owned enterprises and private 
businesses or joint ventures became independent players in the market as major suppliers 
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of commercial housing. Another important institution, the real estate intermediary, was 
introduced into the market because of the reforms. The Urban Real Estate Administration 
Law (UREAL) (1995) provided legal foundations for the creation of real estate 
intermediaries to facilitate the development of commercial housing.  
In addition to the emergence of new market players, the reforms have established a 
new market structure, including market principles, and legal and regulatory frameworks 
guiding land, housing, development and transactions. For example, the 1988 
constitutional amendment allowed land use rights to be leased and transferred for the first 
time. In 1990, the government further introduced regulations guiding leasing and 
transferring, which laid the foundation for the construction of a market land system. 
Moreover, in 1995, UREAL was released, which is the first law aiming to regulate the 
urban real estate market. 
Reform of the housing finance system gave another push to the development of the 
housing market (Zhang 2001). Before housing reform, housing was almost entirely 
financed by the state through state budgetary funding. Reform of the housing finance 
system aims to relax the government’s control over housing finance, widen the finance 
sources, change the state-monopolistic approach to a market approach through the 
development of housing financial institutions, and produces an adequate and stable flow 
of funds to the housing sector. The banking system also has been reformed to provide 
easier finance to enterprises, and government financing has been replaced with loans 
based on market principles.  
Housing reform also caused the unique characteristics of China’s housing market. 
That is, three types of property rights coexist in the market. In the 1994 Housing Reform 
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Resolution, the selling prices of housing were classified into three categories: market 
prices, cost prices and standard prices. Market prices refer to the sale of full property 
rights of a housing unit. The purchasers of cost price housing have restrictions on the 
resale and are only allowed to resell their housing 5 years after purchase, while those who 
bought housing at standard prices only have partial property rights. In other words, the 
proportion of property rights sold to individuals is determined by the proportion of full 
market price paid by housing purchasers (Zhang 2001).  
4.4.5 FDI and the urban housing market 
Foreign investment was crucial for the establishment of China’s urban housing 
market. It has not only introduced foreign investors into the urban housing market as new 
market players, but also effectively formed the primary demand for high-quality offices 
and housing (Wu 1999). Moreover, FDI contributed to capital formation in real estate 
development. The flow of foreign capital into real estate development was necessary to 
overcome the initial scarcity of capital and develop a dynamic and profitable real estate 
market by attracting domestic investment in real estate (Wu 2001).  
FDI has also has triggered a change in the rules of the urban housing market. 
Government officials gradually found that they were not able to control the market as 
they wanted. For example, instead of dominating negotiations as they did with domestic 
companies (especially state-owned enterprises), government has to negotiate with foreign 
investors as an equal (Wu 2001). Otherwise, foreign investment will escape to other 
destinations.  
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Last but not least, foreign investment also contributed to the increase in real estate 
prices in Shanghai. Sustained flow of foreign investment into real estate made Shanghai 
different from other cities after the tightening of macroeconomic policy in 199415.  
While FDI has greatly affected the urban housing market in Shanghai, it alone did 
not create the urban housing market. Rather FDI created initial conditions that have 
spurred domestic capital investment in the city. 
4.4.6 Urban transformation and the urban housing market 
The direct influences of economic transition and FDI are largely on the market 
players and the market structure while urban transformation has direct impacts on 
housing price through changing houses’ locational characteristics, specifically 
accessibility and amenity. Through their effects on urban transformation, economic 
transition and FDI also impose indirect influences on housing price. The influences of 
urban transformation on housing price are relatively straightforward and have been 
extensively addressed in literature (Edelstein 1974, Straszheim 1975, Johnston 1976, 
Grigsby et al. 1987, Giussani and Hadjimatheou 1992, Gaubatz 1999, Wu and Yeh 1999, 
Han 2000, Orford 2000, Lin 2001, Fang and Zhang 2003, Lipscomb 2003, Wu 2003).  
The next chapter provides an investigation of market structure and market players in 
the Shanghai housing market. This will help us better understand the modeling results in 
Chapter 6 and it also is one of the major components of this research.  
                                                 
15 The 1994 tightening policy caused a price drop in most Chinese cities except Shanghai.   
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Chapter 5 Market Players in the Shanghai Housing Market 
As Lanegran and Palm (1978) suggest, the price of property is also likely to be 
determined socially by various rules, resources, relationships and strategies16. In some 
circumstances, such as in China, market structure may play an even more significant role 
in determining housing price. Therefore, it is important to understand both the market 
structure and the market players who operate in the Shanghai housing market. However, 
the primary reason for conducting the analysis on the market players and structure is to 
answer how FDI, economic transition and urban transformation form and modify the 
market structure and these same factors affect market players. In other words, the main 
reason is to respond research question 1 (refer to Chapter 1).    
5.1 Market structure 
Rules are the core component of market structure. In Shanghai, economic transition 
and FDI powerfully influence market rules. Most policies and regulations17 on planning, 
housing development, land acquisition, and household relocation did not exist until the 
reform period. China’s open policies have resulted in the inflow of foreign investment 
and foreign companies. This inflow was accompanied by an influx of management and 
operational experience. This experience has helped institute the real estate industry codes 
for Shanghai’s real estate companies, such as building design, project management, etc. 
Ning Zhu and Jingsong Wang (Table 5-1) both indicated to me that the competition from 
foreign real estate companies has stimulated the improvement of their routine 
management and operation and that the improvement was based on their companies’ 
                                                 
16 In the following sections, the term ‘market structure’ is used to represent rules, resources, 
relationships, strategies, etc.  
17 Yongdong Zhang (Table 3-1) estimated it was above 90%. 
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Table 5-1 The major persons in the survey (repeated Table 3-1) 
Name Institutions Representing
Ning Zhu Eastern China Regional Center of VanKe Real Estate 
Group 
Developers 
Jingsong 
Wang 
Department of Strategic Planning, Goldenfield 
Development Co. Ltd 
Developers 
Steve Clarke Freesia Development Ltd. Foreign 
investor 
Jun Hu Jian’an Planning Bureau Government 
Yongdong 
Zhang 
Department of City Development of Shanghai Government 
Dezhong 
Wang 
Research Lab of Shanghai Municipality Government 
Xiaojian Lu Finance News of Shanghai (Newspaper) Public Media
Jing Liu ZhongNan Property Consulting Inc. Real Estate 
Agents 
Xin Qian Self-employed in real estate business Real Estate 
Intermediary
Zhi Su Department of Real Estate Loan, China Industry and 
Commerce Bank (Sichuan Branch) 
Banks 
Li Qian Law Department, Huaxia Bank   Banks 
Zanhai Li 3rd village of Eastern China Normal University 
(ECNU) 
Households 
Facheng Zuo JiaFu Residential Community Households 
Yun Cheng JiaFu Residential Community Households 
Ji Li Tianyuan Residential Community Households 
Lili Zhao Jingfu Residential Community Households 
Yongyue 
Zhang  
(Dean) College of Orient Real Estate, ECNU Academia 
Bogeng Chen (Professor) College of Orient Real Estate, ECNU Academia 
Xiaodong 
Song 
(Professor) Department of Planning, Tongji 
University 
Academia 
Shiwen Sun (Associate Professor) Department of Planning, Tongji 
University 
Academia 
Yueming 
Ning 
(Professor) Department of Geography, ECNU Academia 
Hongming 
Zhang 
(Professor) the Center for Real Estate Research, 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) 
Academia 
Xuejin Zuo (Professor) the Economics Institute, SASS Academia 
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knowledge of how foreign companies manage and operate. Gradually, the industry codes 
followed by foreign companies were adopted by local companies and became the rules 
that all real estate companies in Shanghai’s housing market follow.  
Land was made available for commercial development during the housing reform. 
Meanwhile, urban renovation and urban development programs have provided more and 
more land for developers and investors. Before the reform, government was the only 
source of funding for housing development. The housing reform and accompanying 
monetary reform have enabled banks and other financial institutions to provide capital to 
developers and investors. For example, the money for routine operation and project 
development in Vanke and Goldenfield is now from banks and the stock market although 
they are both state holding companies18. Moreover, when asked how many real estate 
companies applied for loans, Li Qian and Zhi Su (Table 5-1) both said “too many”. At the 
same time, the opening of the domestic market has stimulated an influx of foreign capital 
into the urban housing market. Economic transition also led to the decentralization of 
power19. Local government acquired more power than before for managing local affairs, 
and different power centers have come into being. This new situation allows a greater 
leeway than ever before for market players to achieve their housing-related goals. In 
Shanghai’s housing market, power is the most important resource for anyone in the 
market since the control of power means the control of other resources (Xuejin Zuo, see 
Table 5-1).  
 
 
                                                 
18 State holding companies not only issue public-owned stocks, but also issue state-owned stocks 
which are the majority of the total shares.  
19 This refers to political power. 
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5.2 Market players 
Shanghai’s housing market brings together a variety of players, including government, 
work units, local developers, intermediary agencies, foreign investors, households and 
housing speculators. Land speculators were once major players during early 1990s but 
they as a group do not exist in today’s housing market because land use policies have 
become much more stringent since 1994.  
5.2.1 Government 
The state plays a role in real estate development, include planning, land allocation, 
relocation, development, and consumption. 
(a) Planning 
In Shanghai, all development projects must comply with the urban master plan. 
However, planning is not always strictly regulated and is likely to be modified 
continually. The reason is, as an anonymous interviewee working in a major university in 
Shanghai told me, “continued modification of planning rules can bring a lot of benefits to 
many government officers at certain positions”. Moreover, economic transition and FDI 
have caused constant shifting of the balance of power between the government and 
economic interests, which is another reason complicating the formation and 
implementation of urban planning in Shanghai. As Yeh and Wu (1996) state, the 
formation and implementation of urban planning now involves many agencies and actors 
who stand for various interests. The flexibility of urban planning leaves a great 
maneuvering space for developers and investors to implement their projects. Another 
anonymous interviewee who works in the planning department told me it was not unusual 
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to be asked to modify a plan when the modification would benefit certain real estate 
developers and projects, or certain areas.   
(b) Land provision20 
After getting the permission from planning authorities, the next step of real estate 
development is land acquisition. In Shanghai, government is the land owner and land 
provider. Land is leased by government free of charge under long-term leases free of 
charge to work units and other state-owned institutions. Land is leased by the government 
for a charge and for much shorter terms to private companies. Land under free, long-term 
lease by the government to work units or other state-owned institutions can be sublet in 
the short-term for a charge by those entities to private companies as well, thus there are 
sizable profits to be made by work units and government institutions in the land market. 
In Shanghai, this process is centered on the Shanghai Land Reserve Center, a branch of 
Land and Resources Bureau, which acquires urban land from urban residents and state 
institutions as their leases expire and reclaims rural land from farmers by authority, and 
then leases land to work units, government institutions, and private companies according 
to the Shanghai master plan or unit, institution and private company request (Xiaodong 
Song and Shiwen Sun, see Table 5-1).  
The potential for profit is very attractive to government departments and officials 
who want to gain part, if not all, of the profits of the land transactions. They cannot 
achieve this under the formal or legal process because any profits will become part of the 
revenue of the government. Therefore, the informal or quasi-legal process of land 
                                                 
20 Land allocation refers to the transfer of land use rights from the state to the users through land 
leasing (Wong and Zhao 1999). 
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subleasing came into being21. The emergence of an informal process not only provides a 
new way for developers and investors to acquire land, but also causes the loss of public 
credibility of government. The interviewees who are common Shanghai locals, such as 
Facheng Zuo, Yun Cheng, Ji Li, and Zanhai Li (Table 5-1), all think the government 
knows of the existence of the informal or quasi-legal land market but because the 
government is too vulnerable to the influence of developers and investors, it can not stop 
the market.  
 (c) Relocation 
Before constructing buildings, the sites need to be cleared and previous residents 
need to be relocated. This is especially important for development projects in the old 
central areas of the city that are densely populated. Shanghai local government is usually 
responsible for site clearance and resident relocation. Without the support of the local 
state and the use of various land acquisition regulations, it is impossible to achieve 
prompt site clearance (Wu 2000). Affected residents are usually compensated, but may 
not receive the market price. Relocation is a controversial topic. This research will 
discuss this topic in greater detail later. 
(d) Development 
The Shanghai government is also the principal investor in most real estate companies 
that dominate the local land-development business. According to Jing Liu’s (Table 5-1) 
estimation, there are about 200 real estate developers that are state invested, accounting 
for 80% of the developers in Shanghai’s housing market. The development companies 
that are owned or partly-owned in by the state are more likely to benefit from preferential 
policies, such as modified planning, and concessions or waiving of development-related 
                                                 
21 Wong and Zhao (1999) have detailed the formal and informal process of land allocation. 
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taxes, for example, the land value increment tax (Jing Liu) because “they help the 
government in local development” (Yongdong Zhang, see Table 5-1). The goal of 
government in setting up development companies is to promote local economic 
development and to provide subsidized or welfare housing to low-income households 
(Yongdong Zhang).  
(e) Housing provision  
The government and government agencies (for example, work units and housing 
bureaus) still play significant roles in housing provision although the provision is 
increasingly moderated by the market. Government is the only public housing provider in 
Shanghai’s housing market. The Housing Management Bureau controls the majority of 
public housing even though the stock of public housing is dwindling.  
The influence of FDI, economic transition and urban transformation on the role of 
government is evident. Economic transition has led to the housing reform while the 
housing reform has reduced the role of the state in the urban housing market through 
privatization and commercialization of housing. In addition, decentralization has led to 
multiple power centers. The competition for capital from other localities/power centers 
has further weakened the once unchallenged role of the Shanghai government in the 
market. Last, economic transition and FDI have introduced various players to the market, 
which help strengthen the role of the market.  
Despite these difficulties, all interviewees think government is the most powerful 
player in the market. The Shanghai government still guides urban development, provides 
supporting infrastructure, and intervenes in resource distribution, such as land allocation 
and cheap capital allocation. The powerful role of government as the decision-maker, 
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regulator, resource controller and participant in the urban housing market cannot be 
under-emphasized.  
5.2.2 Work units22 
Work units are unique players in China’s housing market. China’s reform has 
reduced the coordinating power of the state and increased the autonomy of work units 
(Zhang 2001). Although still controlled by the state, work units have become profit 
oriented and act more and more independently. The implications of this change to the 
Shanghai’s housing market are two-fold. On one hand, according to Xuejin Zuo, 
Hongming Zhang, and Xiaojian Lu (Table 5-1), as work units gain a high level of 
autonomy, they invest production funds in property markets. The ratio of housing 
investment to GDP can be used to highlight the tendency of capital shift from the sphere 
of production to the built environment (Wu 2001). From 1990 to 1999, this ratio changed 
from 3.47% to 9.04% (Shanghai Bureau of Statistics 2000). Many work units operate 
their own real estate projects or cooperate with real estate companies in real estate 
development. Bogeng Chen indicated to me that some projects were to solve the housing 
problems for the employees of work units23, but many more projects are purely for 
making profits through selling housing on the market. Work units have changed from the 
provider of welfare housing to profit-oriented real estate developers.  
The other indication of the change is related to land supply. The shift of capital from 
the production sphere to the built environment, together with falling profits from 
production, results in serious problems such as the reduction of employment, relocation 
                                                 
22 Work units are state-owned institutions and enterprises. 
23 This part of housing transaction is not subject to the influences of market. Inclusion of this kind 
of housing in the database is part of the reason for the unexpected results of hedonic models (refer 
to quantitative analysis).  
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and even closure. Both local governments and state enterprises urgently need capital to 
solve these problems. For work units, the fastest and most convenient way to acquire 
capital is to sell the land they occupy. While the state holds the nominal right of 
ownership, control of land is defined through actual occupancy and therefore is in the 
work units’ hands. They can sell the land to investors through the legal, quasi-legal or 
illegal land market. Investors are also willing to deal with work units because it is much 
easier to negotiate with them (Ning Zhu, see Table 5-1).  
In addition, work units used to be the major housing builders. Because of housing 
reform, they have withdrawn from direct involvement in housing construction. As a 
substitute, they bought housing from the market and then distributed it to their 
employees24. Recently, due to the deepening of housing reform, they do not directly 
provide housing for their employees any more, but they continue to provide housing 
subsidies in somewhat different forms (for example, Housing Purchase Subsidy- gou fang 
bu tie, and Housing Provident Fund- zhu fang gong ji jing) (Huang 2004). As Yongyue 
Zhang and Bogeng Chen (Table 5-1) said, in Shanghai it is a common practice for the 
high profile work units to provide large subsidies to their employees. 
In summary, the roles of work units in Shanghai’s urban housing market have 
diversified during the past few years. Economic development, urban transformation, and 
FDI have created growing demand for urban land and housing. Meanwhile, economic 
transition has given work units more autonomy in using the resources they control. Work 
units take advantage of this growing autonomy and have made themselves major 
commodity housing providers and land suppliers in Shanghai’s housing market.  
                                                 
24 same as footnote 34. 
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The transformation of their role has led to many negative outcomes. For example, in 
order to profit from transferring land use rights to investors and redevelop the site they 
occupy, the work units are eager to relocate their workers to new developments in 
suburban locations, but they often don’t provide enough compensation to their employees. 
This has caused many social conflicts. The enthusiasm of work units for real estate 
development and land use rights transfer originates from insider (work units managers) 
control. “The insiders have the actual control of the work units. Therefore, they can use 
any resources of the work units to meet their personal needs” (an anonymous 
interviewee). In addition, the role of work units as land suppliers conflicts with the role 
taken by the state. By law, government has the ultimate ownership of land. Only 
government has the right to determine who can use the land and how to use it. However, 
the fact is work units are the actual occupiers of urban land. The attempt of both sides to 
control urban land often triggers competitions between work units and government. 
Sometimes, this competition even becomes open conflict when the power of work units is 
large enough. The black land market is a by-product of this competition. On the black 
market, illegal or quasi-legal land transactions between work units and real estate 
investors are not subject the control of the state.  
5.2.3 Developers 
Before economic transition, government and work units were the only housing 
suppliers. Developers have emerged as the major housing providers in China’s housing 
market since 1990. The emergence of developers is attributed to housing reform, 
specifically the commodification of housing and the establishment of the urban housing 
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market. There are three types of local developers in Shanghai’s housing market, state- 
owned developers, collective-owned developers, and private developers.  
Compared to government and work units, developers are more centered on making 
profits. Their strategies and activities in the urban housing market reflect this. In order to 
achieve their goals, they must control as many resources (mainly, land and capital) as 
they can because control of more resources means greater advantage. In addition, they 
consistently strive to modify the rules (mainly, planning and taxation) and the 
relationships with other players (mainly, government and foreign investors) so that they 
can take as much advantage of the rules and relationships as they can. In a word, 
developers aim to control or modify everything that is helpful for making a profit. These 
activities have resulted in the bribery of the employees of government and other related 
institutions. Most interviewees in academia and public groups agree that bribery is 
inevitable. Yet, the positive effects of developers’ strategies and activities also should be 
noted. For example, Ning Zhu (Table 5-1) told me in order to maintain a good 
relationship with the Shanghai government, his company had taken part in some projects 
to build ‘welfare’ housing and housing for relocated residents. Moreover, according to 
Yongdong Zhang and Steve Clarke (Table 5-1), local developers have connections and 
knowledge of the local scene, which is extremely helpful for inexperienced foreign 
investors. Thus the cooperational relationship developed by local developers and foreign 
investors has contributed to the favorable environment for investment.  
Developers’ business requires government approvals and concessions or work units’ 
concessions. For example, building at a higher density than current plans allow, getting 
infrastructure installed at public expense, receiving loan or fiscal subsidies from the 
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municipality, or getting cheap land, all require approval or concessions. Therefore, in 
many real estate projects, developers form partnerships with the government or work 
units. For example, in the Taipingqiao Redevelopment Project, Shui On Group formed a 
partnership with the Jin’an district government (Jun Hu, see Table 5-1). Government and 
work units also welcome the partnership because developers have access to large 
amounts of capital from a variety of sources, such as equity capital, bank loans, 
government and collectives, and bonds and securities. They also have the advantage of 
owning the specialist knowledge in real estate development (Jun Hu, Yongdong Zhang).  
5.2.4 Foreign investors 
The inflow of FDI into Shanghai stems from the restructuring of international finance, 
the decline in economic returns in traditional investment locations, and the willingness of 
the Shanghai government to subsidize foreign investment (Wu 2000). Foreign investors 
are both suppliers and consumers in Shanghai’s housing market. In the market, foreign 
companies and joint ventures provide effective demand for high-quality housing, which 
leads to increasing housing prices. In terms of supply, foreign investors are seldom 
directly involved in housing development (Steve Clarke, see Table 5-1). However, they 
are one of the capital providers of some housing projects operated by local companies. 
For example, since Shanghai government passed the regulation of using foreign 
investments to develop domestic housing in 1993, inward investment has accounted for 
larger and larger proportions of the total investment in the real estate market (e.g. 1/3 in 
1995). 
The introduction of foreign investment is triggering a change in the ‘rules of the 
game’ (Wu 2001). This is because foreign investments, unlike domestic investments, are 
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‘global’ money and therefore are resources beyond government control. They follow a 
clear economic motivation and are less bound by intragovernment politics, social 
responsibilities, ideological commitment and even planning control. Furthermore, foreign 
investors are able to raise a large amount of capital within a short period of time (Steve 
Clarke, see Table 5-1). This is particularly attractive to the Shanghai government who is 
keen to initiate large projects but is constrained by a lack of capital. In order to attract 
more foreign investment, the government is willing to formulate preferential policies to 
satisfy external investors (Yongdong Zhang and Dezhong Wang, see Table 5-1).  
However, this does not mean that foreign investors can act in the market totally 
outside of institutional constraints, nor are the policies of government irrelevant. The 
action of foreign investors is still subject to the influence of the Shanghai government. In 
order to be granted preferential treatment, foreign investors usually need personal 
contacts with government officials (Steve Clarke). In some cases, using the incentive of 
preferential treatment, the Shanghai government can even initiate and usher foreign 
investment to its desired locations.  
In terms of the relationship with local developers, the most common relationship is 
the partnership. This is because foreign investors are constrained by a lack of local 
knowledge and institutional networks (Steven Clarke, Xin Qian, and Yongyue Zhang, see 
Table 5-1).  
5.2.5 Intermediaries and financial institutions 
Intermediaries are the facilitators of China’s urban housing market. The Regulation 
on the Administration of Urban Real Estate Intermediaries announced in 1996 defines the 
scope of services by real estate intermediaries in the Shanghai housing market. This role 
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includes 1) providing consultancy services on real estate legal issues, policies and 
technical issues, 2) providing information services and analysis on real estate 
development, transactions, and rental, 3) real estate evaluation and feasibility studies for 
development projects, 4) real estate agents and rental services, and 5) document services 
on real estate transactions and rental.  
Financial institutions are also crucial for real estate development. Real estate 
development is a highly leveraged industry. Development firms have traditionally 
operated with little of their own capital, borrowing instead against the value of their 
projects upon completion. Without the capital support from financial institutions, the 
urban housing market would not run smoothly. 
Corruption also plays a role in the housing market. Real estate intermediaries, 
financial institutions, and developers attempt to manipulate the market and housing 
demand to enhance profits (Wang 2005, Wei 2005). This manipulation may occur in 
several ways (two anonymous interviewees in academia). On the supply side, once a 
project is finished, the intermediaries may buy up most housing units, leading to an 
artificial shortage of housing. On the demand side, intermediaries, may exaggerate the 
shortage of housing by publicizing ‘rapid urbanization’, ‘population increase’, ‘a shortage 
of land and housing supply’, etc., and promote housing consumption and increase 
households’ housing aspiration level25 through advertising “wealthy housing” (xiaokang 
zhufang). The banks also encourage housing consumption through low mortgage rates 
and loose mortgage control.   
 
 
                                                 
25 The “quality” of housing that everyone wants 
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5.2.6 Households 
Although some households speculate in housing through buying apartments, holding 
them vacant for a short period to catch the price ‘bubble’, and then reselling them, the 
overwhelming majority of households are pure housing consumers. In the Shanghai 
housing market, there are many options for households’ housing consumption (Table 5-2).  
Table 5-2 Options for households to improve their housing consumption  
(modified from Huang 2003) 
Options Qualifications 
Purchase ‘commodity 
housing’ 
Households with high income and urban and permanent 
hukou, with a few exceptions (for example, blue hukou) 
Purchase ‘affordable 
housing’ 
Employees of government agencies and work units who 
have medium-low income, urban and permanent hukou 
Purchase occupied public 
housing 
Sitting tenants of public housing who are usually 
employees of government agencies and work units, and 
have urban and permanent hukou 
Purchase or rent flats that 
work units purchased 
from developers 
Employees of government agencies and work units, with 
urban and permanent hukou 
Rent ‘cheap rental 
housing’ 
Households with lower than minimum income and housing 
consumption according to criteria set up by the local 
government; and who have urban and permanent hukou 
Purchase or rent of 
private housing by 
individuals 
Everyone 
Purchase ‘relocation 
housing’ 
Households with permanent and urban hukou who are 
affected by urban renewal projects 
 
However, these options are not available for every household. In addition to the 
constraints of affordability, the socialist institutions such as the Household Registration 
(hukou) System26 and work units may limit the options. In general, only people with 
                                                 
26 The hukou system, developed in the 1950s, has been an important tool for government control 
and could be considered to be an internal passport system as it defines an individual’s 
socioeconomic status and opportunities (Chan 1994). Every Chinese is born with either an urban 
or a rural hukou, based mainly on birthplace, and either a permanent or temporary hukou based 
on the place of registration. 
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urban and permanent hukou are qualified for state welfare benefits such as subsidized 
housing. Moreover, as most welfare benefits are distributed through state-owned work 
units, a person’s work-unit affiliation also becomes vital in accessing benefits. 
The relationship between households and developers is crucial for the stability of 
Shanghai’s urban housing market because this relationship is usually characterized by 
conflict. Conflict occurs mainly because of two incompatibilities. The first 
incompatibility is increasing housing price and relatively stable household income; the 
other is household loss caused by relocation and insufficient relocation allowances. While 
both incompatibilities can lead to conflict, the latter is more prevalent. The 
redevelopment of Shanghai’s old urban areas has caused the relocation of hundreds of 
thousands. Since 1990, there have been about 100 million households relocated (Han27 
2005) for urban renovation. It is in the best interests of developers to relocate households 
at the least expense. Meanwhile, companies under contract with the developers28 for the 
relocation exercises also intend to maximize their profits at the expense of residents, 
further reducing the amount of compensation or providing even smaller units than those 
to which residents are entitled. As these relocation companies are mostly government-
owned, they may even mobilize the police force to evict residents. Furthermore, the pace 
of demolition is so rapid that in some cases residents are required to vacate their old 
housing before they find transition housing. Ji Li, a resident of Tianyuan Residential 
Community that was scheduled for demolition within a year, told me that he was fully of 
the planned redevelopment. However, due to a lack of resources, residents such as Ji Li 
cannot successfully defend their rights in conflicts with developers.  
                                                 
27 Han, Zheng is current Shanghai’s mayor.  
28 Developers do not always outsource relocation to such companies. Sometimes they also take 
this dirty job.  
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The Shanghai government also should be responsible for defusing the conflicts. As 
the only place where households can seek help, the government must deal with the 
inflated housing price and complaints from households in order to maintain a stable 
society. However, since the government also gains from moderately rising housing prices 
and urban redevelopment, they seem in a difficult position to take action. As Jun Hu 
(Table 5-1) said, they always feel it difficult to decide what to do when they have to 
mediate the conflict between developers who want to clear the land and the people who 
usually have nowhere to go. 
Although foreign investors and work units both gain from urban redevelopment, they 
have a different picture of rising housing prices because rising housing prices may result 
in upward pressure on wages. Thus they stand on the side with households and against 
developers who ask higher housing prices (Steve Clarke). 
The impacts of economic transition, FDI and urban transformation on households are 
uneven. In Shanghai, as well as in other cities, since housing subsidies and the maximum 
amount of space a household can purchase at the subsidized price are determined by 
institutional factors such as job rank and job seniority29, people with higher job ranks are 
more likely to purchase larger housing units. Moreover, a work unit’s financial condition 
determines its ability to provide subsidized housing to its employees (Huang and Clark 
2002). Therefore, resourceful work units, such as high-ranking work units owned by 
ministries or the central government, can provide large housing subsidies to their 
employees while work units with few resources can provide few or no subsidies. For 
example, Yun Cheng (Table 5-1), an employee of Shanghai Commercial Bank, received 
                                                 
29 Yongyue Zhang and Bogeng Chen (see Table 5-1) suggested to me although the specific rules 
of each work units were different, job rank and job seniority were the most important determining 
factors. 
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300,000RMB when she bought her first apartment while Facheng Zuo, an employee of 
Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Corp., received only 70,000RMB. These people (people 
with higher job ranks and people employed by high-ranking work units) and their 
households are likely to continue to be better off because they can trade their housing 
bought with subsidies for larger and better housing on the market. Even though they 
choose not to trade their housing, they can use it as security for raising money, and can 
hand it on to future generations. Meanwhile, FDI has introduced thousands of foreign 
companies in Shanghai, which stimulate the emergence of a large group of high-waged 
professional and managerial workers. This group of people is also likely at an advantage 
because with their high income. For instance, Lili Zhao (see Table 5-1) whose husband is 
the vice director of GE Insurance, China, told me in 2004 someone wanted to buy their 
apartment at about 1,500,000RMB, which they bought in 2000 at about 600,000RMB. 
The employees of foreign companies, as well as those employed by the high-profile work 
units, compose the major group of housing consumers. In addition, measures to promote 
homeownership--- such as low mortgage interest rates and non taxation of implicit rental 
income--- tend to favor this upper-income group.  
On the other side of the coin, low-income households (households employed by work 
units in poor condition and many new immigrants) are at a disadvantage in Shanghai’s 
urban housing urban market. The disadvantage is reflected in several ways. First, high 
housing prices create the poor living conditions of these households. The low income 
households who are usually housing renters are asked to pay higher rents, while those low 
income households who ‘luckily’ own a dwelling unit are trapped in the previous shabby 
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housing units and have no chance to upgrade their housing (Wang and Murie 2000). 
(Picture 5-1). 
Picture  5-1 Typical public housing units in central city of Shanghai 
 
Although the Shanghai government has carried out “The National Comfortable 
Housing Project (anju gongcheng) (1995)” and the “Economic and Comfortable Housing 
(jingji shiyong fang) (1998)”30, both of which emphasize developing housing for low- and 
middle-income groups, these projects turned out to be ineffective because many high 
income households took advantage of these projects, claiming they were low income 
families, and the housing price under the programs is still too high for low income 
households.  
Second, large scale urban redevelopment and renewal have harmed low-income 
households more than other groups.  In 2001, the city demolished unfit and shanty 
apartments covering 3.6 million m2. Most of these were located in the old central city and 
                                                 
30 The housing units developed under the two projects were sold at cost to low-income 
households. The key factors that reduce the price include free land allocation, a regulated profit 
level for developers, smaller housing size, and reduced government charges during the 
development and sale process (Wang 2001). 
 97
occupied by poor households. About 400,000 residents were relocated because of the 
demolition. According to Yongyue Zhang, Bogeng Chen, and Hongming Zhang (see 
Table 5-1), these residents have three options to solve their dwelling problem: pay a 
portion of redevelopment costs to acquire a new commodity housing unit on-site, buy 
new commodity housing elsewhere with both relocation compensation and personal 
funds, and buy a municipal relocation housing unit at cost price. However, the first two 
options are usually not feasible because commodity housing is usually too expensive for 
these residents even with relocation compensation. For example, the “Shanghai’s Urban 
Housing Demolition and Residents Relocation Regulation Details (2001)” stipulates that 
the relocation compensation should equal the average transaction price of public housing 
in the same area. However, as we know, public housing is usually transferred at a 
subsidized price that is far lower than the price of commodity housing. Therefore, the 
relocation compensation is also far lower than the cost of a commodity housing unit.  The 
last option is often the most affordable one, but relocation housing tends to be insufficient 
and to be built in peripheral locations. It was reported that only 10– 40 per cent of 
households could be directly resettled in relocation housing (Xiaojian Lu, see Table 5-1). 
The rest would need to find their own accommodations.  In addition, the residents who 
are driven to peripheral areas encounter an increase in transportation costs, which causes 
them difficulties.  
Among the low-income households, new immigrants are especially disadvantaged31. 
These immigrants are usually low-skilled workers engaged in manufacturing, personal 
services and the hotel, tourist and entertainment industries (Friedmann 1986). Because 
                                                 
31 The immigrants who are typically well-educated and assigned hukou are on par with those of 
local residents in terms of housing consumptions. 
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the current housing system actually prevents them from improving their housing (Table 
6-7), the new immigrant populations tend to lose out in the competition for housing. In 
1994, blue-stamp household registration, an alternative for immigrants to improve their 
housing was introduced. However, since the blue-stamp was only issued to high-income 
immigrants and the bank mortgages for new commodity housing were restricted to people 
with local hukou, this was an ineffective alternative for improving low income 
immigrants’ housing, and thus it was terminated in 2002.  
In the next chapter, this research will employ hedonic modeling to quantitatively 
explore the effects of FDI, economic transition and urban transformation on housing price. 
Given the mixture of government provided and market-based housing, the continuing 
influence of the government and quasi-governmental organizations such as work units in 
the emerging housing market in Shanghai, and all other distinct features of Shanghai’s 
housing market, one would expect that hedonic modeling would not work.  
However, the market is playing an increasing role in Shanghai and, in at least some 
housing sectors, the market now plays the dominant role. Thus hedonic modeling may 
work for at least some portions of the Shanghai housing market. Moreover, the 
application of hedonic modeling can be justified by my data. First, the duration and the 
physical extent of my data are restricted and not subject to severe shocks. In this case, 
according to Maclennan (1997) and Wihelmsson (2000), an equilibrium condition can 
reasonably be assumed. Second, the data are from the secondary market which is less 
subject to insider control. Third, in the secondary market information is more readily 
available for buyers and sellers, thus it is more reasonable to assume there is no 
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information barrier, which indicates that the implicit prices (coefficients of independent 
variables) are unbiased (Wihelmsson 2000).  
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Chapter 6 Empirical Study 
This chapter provides a quantitative analysis of the effects of economic transition, 
foreign investment, and urban transformation on housing price. In this chapter, I first 
discuss the data before turning to a discussion of the model results.  
6.1 Data: 
As shown in Table 3-4, housing price data could be obtained mainly from 
unpublished government files and newspaper advertisements. In fact, I did not do the 
field work for the housing price data by myself. The housing price data in my research 
are from Prof. Fulong Wu who is a lecturer in the Department of Geography of 
University of Southampton in U.K. It is he who did the field work and collected the data 
from the Shanghai Real Estate Exchange Centre (SREEC), the Shanghai Housing and 
Land Bureau and newspaper advertisements. The original data consist of a total of 3207 
records of residential properties which were for sale in August 2000 in 13 districts32. The 
size of the sample was reduced to 1,604 by means of stratified sampling according to the 
total number of properties available for sale in each district. This reduction of sample size 
was mainly necessary because of the heavy workload of identifying property locations. 
After incomplete cases had been removed, the sample size was finally reduced to 1,369 
valid cases. The properties are mainly in the central and inner districts. Three outer 
districts (Baoshan, Jiading, Minhang) and the Pudong new district were also included.  
The variables in the database and their meanings are provided in the Table 6-1. In 
Wu’s original database, only housing prices, housing structural characteristics and 
                                                 
32 These are 11 districts in the central city, Changning, Hongkou, Huangpu, Jing’an, Luwan, 
Nanshi, Pudong, Putuo, Xuhui, Yangpu, and Zhabei, and 2 districts in the peripheral city, 
Baoshan and Minhang 
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property right characteristics are included. Wu has used this original database in his 
research (Wu 2002a, 2002b). However, he did not consider locational variables, i.e. 
distances, in his research. All the distance data in my database were measured by myself 
using ArcGIS and the georeferenced map provided by Wu. The information about the 
location of the commercial centers, FDI concentrated areas, foreigner concentrated areas, 
new urban areas, and renewed urban areas is from public publications, such as Shanghai 
Yearbook, or from my field survey.  
The properties included in this sample are all from the secondary housing market, 
because the price of the existing housing stock is more stable than that of newly built 
‘commodity’ housing33. The price of new housing is influenced to a large extent by 
arbitrary decisions made by developers. Because transaction prices are confidential, in 
this study I used the asking price. This is not unusual in property-price research (for 
example, Orford 1999, Peter et al. 1994). In the secondary housing market, the asking 
price represents a careful consideration of the market situation. It has been found from 
fieldwork that there is a possible swing of ±10% between asking price and transaction 
price, arising from market fluctuations and individual bargaining (Wu 2002). Moreover, 
because of the short period of time for which data was collected and the low inflation rate 
during that period, temporal changes in price across the study period can be ignored. The 
variation due to different bargaining skills in individual cases can be regarded as a 
random disturbance of the transaction price. 
                                                 
33 Asking prices in the secondary market are more reliable than in the new housing market 
(commodity housing market). Although the secondary market is still in an embryonic stage in 
China, in reality the practice of housing exchange in the pre-reform period (Cheng, 1999) 
revealed the value of existing housing stock. The prices listed in the real estate exchange centers 
and property agents are therefore carefully set. Also, the buyers in the secondary market are 
mostly individual households, rather than state workplaces. Therefore, the prices are less affected 
by corporate buyers and developers. 
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Table 6-1 Data description 
Housing price asking price 
Housing 
structural 
characteristics 
number of bedrooms, number of living rooms, building type 
(multi-floor apartments, high-rise apartments, old lane apartments, 
new-built lane apartments, garden house, others), floor 
Housing reform 
(Property right 
characteristic) 
full commodity rights, partial commodity rights, lease-only rights 
Housing 
locational 
characteristics 
distances to shopping centers, to major road, to subway station, to 
open space  
Foreign 
investment 
distances to FDI planned zones; distance to foreigners’ residential 
areas 
Urban 
restructuring 
distances to large-scale renewed urban areas, to newly-built or 
newly-planned urban areas 
Notes: 
1. Total number of rooms= the number of bedrooms + the number of living rooms + the 
number of bathrooms + the number of kitchen 
2. Old lane apartments: the apartment building with the structure like figure 1 but built 5 
years ago; coded as 1 
New lane apartments: the apartment building with the structure like figure 1 but built within 
5 years; coded as 2 
High-rise apartments: the apartment building with more than 5 floors; coded as 3 in the 
database  
Multi floor apartments: the apartment building with 5 or less floors, not including lane 
apartment building; coded as 4 in the database 
Garden house: usually has two to three floors and includes private open space; coded as 5 
 
 
3. Lease-only rights: the occupant is actually tenant; he/she has no right to sell or lease the 
apartment; however, he/she has the exclusive right to rent the apartment; coded as 1 
Partial commodity rights: the occupant has partial rights, i.e. he/she can lease the apartment 
but can not sell it; coded as 2 
Full commodity rights: the occupant can sell or lease the property; coded as 3 
4. The units of distance is kilometer.  
5. New urban areas refer to newly-built urban areas. 
 
 
 
stair 
individual 
apartments 
corridor 
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6.2 Modeling 
I used a hedonic model to investigate the effects of FDI, economic transition and 
urban transformation on the urban housing market. Table 6-2 shows the descriptive 
summary of the final dataset.   
Table 6-2 Dataset Summary 
 Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent 
Variable 
Price (10,000RMB34)               19.156 23.177 2.000 400.000
Number of bedrooms                 1.831 1.054 1.000 15.000
Number of living rooms              0.480 0.567 0.000 2.000 
Floor               4.269 3.835 0.000 28.000
Distance to shopping centers 
(km) 
2.555 3.052 0.004 34.951
Distance to FDI planned zones 
(km)          
2.563 2.188 0.000 24.168
Distance to all open spaces 
(present and planned) (km)       
0.826 1.449 0.003 25.735
Distance to all subway stations 
(present and planned) (km) 
1.334 2.261 0.044 33.267
Distance to newly-built urban 
areas  (km) 
12.613 3.793 0.377 28.303
Distance to large-scale renewed 
urban areas  (km) 
2.533 3.351 0.000 39.623
Distance to major roads  (km)      0.256 1.162 0.000 22.407
Distance to foreigners’ 
residential areas (km)           
3.879 3.080 0.004 32.335
Building type                  3.671 0.745 1.000 5.000 
Independent 
Variables 
Property right type              2.261 0.785 1.000 3.000 
Notes:  
1. Distance is that from a dwelling unit to the nearest object. For example, distance to 
shopping centers refers to the distance from a dwelling unit to the nearest shopping center.  
 
The mean values of the number of bedrooms, of the number of living rooms, and of 
price indicate that most records of the sample are Shanghai’s middle-class and lower 
                                                 
34 1 US dollar is equivalent to around 8.3 RMB. 
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middle-class dwelling units35. Moreover, the mean values of floor and of building type 
suggest that the major building type of the sample is the multilevel apartment building. In 
terms of geographic distribution, most records fall within the central 10 districts, i.e. 
Yangpu, Hongkou, Zhabei, Putuo, Changning, Jing’an, Huangpu, Nanshi, Luwan, and 
Xuhui. Baoshan, Pudong and Minhang also have some records (Map 6-1).  
Map 6-1 The Geographic Distribution of Sample 
 
This research uses the distance to FDI planned zones (FDI-funded business districts 
and industry zones that are planned mainly for foreign companies) and the distance to 
foreigners’ residential areas as proxies for foreign investment. This representation has 
been used before (Haila 2000). The volume of FDI and the number of foreigners are 
positively correlated with other foreign investment variables, such as the number of 
foreign companies and the number of employees of foreign companies (Hill and Munday 
                                                 
35 A typical Shanghai middle-class apartment in 2000 had 2 bedrooms, and one living room, and 
its market price ranged from 200,000RMB to 300,000RMB (Shanghai Bureau of Statistics 2001). 
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1995, Sun 1998b). The deeper a city is involved in global economy, the greater the 
volume of FDI and the number of foreigners. Using distances rather than the volume of 
FDI and the number of foreigners is necessary because it is impossible to associate a 
unique volume of FDI or number of foreigners with each housing unit. This also makes 
sense because households are willing to pay a premium for living close to FDI planned 
zones where jobs are plentiful and to foreigner’s residential areas because there are a 
number of western style entertainment facilities located there. Foreign investment does 
not affect housing price directly. The real underlying factor is the jobs that foreign 
investment creates. Employees of foreign companies have to commute to their work 
places so they care about the distance from their apartments to FDI planned zones as well 
as the distance to foreigners’ residential areas (because these areas have a more pro- 
western culture).  
Property right type is used as the proxy for economic transition. As mentioned before, 
one of the pillars of China’s economic transition is the housing reform and the core of 
this reform is privatization (Wang and Murie 2000, Zhang 2001). The gradual process of 
privatization has resulted in different types of property rights coexisting in the housing 
market. Specifically, housing units that were privatized in different periods are associated 
with different property right types. Therefore, the property right type of a housing unit 
can reflect the influence of housing reform/economic transition on the unit. It is 
hypothesized that housing price is associated with property types, which makes China’s 
housing market somewhat unique. Although other policy variables, such as tax rate and 
urban planning, should also be used, they are difficult to measure quantitatively and 
differentiate by individual property.  
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Urban transformation is reflected in the construction of new urban areas, the renewal 
of old urban areas, and the transformation of infrastructure. This research employs the 
distances to newly-built urban areas and large-scale renewed urban areas to measure the 
influences of urban transformation on housing price. Variables representing 
transformation of the social structure also could be used. However, like most policy 
variables, social structural variables are on the district-level, so they cannot be specified 
for individual properties.  
As represented in Map 6-2, two main new urban areas were built in Shanghai while 
there are many large-scale renewed urban areas. The location and other information about 
the new urban areas and renewed urban areas, as well as the location of FDI planned 
zones and foreigners’ residential areas, are from the Shanghai Bureau of Statistics (1990-
2004) and Shanghai Municipal Committee of Urban Development and Management 
(2004). 
The locations of FDI planned zones and foreigners’ residential areas are shown on 
Map 6-3. Among the FDI planned zones, Hongqiao (Changning district) is planned for 
convention, consulting, banking management, and other service functions. Caohejing 
Park (Minghang district), located in Shanghai’s south-western region, is Shanghai’s 
primary high-technology and research and development center. The Minhang area 
(Minghang district), 30 km south-west of central Shanghai, was also designated as a high 
technology zone in 1983. However it continues to have a strong base in heavy industry 
and to attract a high percentage of non-high-technology manufacturing ventures. The 
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Map 6-2 Newly-built and large-scale renewed urban areas 
 
Map 6-3 FDI Planned Zones and Foreigners’ residential areas 
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present FDI planned zones in the central city (for example, Waitan area) and Lujiazhu 
area in Pudong target capital-intensive firms in the service sector, such as finance and real 
estate, while other FDI planned zones in Pudong are designed for capital-intensive 
manufacturing firms and export-oriented firms. In terms of foreigners’ residential areas, 
Changning includes the largest concentration of housing and ancillary services aimed at 
the resident foreign community. The Huaihai Road and Hengshan Road areas that are 
located at the border area of the Jing’an, Luwan, and Xuhui districts constitute the second 
largest community of foreigners. The Lujiazhu area is the third one.  
This research assumes that the distance variables should have negative signs. All 
other characteristics should have positive effects on housing price.   
1). City-wide Model 
Hedonic modeling techniques can be used to examine the influences of FDI, 
economic transition and urban transformation on Shanghai’s housing market. First, a 
hedonic model for the city-wide Shanghai housing market was run (Table 6-3). In order 
to do comparisons, this research adopts 0.05 and 0.1 significance thresholds.  
In terms of the number of bedrooms, number of living rooms, and distance to 
shopping centers, this model is consistent with the hedonic models developed for Western 
cities (Edelstein 1974, Palm 1978, Linn 1983, Bajic 1985, Olmo 1995, Adair et al.1996, 
Orford 2000). From Table 6-3, the distance to FDI planned zones has a negative 
coefficient, which indicates that FDI has positive effects on housing price. Similarly, the 
negative coefficient of the distance to new urban areas means the construction of new 
urban areas will directly result in the higher price in the contiguous areas. However, 
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Table 6-3 Results of city-wide market hedonic price model 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.7240 7.06 0.000 
Lease-only rights dropped   
Partial commodity rights 0.4547 0.39 0.699 
Full commodity rights  0.9760 0.79 0.427 
Number of bedrooms 16.5254 45.33 0.000 
Number of living rooms 4.7144 6.16 0.000 
Building type 0.4380 0.80 0.421 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -1.6870 -7.01 0.000 
Distance to all open spaces (km) 0.7365 0.89 0.373 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -1.0444 -4.33 0.000 
Distance to foreigner residential areas (km) -0.1737  -1.30    0.193     
Distance to all subway stations (km) 0.7471 1.61 0.107 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.4801 -3.33 0.001 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas 
(km) 
-0.1836 -0.61 0.539 
Distance to the major roads (km) 1.7375 1.84 0.066 
Constant -6.5362  -2.18   0.029    
  F=203.03 R2 = 
0.6773 
Note:  
In this model, the distance to all open spaces and the distance to all subway stations instead of 
the distances to present facilities are used because planned facilities have similar effects on 
housing price as already-existing facilities. Peoples’ expectations for the construction of new 
facilities may lead to the increase/decrease of housing price before the facilities are built.  
 
it turns out that property right type, distance to foreigners’ residential areas, and distance 
to large-scale renewed urban areas are not significant (Table 6-3), which is contradictory 
to our assumptions because we initially assumed that all the variables should be 
significant. The results of this model could lead us to conclude that these 3 indicators 
have no influences on housing price. This may be true for distance to foreigner residential 
areas and distance to large-scale renewed areas, but may not be true for property right 
type. From Table 6-4, it is clear that full commodity rights are associated with higher 
housing price while lease-only property rights are correlated with lower housing price. 
The reason why property right type is not significant is perhaps because they are all 
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dummy variables and their mean values are just marginally greater than their standard 
errors and this indicates that the effect of partial or full commodity rights on price is not 
significant different from that of lease-only rights.  
Table 6-4 Property rights and housing price 
Property rights Mean of housing price (yuan) 
Full commodity property rights 241,665 
Partial property rights 172,430 
Lease-only property rights 108,270 
 
Moreover, the complexity of the urban housing market may cause the unexpected 
outcomes in the city-wide market model. Urban researchers state that the urban housing 
market consists of a series of linked, quasi-independent submarkets (Maclennan 1982, 
Orford 2000). The influences of FDI, economic transition and urban transformation may 
vary across the submarket. Therefore, it may be valuable to run hedonic models at a 
submarket level.  
In a subsequent run of the city wide model, a dummy variable for district was 
included (Table 6-5). Two outcomes are meaningful. The first is that dummy5, dummy7, 
dummy11 are significant at the 0.05 level and dummy9 is significant at the 0.10 level. 
This suggests that the 5th, 7th, 11th and 9th submarkets are significant different from the 1st 
submarket, which is the dropped one. The other is the coefficients and their significance 
change after introducing dummy variables. Both outcomes indicate the existence of 
submarkets. Therefore, we can safely base our next analyses on the assumption of the 
existence of submarkets.  
2). District-based submarket models 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the research first divided the housing market into several 
spatial submarkets based on administrative boundaries. Each spatial submarket was then 
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further subdivided by building type36. The outcomes are summarized in Appendix A 
(Table A-1 to Table A-16) and Table 6-6.  
Table 6-5 Results of city-wide market hedonic price model 
Variable Coeffici
ent 
t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.6431 6.32 0.000 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 0.1904 0.16 0.873 
Full commodity rights  1.2041 0.96 0.339 
Number of bedroom 16.5933 45.54 0.000 
Number of living room 6.0720 7.61 0.000 
Building type 0.8071 1.49 0.136 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -0.7651 -2.27 0.024 
Distance to all open spaces (km) 1.2534 1.48 0.139 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -1.1258 -3.96 0.000 
Distance to foreigner residential areas (km) -0.0601 0.41 0.684    
Distance to all subway stations (km) 0.2011 0.39 0.697 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.3341 -1.69 0.091 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -0.2656 -0.70 0.481 
Distance to the major roads (km) 0.6620 0.68 0.499 
Dummy1 dropped   
Dummy2 2.9150 1.04 0.300 
Dummy3 1.8940 0.76 0.446 
Dummy4 0.3761 0.09 0.928 
Dummy5 7.7218 2.69 0.007 
Dummy6 3.5009 1.16 0.245 
Dummy7 -6.5319 -2.42 0.016 
Dummy8 2.0069 0.59 0.557 
Dummy9 5.2258 1.82 0.068 
Dummy10 1.2619 0.53 0.597 
Dummy11 5.4753 2.04 0.041 
Dummy12 2.7060 1.03 0.302 
Dummy13 0.6419 0.24 0.813 
Constant -14.5303 -3.19    0.001    
  F=125.30 R2 = 0.6911
 
 
 
                                                 
36 There are 4 types of buildings in the database. Each dwelling unit belongs to only one of the 
building types. 
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Table 6-6 Summary of district-based submarket models 
District Building type Significant variables 
Baoshan multi-rise  number of bedrooms (+), distance to major roads (+) 
Changning multi-rise number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+), 
full commodity rights (+) 
high-rise number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+) Hongkou 
 multi-rise number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+) 
new lane house floor (+), number of bedrooms (+), distance to 
shopping centers (+) 
Jing’an 
multi-rise number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+) 
Luwan multi-rise number of living rooms (+) 
Minghang multi-rise number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+), 
distance to newly-built urban areas (-), Distance to 
foreigners’ residential areas (+) 
Pudong multi-rise number of bedrooms (+) 
multi-rise number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+), 
and distance to FDI planned zones (-) 
Putuo 
high-rise number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+), 
distance to FDI planned zones (-), distance to all open 
areas (-) 
Xuhui multi-rise number of bedrooms (+), distance to foreigners’ 
residential areas (+) 
multi-rise partial commodity rights(+), full commodity rights (+), 
number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+), 
distance to open spaces (-), distance to major roads (+) 
Yangpu 
high-rise number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+) 
Zhabei multi-rise partial commodity rights(+), full commodity rights (+), 
number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+), 
distance to newly-built urban areas* (-), distance to 
major roads (-) 
New 
Huangpu 
multi-rise partial commodity rights (+), number of bedrooms (+), 
number of living rooms (+) 
Note: 
The variables marked with * means are significant only at 0.1 significance level. 
 
This approach results in a total of 60 spatial structural submarket models. Of these 60, 
only 16 are worthy of further investigation. In 29 cases, there are too few observations for 
model calibration. In 15 other cases, the submarket models are not significantly different 
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from the city-wide model 37. As revealed by Table 6-6, multi-rise building is the 
dominant building type in every submarket analyzed. This table also shows great 
variation exists among the submarket models, which indicates that joint spatial structural 
submarkets do exist. Specifically, foreign investment variables are significant in the 
Minghang, Putuo, and Xuhui multi-rise submarkets. Distance to FDI planned zones has a 
negative sign as expected while distance to foreigners’ residential areas has positive sign 
that is not anticipated. Property right type is significant in Changning, Yangpu, Zhabei, 
and New Huangpu multi-rise submarkets. In addition, the construction of new urban 
areas influences housing price only in the Minghang (at 0.05 level) and Zhabei (at 0.1 
level) multi-rise submarkets.  
3). Price Surface-based submarket models: 
The delimitation of spatial submarkets according to the administrative boundaries has 
many limitations. For example, the housing units located in a district may be actually far 
from the economic and culture centers of this district but near to the centers of another 
district. Households of these housing units may commute more often to the nearby center 
and the prices of these housing units may be affected more by the nearby center. 
Assigning housing units to submarkets based on administrative district may cause the 
coefficients of the submarket hedonic model to be biased and the hedonic model to not 
possess good explanation power.  
In order to solve the problem, we could use a price surface to define the spatial 
submarket. The rationale is that since geographically nearby housing units are subject to 
similar influences of locational characteristics, they should show some pattern of price 
                                                 
37 The F values are too small; Table 6-5 also suggests some submarket models may not be 
significant. 
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level. Moreover, housing price groups can be used to represent consumer groups because 
people having lower consumption power are not likely to purchase the property 
belonging to the higher price group. People having higher consumption power are also 
not likely to purchase the property of the lower price group because of social status 
considerations and the preference to live close to people sharing the same lifestyle. In this 
sense, spatial submarkets delimited by price surfaces actually correspond to different 
consumer groups. In addition, price surfaces can partially capture structural 
characteristics because houses close to one another and with similar structural 
characteristics usually have a similar selling price. 
However, the housing transaction price must be standardized, which means we should 
use the average price of a housing unit rather than the total value38 for price surface 
delimitation. Although it is ideal to use floor area to calculate the average price, this 
research determines the average price by dividing the housing price by the total number 
of bedrooms and living rooms. This is not only because the total floor area is unavailable, 
but also because Shanghai locals place more value on number of rooms than on the total 
floor area (Shanghai Bureau of Statistics 2001). 
With the housing prices represented as a point feature, and using surface analysis in 
ArcGIS, we can generate a price surface that shows the continuous geographic 
distribution of housing prices. Specifically, we use kriging to generate the price surface. 
This interpolation method (kriging) consists of geostatistical methods that are based on 
statistical models that include autocorrelation (the statistical relationship among the 
measured points) (ArcGIS Desktop Help). The resulting price surface is continuous and 
has boundaries that help distinguish different price levels on a map (Map 6-4). Based on 
                                                 
38 This is also the theoretic base for the sales comparison method used in real estate appraisal. 
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the price surface, we can delimit the housing submarket as shown in Map 6-5. The results 
for each price surface-based submarket are summarized in Appendix B (Table B-1 to 
Table B-8) and Table 6-7. 
Map 6-4 Price Surface  
. 
Map 6-5 Housing submarket based on price surface 
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Table 6-7 Summary of price surface-based submarket models 
Spatial  Structural Significant variables 
new lane 
house  
Floor (+), number of bedrooms (+), distance to shopping 
centers (+), distance to FDI planned zones* (-), distance to 
foreigners’ residential areas (-) 
Core 
submarket 
 
multi-rise number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms* (+) 
old lane 
house 
number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+), partial 
commodity rights (-), distance to shopping centers (-), 
distance to FDI planned zones (+), distance to foreigners’ 
residential areas* (-) 
new lane 
house 
Floor* (+), number of bedrooms (+) 
high-rise number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms 
(+),distance to FDI planned zones (-), distance to major roads 
(+) 
Middle 
submarket 
 
multi-rise number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms (+), partial 
commodity rights (+), full commodity rights* (+), distance to 
foreigners’ residential areas (-) 
high-rise number of bedrooms (+), partial commodity rights * (+), 
distance to the major road * (+) 
Peripheral 
submarket 
 multi-rise Floor (+), number of bedrooms (+), number of living rooms 
(+), partial commodity rights (+), full commodity rights (+), 
distance to shopping centers (-), distance to FDI planned 
zones (-), distance to all subway stations* (+), distance to 
newly-built urban areas (-), distance to the major roads (+) 
Note: 
The variables marked with * means are significant only at 0.1 significance level. 
 
Once again, Table 6-7 shows great variation exists among the submarket models. 
Specifically, distance to FDI planned zones is significant in the core new lane house (at 
0.1 level), middle old lane house, middle high-rise apartment, middle multi-rise 
apartment, and peripheral multi-rise apartment submarkets, while distance to foreigners’ 
residential areas is significant only in the middle old lane house (at 0.1 level), core new 
lane house, and middle multi-rise apartment submarkets. Property right type is significant 
in the peripheral high-rise apartment (at 0.1 level), middle old lane house, middle multi-
rise apartment, and peripheral multi-rise apartment submarkets. In addition, the 
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construction of new urban areas significantly influences housing price only in the 
peripheral multi-rise submarket.  
6.3 Result Analysis 
This section provides a detailed discussion of the modeling results with respect to 
FDI, economic transition and urban transformation. Before proceeding, it is necessary to 
remark that negative signs on distance variables indicate positive effects on housing price, 
and vice versa.  
1) FDI variables 
In the city-wide model, distance to FDI planned zones has a significant and negative 
coefficient, which indicates that the farther the distance to the FDI-planned zones, the 
lower the housing price. This conforms to our expectations that foreign investment has 
positive effects on housing price and the result is also consistent to the observed effects of 
foreign investment. Moreover, distance to foreigners’ residential areas has a negative sign 
in the city-wide model although it is not significant. This is encouraging because it 
indicates that although the effect is not statistically significant, distance to foreigners’ 
residential areas has a positive influence on housing price at the city-wide level. 
1a) District Submarkets  
At the submarket level, however, foreign investment indicators exhibit various 
characteristics. Among the district-building type models, distance to FDI planned zones is 
significant and its effect is positive only in two models, Putuo high-rise and Putuo multi-
rise (Table 6-6). Distance to foreigners’ residential areas is significant in Minghang 
multi-rise and Xuhui multi-rise models (Table 6-6). However, the signs of distance to 
foreigners’ residential areas in the two models are all positive which indicates a negative 
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impact, which is not what was expected. This problem will be explored later in this 
section.  
The signs of the foreign investment indicators can be compared best in the multi-rise 
apartment models for all district submarkets since only these models have significant 
explanatory power in 12 of 16 district models (see Appendix A). For distance to FDI 
planned zones, the Baoshan, Hongkou, Minghang, Putuo, Yangpu, and Zhabei muti-rise 
models have negative coefficients, while the Changning, Jing’an, Luwan, Pudong, Xuhui, 
and New Huangpu have positive coefficients39. The results are represented on Map 6-6. It 
is clear that peripheral and northern districts have the negative coefficients while central 
and southern districts have the positive coefficients. Interestingly, the pattern of positive 
coefficients is similar to the geographical distribution of FDI planned zones (Map 6-3). 
Map 6-3 shows that most FDI planned zones are located in the central, southeast and 
southwest areas. This occurs because most of the employees of foreign invested 
companies are young people and new immigrants. These people and other young people 
who are employed by high-profile state work units comprise the majority of housing 
buyers (Shanghai Bureau of Statistics 2001). Distance to place of work places, i.e. FDI 
planned zones, is an important locational characteristic of housing for these employees. 
However, because the housing in central and southern Shanghai is expensive compared to 
that in the northern districts, most employees of foreign invested firms do not live in 
central and southern Shanghai. Also, the central and southern districts are the areas of the 
city occupied by work units and their employees. This places further pressure on housing 
in central and southern Shanghai. Therefore, the central and southern districts are not 
very attractive to young and affluent foreign company employees.   
                                                 
39 Remember negative coefficients mean positive effects on price, and vice versa. 
 119
Regarding distance to foreigners’ residential areas, Baoshan, Hongkou, Jing’an, 
Luwan, Pudong, Yangpu, Zhabei, and New Huangpu have negative coefficients, while 
Changning, Minghang, Putuo, and Xuhui have positive coefficients. Map 6-7 shows the 
geographical distribution of negative and positive coefficients. The districts with positive 
coefficients for foreigners’ residential areas are all located in the western urban area.  
Once again, this pattern is like the geographical distribution of FRAs as shown in Map 6-
3 - most FRAs are located in the western side of the city. This suggests that the FDI 
indicators exhibit unexpected effects (negative effects, positive signs) in districts where 
the FDI planned zones or FRAs are mainly located while they show the expected effect 
(positive effects, negative signs) in districts where FDI planned zones or FRAs are 
relatively sparse.   
The combination of Map 6-6 and Map 6-7 indicates that both distance to FDI 
planned zones and distance to foreigners’ residential areas have positive effects on price 
in the Zhabei, Hongkou, Baoshan, and Yangpu multi-rise submarkets, all of which are in 
the northern part of the city. This result further indicates the northern districts are 
particularly attractive to young people who have a decent income and seek a western 
lifestyle. On the other hand, distance to FDI planned zones and distance to foreigners’ 
residential areas seem to have negative effects on the Changning and Xuhui multi-rise 
submarkets. The reason is, as indicated in last paragraph, Changning and Xuhui are the 
districts where FDI and foreigners are most likely to locate40, households in the two 
districts do not have to compete for premium locations that are close to either FDIPZs or 
FRAs. 
                                                 
40 Map 6-3 shows that Changning and Xuhui have 3 foreigners’ residential areas, 75% of the total 
FRAs in Shanghai, one of which is the largest FRA in Shanghai.  
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Map 6-6 Effect of FDI Planned Zones 
 
Map 6-7 Effect of Foreigners’ Residential Areas 
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1b) Price Surface Submarkets 
When using the price surface approach to delimit the spatial structural submarkets, 
the foreign investment indicators perform better. Distance to FDI planned zones is 
significant in the core new lane, middle old lane, middle high-rise, and peripheral multi-
rise models (Table 6-7). However, in the middle old lane submarket, the coefficient is 
positive, which is unexpected. This may be because old lane houses are more likely 
subject to the effects of the old housing system41. Distance to foreigners’ residential areas 
is significant and also has negative signs in core new lane, middle old lane, and middle 
multi-rise submarkets.  
In order to compare the effects of foreign investment in different areas, we may look 
just at the foreign investment indicators in the multi-rise models of the three price surface 
submarkets. For distance to FDI planned zones, the core submarket and peripheral 
submarket have negative signs while the middle submarket has a positive sign. Like 
before, this is possibly because in the middle submarket, FDIPZs are not scarce resources 
for housing buyers, or possibly because the major buyers of the middle multi-rise 
submarket do not value distance to FDI planned zones (they are previous work unit 
employees, not the employees of foreign companies). Regarding distance to foreigners’ 
residential areas, all the price surface multi-rise models have negative coefficients.  
From the above analysis, it seems that foreign investment does affect housing prices 
in Shanghai, both city-wide and submarket level. Foreign companies and joint ventures 
provide effective demand for high-quality housing, which leads to positive effects on 
housing price. Foreign company employees, since they are young and most of them are 
                                                 
41 The housing that was developed under the old housing system was sold to its residents not 
according to market principles. 
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new immigrants, comprise the majority of housing buyers (Shanghai Bureau of Statistics 
2001). Therefore, their preferences for housing largely determine the specifications of 
hedonic housing price models, especially the foreign investment indicators in the models.  
Meanwhile, the influences of the old housing system still exist. The unexpected 
performance of foreign investment indicators in some submarkets is mainly due to the 
influence of the old housing system. Work units and their employees occupy the majority 
of the central and southern parts of the city. The work units’ employees comprise the low 
income group of Shanghai residents. Their limited financial resources mean that they are 
more likely to stay in the central city and have no incentive to move outwards. Therefore, 
they cannot be the major buyers in Shanghai’s housing market. Moreover, this also 
implies that there are fewer housing transactions in the central city. The fact that the 
central city and old building submarkets are more subject to the influence of old system 
while peripheral and newer building submarkets are more market oriented results in the 
central districts and/or old building type models performing worse than peripheral 
districts and/or newer building type models in terms of conforming to the results of the 
theoretical analysis. 
Another interesting result of the analysis is that foreign investment indicators do not 
have expected effects on housing prices in the submarkets where FDI and foreigners are 
most likely located. This result is reasonable because households will not compete for an 
attribute if the attribute is not scarce or exclusive. In addition, it is noticeable that 
submarkets have very different model specifications, which indicates that Shanghai’s 
housing market is not homogenous and submarkets do exist. Furthermore, it seems that 
the price surface delimitation scheme performs better than the simple district subdivision 
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scheme because it generates models that better conform to our theoretical analysis and 
that are much easier to analyze.   
2). Economic transition indicator 
Property right type is not significant in the city-wide model. However, correlation 
analysis (Table 6-4) indicates that property right type has an effect on housing price. 
Higher housing price is associated with better property right type42. In addition, if we fit 
separate hedonic models for the 3 property right types (Appendix C), it is obvious that 
great differences exist between the models, which indicate that property right type affects 
people’s preferences for housing characteristics, and therefore influences housing price.   
In the district based submarket models, property right type is significant in the 
Changning multi-rise, Yangpu multi-rise, Zhabei multi-rise, and New Huangpu multi-rise 
models. The signs in these models are all positive as expected, which indicates property 
rights have positive effects on housing price. Like in the previous section, we may 
observe how the effects of property right type vary across space through comparing the 
signs of this variable in district multi-rise models. The comparison shows that property 
right type has a negative sign only in Xuhui and Minghang multi-rise apartment models. 
The underlining reason for the abnormal performance of the Xuhui and Minghang multi-
rise apartment models is unclear. Taken together, the results of the comparison imply that 
property right type has a positive effect on housing price in the majority of the city.  
As for the price surface-based submarkets, property right type is significant in the 
middle old lane, middle multi-rise, peripheral high-rise, and peripheral multi-rise models 
(Table 6-7). However, the sign of this variable in the middle old lane model is negative 
                                                 
42 Full commodity property rights are preferable to partial commodity rights while lease-only 
rights are the least preferable property right type. 
 124
which contradicts our expectation. This result once again confirms that the transactions of 
old properties are less compatible with market principles and more constrained by the old 
housing system. Moreover, the above results indicate, generally, that outer urban areas 
and newer building types (multi-rise and high-rise apartments) are more subject to the 
impact of property right type.  
Regardless of the significance, the signs of property right type in the core new lane, 
core multi-rise, middle old lane, and middle new lane models are negative while the signs 
in core new lane, middle high-rise, middle multi-rise, peripheral high-rise, and peripheral 
multi-rise models are positive. Together with the previous results, these results confirm 
that the operation of outer and newer submarkets is less affected by the old housing 
system and more influenced by market mechanisms. This is because the majority of high-
rise and multi-rise apartments were built during last decade after privatization and located 
in the middle and peripheral areas. There apartments were mostly developed by 
commercial developers. Therefore, their original selling price and their resale price are 
more market-driven. On the other hand, the inner city and old building housing market is 
still heavily subject to the influence of the government. In this part of the housing market, 
most housing units were built before privatization. When these units were privatized, the 
selling prices were affected by many non-market factors (such as job rank and job 
seniority), so were the reselling prices. The intervention of government in household 
housing consumption is one important reason for unanticipated behaviors of some of the 
hedonic models. 
In summary, although the city-wide model does not signify that property right type 
influences housing price, the submarket models show that property right type does affect 
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housing price, especially for newer housing and housing in the outer city. The result is as 
expected in a transitional economy. In Shanghai, old housing, such as old lane housing, is 
mostly located in central city area. During the housing reform, old housing was sold to 
employees by work units or the government at subsidized prices and the selling price and 
what type of property rights to be ‘sold’ were determined by work units and government 
usually based on institutional factors such as job rank and job seniority, not by the market. 
(also see section 5.2.6). On the other hand, in the outer city, the majority of the housing is 
newly-built commodity housing43 and the price is determined by the market, not by work 
units and the government. Thus, households have to pay a premium for commodity 
property rights.  
The different performances of property right type in the spatial structural models also 
reinforce the assumption that submarkets exist in the Shanghai housing market. Moreover, 
the above analysis implies that economic transition (housing reform) is one of the reasons 
contributing to market segmentation. In addition, an interesting and meaningful finding is 
that the hedonic models for different property right types (Appendix C) are significantly 
different. This finding suggests another submarket delimitation method, i.e. subdividing 
the market based on the housing property right type. This topic could be explored in later 
research.  
 
 
                                                 
43 Why does commodity housing cluster in the outer city? Redevelopment of old urban areas is 
very costly. Also, land assembly in the central city is difficult and involves much negotiation. As 
a result, commercial housing tends to cluster in certain areas of the city, particularly at the urban 
fringe.  
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3). Urban transformation indicators 
For the city-wide model, the distance to newly-built urban areas has the anticipated 
effect on housing price. The negative coefficient of distance to newly-built urban areas 
means the construction of new urban areas results in higher housing prices in these 
regions. In addition, distance to large-scale renewed urban areas has a negative sign in the 
city-wide model as expected although it is not significant. This result implies that 
households’ house-shopping decisions may not be affected by urban renovation programs 
as much as is supposed.  
In the district-based submarket models, distance to newly-built urban areas is 
significant only in the Minghang multi-rise and Zhabei multi-rise models. The signs are 
negative as expected. As before, the research compares the signs of this variable in spatial 
multi-rise models. The Baoshan multi-rise, Jing’an multi-rise, Luwan multi-rise, Putuo 
multi-rise, Xuhui multi-rise, and Yangpu multi-rise models have distance to newly-built 
urban areas with positive signs. Mapping this result on Map 6-8 and comparing Map 5-8 
with Map 6-2 (the distribution of newly-built urban areas) does not provide further 
information about how the distribution of newly-built urban areas affects the performance 
of this variable in hedonic models. As for the distance to large-scale renewed urban areas, 
this variable is not significant in all district-based models. The comparison of the 
geographical distribution of the effects (Map 6-9) with the distribution of large-scale 
renewed urban areas (Map 6-2) leads to encouraging findings. The large-scale renewed 
urban areas have negative coefficients in the districts where the large-scale renewed 
urban areas are located and positive coefficients in other districts. This finding bolsters 
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Map 6-8 Effects of newly-built urban areas  
 
 
Map 6-9 Effects of large-scale renewed urban areas  
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the hypothesis that large-scale renewed urban areas may cause housing price increases in 
contiguous areas while leading to a decrease in prices further away. 
Among price surface-based models, distance to newly-built urban areas is significant 
and negatively signed in the peripheral multi-rise apartment model, while distance to 
large-scale renewed urban areas is not significant for any submarket. Regardless of the 
significance of the variables, distance to newly-built urban areas has a negative sign in all 
spatial multi-rise apartment models, which indicates that the construction of new urban 
areas has a positive effect on housing price. This corresponds to the result of the city-
wide model. This positive effect is especially noticeable in the area adjacent to the newly-
built urban areas, in this case, the peripheral submarket. As for distance to large-scale 
renewed urban areas, this variable is not significant in all price surface multi-rise models. 
In terms of the sign of the variable, it is negative in the core and peripheral submarkets 
while positive in middle submarket, which is in accordance with the finding that large-
scale renewed urban areas have a positive effect on the areas where large-scale renewed 
urban areas are located. 
In summary, the analysis of the newly-built urban areas’ effect on housing price is not 
very encouraging in district-based submarket models. This is mostly because the two 
newly-built urban areas are far from all districts. Therefore, a reasonable conclusion is 
that the positive effects of newly-built urban areas do not extend extensively across space; 
the adjacent areas are subject to the greatest (significant) influence from the newly-built 
urban areas. This supposition is supported by the results of the price surface-based 
submarket models.  
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The investigation of large-scale renewed urban areas gives consistent results even 
when using different submarket subdivision schemes. Large-scale renewed urban areas 
may cause the housing price to increase in contiguous areas while leading to a decrease in 
areas further away. The theoretical analysis also supports this supposition. The adjacent 
areas are better off because renovation benefits nearby areas most, while the farther areas 
are worse off.   
In summary, although the construction of new urban areas may benefit the whole city, 
the renovation of old urban areas benefits some areas and hurts other areas. This fact 
gives incentives to market players to influence urban planning that results in urban 
construction and urban renovation (for example, the Shanghai city/district government is 
usually under pressure from developers to modify detailed plans). Comparing the two 
market subdivision schemes, price surface schemes appear superior to district schemes. 
For instance, the price surface schemes generate fewer submarkets; the results of the 
price surface schemes are easier to interpret; and these schemes produce results that better 
correspond to the results of theoretical analysis. 
4). Conclusion 
The city-wide model confirms our hypotheses about the influences of FDI, economic 
transition and urban transformation on housing price. Foreign investment and urban 
transformation are both significant variables in the city-wide model, and the signs of the 
variables are as expected. Although the economic transition variable, i.e. property right 
type, is not significant in the city-wide market’s hedonic model, it is highly correlated 
with housing price and thus its effect cannot be denied (Table 6-4).  
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When looking at the submarket level, FDI, economic transition and urban 
transformation are significant in some but not all submarkets. This fact on one hand 
implies that the effects of FDI, economic transition and urban transformation on housing 
price are unevenly distributed, and on the other hand suggests that Shanghai’s urban 
housing market is segmented and the submarket assumption is valid. In general, the 
closer to the central city and the older the housing, the less influence FDI, economic 
transition and urban transformation have. Still, the modeling results are not perfectly 
satisfying. The signs of many indicators in the hedonic models are contradictory to our 
expectation, which is probably caused by the multicentric characteristic of Shanghai’s 
urban spatial structure, the errors introduced during the data processing process, housing 
distribution system, and more important, the transitioning housing system.   
Two different schemes are used to subdivide the urban housing market. Generally 
speaking, the results of the two schemes are similar. However, since the sample size is 
relatively small, dividing the dataset into many subsets may decrease the credibility of the 
resulting models because each model is then fitted on a relatively small sample. This may 
be why in the district spatial models many variables behave other than as expected. This 
fact, plus that the district-based modeling scheme generates more models and complicates 
the analysis, make the price surface-based modeling scheme more attractive. The analysis 
also indicates that subdividing Shanghai’s urban housing market into spatial-property 
right type submarkets might be another good alternative. This scheme is supported by the 
fact that different property right types coexist in the market, and the housing price is 
highly correlated with or influenced by its property right type, but that is a topic for future 
research.  
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To sum up, the quantitative analysis generally, though not perfectly, supports our 
hypotheses on the effects of FDI, economic transition and urban transformation on 
housing price and submarkets. In the urban housing market of transforming Shanghai, 
FDI, economic transition and urban transformation impose impacts on housing price even 
though the degrees of the impacts vary across space and building types. At the same time, 
FDI, economic transition and urban transformation also contribute to the segmentation of 
the housing market through differentiating households’ demands for housing 
characteristics44.   
 
                                                 
44 FDI, economic transition and urban transformation have introduced new housing characteristics 
that many households will take into account when they make house-buying decisions.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
In this research, the influence of economic transition, foreign investment, and urban 
transformation on Shanghai’s urban housing market is investigated. Shanghai is selected 
because of its uniqueness, i.e. its integration into the world economy, its unparalleled 
economic status in China and its recent change in spatial and social structure. There is no 
better place than Shanghai for examining the influences of economic transition, foreign 
investment and urban transformation on urban housing markets in China. Moreover, since 
Shanghai is the most developed city in China, it serves as a development model for other 
Chinese cities - what has happened and is happening in Shanghai will more or less 
influence the development of other Chinese cities. Therefore, studying Shanghai is a 
crucial for understanding what is going on and what will be going on in most Chinese 
cities.  
This research demonstrates how FDI, economic transition and urban transformation 
impact the Shanghai housing market. FDI, economic transition and urban transformation 
have introduced new market players into the housing market. These new players have in 
turn affected the structure of the housing market in Shanghai. Moreover, the research 
shows that, in Shanghai’s urban housing market, the introduction of new players has 
altered the relationships between more traditional players in fundamental ways (Wu 
2003). For example, the government, while still a powerful player in the market, is no 
longer an all-powerful player in the market. New alliances have also been formed such as 
those linking financial intermediaries and developers. It is also the case that certain 
groups have very little power in the market. This is particularly the case for low income 
households and immigrants to Shanghai. Finally, there exist issues of social justice in the 
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housing market. For example, government, armed with legislation and charged with the 
responsibility for urban development and distribution for the benefit of the public, is 
failing to assist the poor. The failure to act appears to stem from their pursuit of short-
sighted interests while compromising their social responsibilities.  
Through theoretical analysis, it is evident that economic transition has caused 
variations in housing price through improving infrastructure, changing planning, fiscal 
and taxation policies, privatizing housing, and restructuring property rights; the urban 
housing market is also influenced by foreign investment. Foreign investment creates the 
jobs and attracts domestic capital into Shanghai, which creates more jobs. More jobs 
mean more workers and more demand for housing. In addition, foreign investors provide 
development capital to real estate developers. Thus foreign investment results in more 
jobs and more capital that helps in the development of Shanghai’s housing market and 
creates a ripple effect on housing price. In addition, economic transition and foreign 
investment caused the transformation of urban form which directly affects housing price. 
The quantitative analysis not only verifies that FDI, economic transition and urban 
transformation affect the housing price but also shows that influences are uneven across 
space and housing types. In general, the outer city and newer housing types are more 
affected by FDI, economic transition and urban transformation, as well as by the market, 
while the old housing system still affects the inner city and old housing types.  
The various specifications of hedonic models indicate that Shanghai’s urban housing 
market is composed of several quasi-independent submarkets. This research uses two 
different ways to subdivide urban housing market, i.e. district-building type method and 
price surface-building type method. Generally, the two methods lead to similar results. 
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However, since the price surface-building type scheme simplifies the outcomes and 
facilitates the analysis, this delimitation scheme seems preferable. 
This study is significant in that first, it helps people better understand the effects of 
FDI, economic transition and urban transformation on housing price. Through qualitative 
and quantitative analysis, the study answered the question: What are the impacts of 
economic transition, foreign investment and urban transformation (UT) on housing price? 
Previous literature rarely has paid attention to this question and thus it was not well 
investigated before. In addition, the submarket portion of the research enriches people’s 
knowledge of how to delimit submarkets. It may help answer the question: What is the 
best way to define submarkets? Moreover, this research systematically investigated the 
market structure and players of a transitional economy’s housing market, especially with 
respect to Shanghai. The research identified the important components of a transitional 
economy’s housing market structure, the major players in the market, the roles and 
relationships of these players, and the influences of FDI, economic transition and urban 
transformation on the market structure and players. Previous researches only addressed 
either market structure or market players and thus were incomplete.  
In terms of methodology, the integration of FDI, economic transition and urban 
transformation in hedonic price models to quantitatively analyze their effects is 
pioneering work. The application of hedonic price models to a transitional economy is 
also new. Almost all the housing price literature is with respect to the urban housing 
market in Western developed countries. Wu (2002a, 2002b) first employed the hedonic 
modeling technique to investigate the housing market in China, a developing transitional 
economy, but he only considered the impacts of house’s structural characteristics on price, 
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which was an obvious mistake because location is another crucial factor determining 
housing price45. My research corrects his oversight by introducing locational factors. 
Finally, this research provides a general research framework for studying the influence of 
FDI, economic transition and urban transformation on housing markets.  
However, there are many things that need to be improved in further study. The first is 
associated with the functional form of the hedonic model. In this study, only a classic 
function form was adopted. Therefore, it is really hard to say whether this model 
perfectly fits Shanghai’s housing market. Other forms of hedonic model should be tried 
in order to be able to do a cross-model comparison. Only after the comparison, can we 
decide if this functional form is the best one for Shanghai’s housing market. The second 
is associated with the indicators of FDI, economic transition and urban transformation. 
The models used selected indicators of FDI, economic transition and urban 
transformation but in reality, other indicators of FDI, economic transition and urban 
transformation also have effects. For example, like property right types, financial policy 
also signifies an aspect of economic transition.  Moreover, the models assumes only the 
distances to FDI planned zones, foreign residential areas, newly-built urban areas and 
large-scale renewed urban areas matter while in fact, the magnitudes of the zones and the 
areas are also important for determining housing price. A better model would employ 
more indicators. The last improvement is associated with the delimitation of submarkets. 
The two schemes used for subdividing the urban housing market probably over-bound the 
submarkets and thus might be one of the reasons for some of the unexpected results. 
                                                 
45 It is well-known in real estate industry that three factors determine property value, “location, 
location, and location”. 
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Future study might subdivide the housing market into submarkets of even smaller scale to 
get better results. 
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Appendix A: Hedonic models of district-building type submarkets 
 
 
 
Table A-1 Baoshan, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.6164 1.33 0.192 
Number of bedrooms 6.9934 4.69 0.000 
Number of living rooms 1.0095 0.51 0.616 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 1.9251 0.47 0.640 
Full commodity rights  2.4414 0.63 0.532 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -0.5175 -0.55 0.582 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -0.2919 -0.16 0.872 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -0.7483 0.57 0.574 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -2.7376 -1.58 0.123 
Distance to all subway stations (km) -1.4427 -1.42 0.164 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) 0.2666 0.37 0.715 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) 1.2582 1.13 0.265 
Distance to the major roads (km) 6.4485 3.15 0.003 
Constant 9.7382   0.75 0.457 
 Obs=52 F=6.48 R2 = 0.6892
 
 
Table A-2 Changing, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coeffici
ent 
t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.1194 0.42 0.677 
Number of bedrooms 8.3878 9.24 0.000 
Number of living rooms 9.8022 8.23 0.000 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 1.5524 0.94 0.348 
Full commodity rights  5.4556 2.82 0.006 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -1.2811 -0.82 0.416 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -3.6792 -1.10 0.274 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) 1.7030 0.66 0.508 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) 0.7465 0.34 0.734 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 1.7838 0.78 0.440 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -2.6105 -1.40 0.163 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -1.7553 -1.33 0.186 
Distance to the major roads (km) -9.9618 -1.54 0.126 
Constant 40.8271  1.61 0.110 
 Obs=123 F=30.16 R2 = 0.7825
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Table A-3 Hongkou, High-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.5906 0.99 0.345 
Number of bedrooms 15.5863 2.29 0.043 
Number of living rooms 15.4789 2.36 0.038 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights -9.3115 -0.96 0.357 
Full commodity rights  Dropped   
Distance to shopping centers (km) 2.1592 0.17 0.871 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -7.8203 -0.39 0.702 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -1.2715 -0.04 0.969 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -9.8589 -0.25 0.811 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 6.0324 0.27 0.795 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -16.4039 -0.75 0.471 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -11.2570 -0.40 0.696 
Distance to the major roads (km) 30.3561 0.80 0.443 
Constant 244.588   0.98 0.348 
 Obs=24 F=3.49 R2 = 0.7921 
 
 
 
Table A-4 Hongkou, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.3523 0.91 0.367 
Number of bedrooms 8.1743 6.98 0.000 
Number of living rooms 5.0509 3.27 0.002 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 2.6512 1.00 0.323 
Full commodity rights  3.1790 1.38 0.173 
Distance to shopping centers (km) 0.1912 0.12 0.906 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -0.0592 -0.02 0.983 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -1.7589 -0.81 0.422 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) 0.7873 0.31 0.761 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 2.1946 0.76 0.449 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.7458 -0.24 0.808 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) 0.0425 0.01 0.989 
Distance to the major roads (km) 0.5579 0.08 0.936 
Constant 2.3706   0.06 0.955 
 Obs=78 F=11.98 R2 = 0.7087
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Table A-5 Jing’an, New lane house 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 11.4503 2.76 0.012 
Number of bedrooms 20.0800 9.01 0.000 
Number of living rooms 12.2614 0.54 0.596 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights Dropped   
Full commodity rights  -0.9400 -0.05 0.961 
Distance to shopping centers (km) 55.8380 2.47 0.022 
Distance to all open spaces (km) 13.7807 0.57 0.578 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -9.9505 -0.79 0.440 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -8.0265 -0.24 0.812 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 3.8909 0.16 0.873 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -5.8103 -0.24 0.810 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -11.1021 -0.78 0.443 
Distance to the major roads (km) 40.3986 0.41 0.685 
Constant 39.7620  0.13 0.897 
 Obs=33 F=22.61 R2 = 0.9314
 
 
 
Table A-6 Jing’an, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.0569 0.10 0.921 
Number of bedrooms 9.6594 6.52 0.000 
Number of living rooms 7.2464 2.65 0.013 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 3.8569 1.27 0.214 
Full commodity rights  4.2868 1.35 0.186 
Distance to shopping centers (km) 2.5557 0.59 0.558 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -5.7469 -0.90 0.376 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) 0.2183 0.11 0.912 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -8.0783 -0.91 0.368 
Distance to all subway stations (km) -0.0039 0.00 0.999 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) 1.3720 0.19 0.848 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) 0.0494 0.01 0.991 
Distance to the major roads (km) -3.7979 -0.29 0.773 
Constant -11.4294 -0.12 0.907 
 Obs=45 F=8.29 R2 =0.7766 
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Table A-7 Luwan, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor -0.7976 -0.80 0.428 
Number of bedrooms 5.5115 1.89 0.070 
Number of living rooms 14.8910 2.68 0.012 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 0.8477 0.20 0.847 
Full commodity rights  8.2779 1.21 0.238 
Distance to shopping centers (km) 1.9515 0.05 0.958 
Distance to all open spaces (km) 4.1968 0.71 0.481 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) 0.3512 0.01 0.991 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -1.0686 -1.12 0.272 
Distance to all subway stations (km) -4.1912 -0.40 0.690 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) 2.9769 0.26 0.798 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -1.7457 -0.52 0.606 
Distance to the major roads (km) 32.5975 1.68 0.105 
Constant -26.7966 -0.17 0.863 
 Obs=42 F=6.92 R2 =0.7627  
 
 
 
Table A-8 Minghang, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.5118 1.60 0.112 
Number of bedrooms 5.5687 6.49 0.000 
Number of living rooms 6.5702 4.22 0.000 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights -3.7250 -0.86 0.391 
Full commodity rights  -1.3946 -0.31 0.755 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -2.3817 -0.97 0.336 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -0.2040 -0.17 0.867 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -0.1508 -0.19 0.850 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) 0.5807 3.08 0.003 
Distance to all subway stations (km) -0.7571 -0.71 0.479 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.6151 -3.33 0.001 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) 1.2395 0.43 0.667 
Distance to the major roads (km) 2.4515 1.63 0.106 
Constant 14.1475 1.92 0.057 
 Obs=128 F=16.92 R2 =0.6586 
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Table A-9 Pudong, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor -0.1098 -0.69 0.493 
Number of bedrooms 4.5546 7.93 0.000 
Number of living rooms 1.3318 1.67 0.100 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 1.2615 1.04 0.305 
Full commodity rights  1.6825 1.39 0.169 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -0.3236 -0.80 0.425 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -0.2657 -0.42 0.676 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) 0.2341 0.61 0.543 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -0.1661 -1.46 0.150 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 0.4706 0.63 0.530 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.0489 -0.18 0.861 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) 0.0208 0.09 0.930 
Distance to the major roads (km) -0.2194 -0.28 0.777 
Constant 3.4136 0.79 0.435 
 Obs=69 F=6.47 R2 =0.6045  
 
 
 
Table A-10 Putuo, High-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.1785 0.72 0.476 
Number of bedrooms 12.6701 3.33 0.002 
Number of living rooms 8.7873 3.02 0.005 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 0.3194 0.08 0.933 
Full commodity rights  Dropped   
Distance to shopping centers (km) 2.1429 1.02 0.315 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -11.5810 -2.50 0.018 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -9.7606 -3.38 0.002 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) 0.4617 1.55 0.132 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 4.4797 1.38 0.177 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) 4.9680 1.45 0.156 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) 2.5318 0.44 0.662 
Distance to the major roads (km) -13.8705 -0.95 0.35 
Constant -68.6655 -1.41 0.168 
 Obs=44 F=7.39 R2 =0.7409  
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Table A-11 Putuo, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.1054 0.51 0.614 
Number of bedrooms 7.7971 10.25 0.000 
Number of living rooms 7.7216 8.10 0.000 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 2.4530 1.38 0.169 
Full commodity rights  1.6083 0.94 0.350 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -0.4234 -0.66 0.513 
Distance to all open spaces (km) 2.4561 1.36 0.175 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -3.0763 -2.49 0.014 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) 0.0794 0.63 0.528 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 0.1706 0.13 0.900 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) 1.5222 1.38 0.168 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -0.5904 -0.37 0.711 
Distance to the major roads (km) 5.5966 1.16 0.248 
Constant -22.6545 -1.37 0.173 
 Obs=219 F=24.63 R2 =0.6097 
 
 
 
Table A-12 Xuhui, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor -0.3053 -0.56 0.574 
Number of bedrooms 28.2837 38.58 0.000 
Number of living rooms 4.2327 1.38 0.170 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights -4.3827 -1.20 0.235 
Full commodity rights  -0.8413 -0.18 0.855 
Distance to shopping centers (km) 1.0804 0.46 0.646 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -4.0259 -0.93 0.355 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) 1.4986 0.32 0.753 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) 2.0516 2.42 0.017 
Distance to all subway stations (km) -0.9945 -0.22 0.829 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) 3.6761 0.82 0.413 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) 0.7115 0.28 0.780 
Distance to the major roads (km) -21.0582 -1.90 0.060 
Constant -70.5523 -1.30 0.197 
 Obs=103 F=155.53 R2 =0.9578 
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Table A-13 Yangpu, High-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor -0.4448 -1.21 0.251 
Number of bedrooms 12.3598 3.08 0.011 
Number of living rooms 18.3822 3.65 0.004 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 0.6187 0.12 0.910 
Full commodity rights  Dropped   
Distance to shopping centers (km) -9.2400 -1.44 0.177 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -6.9721 -0.84 0.419 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) 4.0102 0.41 0.692 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -9.3518 -1.18 0.263 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 6.3469 1.04 0.321 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -2.0153 -0.10 0.921 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -10.0687 -0.47 0.645 
Distance to the major roads (km) 35.7978 2.00 0.071 
Constant 106.7104 0.38 0.708 
 Obs=24 F=8.49 R2 = 0.9025 
 
 
 
Table A-14 Yangpu, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor -0.1472 -0.90 0.370 
Number of bedrooms 5.6013 8.94 0.000 
Number of living rooms 6.7828 8.33 0.000 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 2.9404 3.12 0.002 
Full commodity rights  6.1265 5.99 0.000 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -0.3658 -0.35 0.726 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -1.8812 -2.00 0.048 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -0.6700 -0.54 0.590 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -0.0492 -0.14 0.888 
Distance to all subway stations (km) -0.5277 -0.53 0.597 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) 1.8552 0.90 0.371 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) 1.5568 0.76 0.449 
Distance to the major roads (km) 5.3845 1.99 0.049 
Constant -18.3259 -0.69 0.495 
 Obs=124 F=28.74 R2 =0.7726 
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Table A-15 Zhabei, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.1150 0.70 0.489 
Number of bedrooms 6.0297 8.05 0.000 
Number of living rooms 4.9284 4.93 0.000 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 3.6465 2.41 0.021 
Full commodity rights  5.7530 3.79 0.001 
Distance to shopping centers (km) 3.2105 1.14 0.260 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -1.5319 -1.05 0.301 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) 0.0686 0.03 0.977 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -3.8265 -1.52 0.136 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 2.0931 1.27 0.213 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -2.0606 -1.92 0.062 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -1.8080 -0.96 0.345 
Distance to the major roads (km) -8.6873 -1.99 0.053 
Constant 41.2624 1.99 0.054 
 Obs=53 F=17.63 R2 =0.8556 
 
 
Table A-16 New Huangpu46, Multi-rise apartment 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor -0.7816 -0.95 0.360 
Number of bedrooms 6.5422 2.76 0.015 
Number of living rooms 10.0664 2.79 0.014 
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 5.8803 2.43 0.029 
Full commodity rights  0.8078 0.11 0.913 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -3.7448 -0.89 0.386 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -2.2876 -0.53 0.605 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -1.1248 -0.27 0.788 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -0.2787 -0.95 0.360 
Distance to all subway stations (km) -2.0056 -0.48 0.636 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -2.9715 -1.02 0.325 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -1.7711 -0.41 0.689 
Distance to the major roads (km) -2.2212 -0.16 0.878 
Constant 51.0148 1.12 0.283 
 obs=28 F=4.70 R2 = 0.8134 
 
                                                 
46 Nanshi District and the old Huangpu District were combined in July, 2000. The new district is 
named Huangpu District. This research uses New Huangpu to distinguish it from the old Huangpu 
district.  
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Appendix B: Hedonic models of price surface-based submarkets 
 
 
Table B-1 Core surface-New Lane Apartments 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 11.5995    3.45    0.002     
Number of bedrooms 18.4894   10.11    0.000     
Number of living rooms 19.1760   1.09    0.285    
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 10.7300 0.52 0.604 
Full commodity rights  -1.6155   -0.10    0.924    
Distance to shopping centers (km) 48.4601    3.05    0.005     
Distance to all open spaces (km) 16.1511   1.09    0.284    
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -15.7426   -1.86    0.072    
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -27.3477  -2.27    0.030    
Distance to all subway stations (km) 1.5832   0.11    0.911     
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) 5.6298   1.36    0.183    
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -10.6933   -1.08    0.288    
Distance to the major roads (km) 19.9581  0.33   0.743    
Constant -102.1035   -1.61    0.117    
 Obs=45 F=27.36 R2 = 0.9198
 
 
Table B-2 Core surface-Multi-rise apartments 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor -0.3603  -0.49    0.624    
Number of bedrooms 28.3209   33.22    0.000      
Number of living rooms 9.3033   1.78    0.081    
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights -5.0211 -1.01 0.319 
Full commodity rights  -6.9288   -1.10    0.276    
Distance to shopping centers (km) 3.4957   0.38    0.703    
Distance to all open spaces (km) -4.7442   -0.79    0.434    
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -1.8051   -0.47    0.642       
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -2.7825   -0.37    0.715     
Distance to all subway stations (km) 2.7377   0.39    0.695    
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.6976   -0.50    0.617    
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -1.4339   -0.33    0.740    
Distance to the major roads (km) -39.6054   -1.63   0.109    
Constant -6.2110   -0.30    0.763    
 Obs=75 F=135.57 R2 = 0.9665
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Table B-3 Middle surface-Old lane house 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.3080   0.46    0.656    
Number of bedrooms 3.2280   4.47    0.002     
Number of living rooms 7.5303    3.95    0.003     
Lease-only rights dropped   
Partial commodity rights -5.7617 -2.38 0.041 
Full commodity rights  dropped   
Distance to shopping centers (km) -3.6036   -2.96    0.016    
Distance to all open spaces (km) -2.6135   -1.19    0.265    
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) 5.7979   3.44    0.007     
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -1.8484   -1.91    0.088    
Distance to all subway stations (km) -0.3948   -0.19    0.852    
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) 0.4663   1.14    0.282    
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) 2.5690   1.16    0.276     
Distance to the major roads (km) 13.5830   1.83    0.101    
Constant -1.9843  -0.30    0.772    
 Obs=22 F=16.44 R2 = 0.9564
 
 
 
Table B-4 Middle surface-new lane house 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 6.8548   1.97    0.085    
Number of bedrooms 13.7387   6.63    0.000     
Number of living rooms 5.3653   0.99    0.351    
Lease-only rights dropped   
Partial commodity rights -6.0358   -0.54    0.607     
Full commodity rights  dropped   
Distance to shopping centers (km) 4.6227   0.85    0.422    
Distance to all open spaces (km) 2.0570   0.13    0.900    
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -2.6183   -0.39    0.703    
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -1.1645   -0.34    0.742    
Distance to all subway stations (km) 2.66403   0.14    0.892    
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -1.5649   -0.55    0.600    
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -11.1394   -1.52    0.168    
Distance to the major roads (km) 26.7451   1.34    0.217    
Constant 3.6640   0.09    0.928    
 Obs=21 F=34.81 R2= 0.9812 
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Table B-5 Middle surface-high-rise apartments 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.2649   1.21    0.230     
Number of bedrooms 13.3812   5.12    0.000     
Number of living rooms 13.7821   4.92    0.000     
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 4.6860   1.36    0.176     
Full commodity rights  dropped   
Distance to shopping centers (km) -2.2720   -1.28    0.203    
Distance to all open spaces (km) -5.6664   -1.23    0.223    
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -5.3405   -2.23    0.028     
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) 2.1084   1.24    0.220    
Distance to all subway stations (km) 4.3168   0.79    0.430    
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.7439   -1.10    0.274    
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -0.9839   -0.51    0.613     
Distance to the major roads (km) 24.1118     2.04    0.045     
Constant 2.1044    0.15    0.880    
 Obs=95 F=10.94 R2 = 0.6155
 
 
 
Table B-6 Middle surface-multi-rise apartments 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor -0.0375   -0.21    0.835    
Number of bedrooms 9.3514   14.64    0.000     
Number of living rooms 8.9640   11.39    0.000     
Lease-only rights dropped   
Partial commodity rights 3.7055 3.12 0.002 
Full commodity rights  1.9481   1.80    0.072     
Distance to shopping centers (km) -0.6730   -1.39    0.164    
Distance to all open spaces (km) -0.1217   -0.10    0.917    
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) 0.7990   0.97    0.334    
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -1.3538   -2.48    0.014    
Distance to all subway stations (km) -0.2825   -0.26    0.794    
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.2466   -1.31    0.192    
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) 0.5229   1.08    0.283    
Distance to the major roads (km) -2.3942  -0.77   0.442    
Constant 3.1338   0.91    0.363    
 Obs=389 F=54.49 R2 = 0.6538
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Table B-7 Peripheral Surface-high-rise apartments 
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor -0.0728     -0.36    0.720     
Number of bedrooms 10.9451   4.21    0.000     
Number of living rooms 5.3736   1.45    0.154     
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 4.7493    1.82    0.076     
Full commodity rights  Dropped   
Distance to shopping centers (km) 0.8971   0.86    0.394     
Distance to all open spaces (km) 0.2086   0.07    0.941     
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -1.1332   -1.24    0.222     
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) 0.4363   0.45    0.657     
Distance to all subway stations (km) -0.5431   -0.28    0.785     
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.3466   -0.48    0.634     
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -0.6450   -0.57    0.573     
Distance to the major roads (km) 11.0792   1.87    0.069     
Constant -0.2317   -0.02    0.986    
 Obs=50 F=5.38 R2 = 0.6356 
 
 
 
Table B-8 Peripheral Surface-multi-rise apartments  
 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.2831   2.71    0.007     
Number of bedrooms 6.4401   19.55    0.000     
Number of living rooms 4.1640   9.55   0.000     
Lease-only rights Dropped   
Partial commodity rights 4.2729 5.59 0.000 
Full commodity rights  2.6605   3.59    0.000     
Distance to shopping centers (km) -0.7348   -6.79    0.000    
Distance to all open spaces (km) -0.5930  -1.46    0.145     
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -0.3224  -2.27    0.024    
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -0.1324  -0.92    0.359    
Distance to all subway stations (km) 0.3764   1.81   0.070    
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.2914   -3.99  0.000    
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -0.1820   -1.10   0.272    
Distance to the major roads (km) 1.8816   4.20   0.000     
Constant 4.0516   2.70    0.007    
 Obs=600 F=78.31 R2 = 0.6347
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Appendix C: Hedonic models of different property right types 
 
Table C-1 Results of hedonic price model- right type 1 (lease-only type) 
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.1493 0.71 0.480 
Number of bedrooms 5.3306 12.47 0.000 
Number of living rooms 4.3840 3.21 0.001 
Building type 0.3721 1.69 0.092 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -1.6758 -5.80 0.000 
Distance to all open spaces (km) -0.8964 -1.33 0.186 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -0.1925 -0.68 0.500 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 1.4957 3.01 0.003 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -0.5270 -4.32 0.000 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.3270 -1.92 0.056 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -0.5530 -1.75 0.081 
Distance to the major roads (km) 3.1460 2.92 0.004 
Constant -3.3330 -1.10 0.270 
  F=32.23 R2 = 0.5826
 
 
 
Table C-2 Results of hedonic price model-right type 2  
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.3965 2.09 0.037 
Number of bedrooms 22.7863   39.31    0.000 
Number of living rooms 1.6741 1.28 0.202 
Building type 2.7914 1.38 0.169 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -1.3364 -3.40 0.001 
Distance to all open spaces (km) 1.1817 0.90 0.370 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -0.9554 -2.36 0.019 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 0.5340    0.70 0.482 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) 0.4573 1.57 0.117 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.1807 -0.83 0.405 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) 0.1500   0.34 0.734 
Distance to the major roads (km) -0.0722 -0.05 0.959 
Constant -31.18807   -3.42    0.001    
  F=141.87 R2 = 0.8025
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Table C-3 Results of hedonic price model-right type 3  
Variable Coefficient t value P > | t | 
Floor 0.6797 4.65 0.000 
Number of bedrooms 13.8742 25.42 0.000 
Number of living rooms 7.0104 6.91 0.000 
Building type -4.1107 -3.04 0.002 
Distance to shopping centers (km) -1.5699 -4.42 0.000 
Distance to all open spaces (km) 0.4188 0.32 0.750 
Distance to FDI planned zones (km) -1.1025 -3.06 0.002 
Distance to foreigners’ residential areas (km) -0.2537 -1.46 0.144 
Distance to all subway stations (km) 1.1448 1.66 0.096 
Distance to newly-built urban areas (km) -0.7807 -3.55 0.000 
Distance to large-scale renewed urban areas (km) -0.9429 -1.95 0.052 
Distance to the major roads (km) 3.1435 2.05 0.041 
Constant -20.9453 3.12 0.002 
  F=101.30 R2 = 0.6572
 
 
Table C-4 Significant and insignificant variables of the three models 
Significant 
variables 
1. Number of bedrooms; 2. Number of living rooms; 3. 
Building type; 4. Distance to shopping centers; 5. Distance to 
all subway stations; 6. Distance to foreigners’ residential 
areas; 7. Distance to newly-built urban areas; 8. Distance to 
large-scale renewed urban areas; 9. Distance to the major 
roads 
Property 
right 
model 1 
Insignificant 
variables 
1. Floor; 2. Distance to all open spaces; 3. Distance to FDI 
planned zones 
Significant 
variables 
1. Number of bedrooms; 2. Distance to shopping centers; 3. 
Distance to FDI planned zones 
Property 
right 
model 2 Insignificant 
variables 
1. Floor; 2. Number of living rooms; 3. Building type; 4. 
Distance to all open spaces; 5. Distance to all subway 
stations; 6. Distance to foreigners’ residential areas; 7. 
Distance to newly-built urban areas; 8. Distance to large-scale 
renewed urban areas; 9. Distance to the major roads 
Significant 
variables 
1. Floor; 2. Number of bedrooms; 3. Number of living rooms 
4. Building type; 5. Distance to shopping centers; 6. Distance 
to FDI planned zones; 7. Distance to all subway stations; 8. 
Distance to newly-built urban areas; 9. Distance to large-scale 
renewed urban areas; 10. Distance to the major roads 
Property 
right 
model 3 
Insignificant 
variables 
1. Distance to all open spaces; 2. Distance to foreigners’ 
residential areas 
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NANJING UNIVERSITY        Nanjing, CHINA 
Master of Science in Land Management     07/2001 
 Specialization: land planning and appraisal 
B.S. in Land Management and Real Estate Development  07/1998 
 
AWARDS 
 Graduate Student Fellowship. Indiana University- Bloomington. 2001 
 National Excellent Graduate Student Scholarship. Nanjing University. 2000  
 RenMing Scholarship. Nanjing University. 1997, 1996 and 1995 
 GuangHua Scholarship. Nanjing University. 1996  
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
 Assistant Instructor, “Advanced GIS”, 01/2004-05/2004 
 Assistant Instructor, “Introduction to GIS”, 09/2003-12/2003 
 Instructor, “Introduction to Human Geography”, 05/2003-06/2003  
 Assistant Instructor, “Introduction to Human Geography”, 01/2003-05/2003  
 
EXPERIENCE 
VANKE GROUP INC.       Shanghai, CHINA 
Project Consultant (summer intern)      06/2002-09/2002 
 Collected demographic, economic and market data; predicted population, 
household income, economic development, and land supply for each city; prepared the 
social and economic development reports of the major cities in Yangtze River Delta for 
investment purpose; conducted revenue prediction for the possible projects in these cities; 
presented the results to the board of directors 
REAL ESTATE INSTITUTE OF NANJING UNIVERSITY  Nanjing, CHIA 
Junior Consultant (Part-time)      09/1998-07/2001 
 Worked as a team member to set up the parameter system for appraising the land 
value of Jiangsu Providential Petroleum and Chemical Corporation; led a 5 person group 
to prepare the final project report  
ADDITIONAL 
Computer Skills: SPSS, Minitab, Stata, Word, Excel, ArcGIS, MapInfo, Fragstats,  
Language Skills: Native speaker of Chinese Mandarin, English  
